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Modern Philosophy has never been able to quite shake off the Cartesian idea of
the mind, as something that “resides”—such is the term—in the pineal gland.
Everybody laughs at this nowadays, and yet everybody continues to think of mind
in this same general way, as something within this person or that, belonging to
him and correlative to the real world.
— Charles S. Pierce

Every great advance in science has issued from a new audacity of imagination.
— John Dewey
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Abstract

A revolution is afoot in the cognitive sciences. For decades, the received view has been that
all forms of cognitive activity need to be explained by appealing to mental representations
and the sort of computational mechanisms by which these representations are manipulated
and transformed. This received view is now being questioned by those who defend radical,
non-representational approaches to cognition. This dissertation takes issue with one specific
radical approach: the radical enactive account of cognition, or REC. My overall goal is to
articulate a positive, complementary relationship between REC and a series of already existing approaches in the cognitive sciences in the form of ecological psychology and similaritybased theories in cognitive neuroscience. I hold that it is by incorporating these scientific
frameworks into REC that we can build a theoretically sound, empirically robust positive
alternative to both representationalism and other forms of enactivism. This dissertation is
composed of five autonomous but thematically intertwined papers, all of them presented as
independent chapters. The first paper is devoted to discussing different objections to the
possibility of a radical embodied cognitive science. The second paper focuses on the debate
about plant intelligence from a radical embodied perspective. The third chapter problematizes the notion of structural or S-representation and explicates how neutrally-based
structural similarities can play an explanatory role in a radical enactive cognitive neuroscience.
The last two papers explore the complementarities between REC and ecological psychology,
presenting the case for a full-blown alliance between both frameworks.

2

Acknowledgments

Philosophy is commonly depicted as a solitary activity. According to this widely endorsed
cliché, doing philosophy involves being alone with your thoughts, preferably sited in an armchair, and with a glass of—please, insert your favorite alcoholic beverage here. I have no clue
where this image comes from, but I am sure of something: this has not been the case for me.
During my academic life I have had the opportunity to meet a lot of incredible people and I
am certain that my current philosophical skills would have not been the same if it wasn’t
because of my conversation and collaboration with them. I hope the following words will
serve to express my gratitude to all who have contributed, directly or indirectly, to this thesis.
First of all, I am grateful to my primary supervisor, Dan Hutto, for having trusted me
with this amazing research opportunity. It is a privilege to find a supervisor with the same
philosophical affinities and, even more importantly, someone whose door is always open for
any question or doubt you may have. But, rather than being just my supervisor, Dan has been
a mentor for me. If I leave the University of Wollongong being a better philosopher, it is, no
doubt, because of him.
I am also indebted to Michael Kirchhoff (co-supervisor), who has worked tirelessly in
helping me shape the arguments of this dissertation. This thesis would not have been possible
without his dedication, and I sincerely hope I may return the favor someday. My gratitude
also goes to Glenda Satne (associate supervisor), whose help was crucial at the first stages of
my Ph.D. Glenda and Michael have been essential for the completion of this project, and I
am immensely grateful to them for this.
Paco Calvo occupies an important position in this list, and he does so for various reasons. He introduced me to ecological psychology for the first time, and convinced me—
under threat of killing me if I did not accept the scholarship offer—to come to Australia to
do my Ph.D. Also, he taught me about plant intelligence, and the potential this research has
for developing a non-representational science of the mind. This common interest led us into
an active collaboration from which I keep learning. I consider Paco one of my mentors, and
I am proud he considers me a colleague now.

3

Next, I want to express my gratitude to my colleagues, especially Alan (my original
partner in crime), Anco, Russell, and Nick. It is impossible to determine how much our
countless pub discussions have contributed to this thesis, and how important their emotional
support has been for the completion of this project. Writing a doctoral dissertation in philosophy is a long and frustrating process, but it is less so if you are surrounded by good
friends who share your love and passion for the discipline. I am deeply indebted to them and
I will do my best to keep collaborating with them in the future for they have a brilliant career
ahead.
I also want to express my gratitude to my friends in Australia, including Sonia, Núria,
Liz, Adam, Leo, Kai, Jo, Charlie, Kris, Janne, Lies, Alfie and many others. Every time I
needed help, advice, or just someone to have a beer with, they have been there, and I am
afraid I will never be able to return all they have done for me. Of especial importance have
been Sonia and Núria, with whom I formed a little Spanish family when I needed it most.
Thanks for all.
I hope the reader will forgive me if I continue in Spanish.
Tengo la extraordinaria suerte de contar con la amistad de Vicente, Manuel y Lorena.
Si pienso en los últimos cuatro años, me doy cuenta de que nuestros debates y discusiones
sobre psicología ecológica están en la raíz de muchas de las ideas desarrolladas en esta tesis.
Sólo espero poder seguir colaborando con ellos en el futuro, porque su amistad me sostiene
y porque son una fuente constante de inspiración.
Me gustaría tener unas palabras para aquellos que me introdujeron en la filosofía. Si
pienso en mis primeros maestros, tres nombres me vienen inmediatamente a la mente: Antonio Peris, José Ignacio Nájera y Patricio Peñalver. Fue gracias a ellos que descubrí la belleza
de la filosofía y lo importante que es filosofar. Gracias por tanto, maestros.
Quisiera incluir en esta lista a mis amigos más queridos. Antonio Hidalgo, quien para
mi mejor representa las virtudes del filósofo; los Margaritos, compañeros de tantas fiestas y
vivencias; Sonia, a la que debo tanto de mi formación emocional; y, por último, Laura y
Omar, porque estaban ahí cuando más frío hacía. Quizás no lo saben, pero también hay algo
de ellos en esta tesis.
Sin duda, el mayor de los agradecimientos va para mi familia. A mis padres, por su
esfuerzo, sacrificio y dedicación, que me han permitido llegar hasta donde estoy ahora. A mi
hermana, mi cuñado y mis sobrinos, por ser un apoyo constante durante toda mi vida y por

4

hacer todo mejor a mi alrededor. Aunque a veces me queje de ellos, me siento afortunado
por tener la familia que tengo.
Para terminar, tengo que dedicar unas palabras a Ana. Es difícil expresar toda la gratitud y amor que siento por ella. Ana ha estado siempre ahí en los últimos años de mi vida, e
incluso estuvo dispuesta a cruzarse el mundo para estar juntos. No puedo imaginar la vida
sin ella, y no quiero hacerlo, porque ella es irremplazable. Su inteligencia y cariño son pilares
esenciales en mi día a día. Sólo deseo que aguantemos de pie, para que podamos seguir dando
vueltas. Esta tesis va dedicada a ella.
I am sure I forget very important people I am grateful to. I hope they can forgive me,
but I will be happy to buy them a beer if they can’t.

5

Certification

I, Miguel Segundo Ortin, declare that this thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the conferral of the degree Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) from the University of Wollongong,
is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. This document has not
been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.
This thesis has been prepared in journal article compilation style format, according to the
official guidelines approved by the University of Wollongong. Some of the chapters included
in this thesis are reproductions of co-authored articles of which I am the first author. These
chapters are preceded by a signed certification that details the contributions of each author.

Miguel Segundo Ortin
19th June 2019

6

List of Names or Abbreviations

AOR

Action Oriented Representation

AP

Action Potential

DST

Dynamical Systems Theory

HPC

Hard Problem of Content

IBE

Inference to the Best Explanation

IOE

Inference to the Only Explanation

IT

Indispensability Thesis

NCT

Niche Construction Theory

NtCS

Non-trivial Causal Spread

PP

Predictive Processing

REC

Radical Enactive Cognition/Radical Enactivism

SBC

Similarity-Based Cognition

VP

Variation Potential

7

Table of Contents

1 General Introduction .................................................................................................................11
Preparatory remarks ............................................................................................................................ 11
Literature review .................................................................................................................................... 13
The Embodiment Thesis ................................................................................................................ 13
Embodied cognitive science: General principles ................................................................. 17
A tale of moderates and radicals ............................................................................................... 20
The varieties of enactivism ........................................................................................................... 23
Overview of the thesis ....................................................................................................................... 27
2 No cognitive science without representation? .......................................................................31
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 32
No cognitive science without representation: The Indispensability Thesis ................... 34
The deductive argument .................................................................................................................... 35
The inference to the only explanation.......................................................................................... 39
The argument from positive abduction ....................................................................................... 44
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 51
3 Are plants cognitive? Plant intelligence from a radical embodied perspective .................53
Extra! Extra! A new war on cognition!........................................................................................... 55
On adaptive behavior and decision-making.............................................................................. 57
On anticipatory behavior ................................................................................................................... 61
On learning and memory .................................................................................................................. 63
The ‘nervous’ system of plants ........................................................................................................ 67
Conclusion: Resituating (plant) cognition ................................................................................... 70
4 Similarity-based cognition: Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience .................73
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 75
Similarity-based cognition in cognitive neuroscience ........................................................... 76
The case for structural representations ....................................................................................... 79
The case against structural representations............................................................................... 82
A further case against structural representations .................................................................... 87
Conclusion: Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience .......................................... 92

8

5 Ecological psychology is radical enough ................................................................................95
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 97
A primer on ecological psychology ............................................................................................... 98
Radical enactivism meets ecological psychology ................................................................. 100
Information at the ecological scale ............................................................................................ 104
No need for RECtification: Specificity and meaning without content .......................... 109
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 116
6 Enriching Radical Enactive Cognition ................................................................................... 118
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 119
Putting REC to the test .................................................................................................................... 120
On the nature of REC ....................................................................................................................... 121
Going radical? Go ecological! ....................................................................................................... 124
Emphasizing information........................................................................................................... 124
From the extensive mind to the ecological stance.......................................................... 131
Learning and evolution as key explanatory aspects ....................................................... 135
On what (cognitive) scientific explanations require ............................................................. 139
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 142
7 General discussion .................................................................................................................. 143
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 148
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 170

9

List of Tables, Figures and Illustrations

Figures
1.1

Illustration of the structure of the female cricket’s auditory system

16

1.2

Schema of the brain-body-environment conceptualized as a dynamical system

19

2.1

Transformations in the optic array brought forth by the observer’s movements

43

3.1

Training and testing protocol for associative learning in pea plants

65

3.2

Distribution and network of vascular tissue in a single stem layer of Papaya

68

4.1

Activation profile of a place cell

78

4.2

Structure of the training mazes used by Johnson and Redish (2007)

90

5.1

Centrifugal expansion optic flow in the direction of locomotion

111

5.2

Schema of the optical expansion of an object as it approaches the agent

111

6.1

Co-dependence of perception and action according to ecological psychology

127

Tables
1.1

Differences between orthodox, embodied, and radical embodied cognitive science 21

10

Chapter 1
General Introduction

Preparatory remarks

These are exciting times for those who work in the sciences of cognition. Thanks in part to
the work of philosophers, cognitive scientists begin to slowly move away from two fundamental assumptions about the nature of cognition. The first assumption is that cognition is
confined to the head. The second assumption is that cognition always and everywhere involves the manipulation of (mental) representations.
The first assumption is being questioned, among others, by those who defend that
cognition is embodied. To say that cognition is embodied is to say that body and environment
are constitutive parts of the machinery that brings about cognitive behavior. Those who think
that cognition is embodied reject that we can explain cognitive behavior solely by paying
attention to what occurs in the organisms’ brain.1
The second assumption is being questioned by proponents of radical embodied cognitive
science. Proponents of radical embodied cognitive science hypothesize that we can account
for a number of cognitive phenomena—ranging from perception and motor control to some
forms of imagination and memory—without positing mental representations and the series
of computational mechanisms by which these representations are manipulated and transformed.
This thesis takes issue with this radical line of thought. To appreciate the radicalism of
this proposal, we need to take into consideration the importance that representationalism, as
a research paradigm, has for contemporary cognitive scientists. It is not an exaggeration to
say that the notion of mental representation is one of the cornerstones of mainstream cognitive science, with numerous research frameworks dedicated to finding those
representations and describing how they causally interact to produce various forms of cognitive behavior. As Bechtel (2016) tells us, most of the research in cognitive science

Other approaches that are contributing to overcome the traditional neurocentric view of cognition
are the extended, embedded, enactive, and ecological approaches. This thesis will focus primarily on
the enactive and ecological approaches as radical versions of the embodied cognition approach.
1
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is explicitly devoted to identifying representations and determining how they are
constructed and used in information-processing mechanisms that control behavior.
Characterizing neural processes as representations is not viewed as just a convenient
way of talking about brain processes. The research is predicated on these processes
being representations; the explanatory tasks they devote themselves to are identifying those neural processes that are representations, figuring out what their content
is, and how these representations are then used in controlling behavior. (pp. 12931294)
The radicalism of radical embodied theories of cognition consists, precisely, in that
they put in question what most cognitive scientists take for granted—namely, that all forms
of cognitive activity are best explained in representational terms. In fact, many consider that
appealing to mental representations is indispensable to explain any form of cognitive activity,
thus blocking the possibility of a radical embodied science of cognition. The second chapter
of this thesis is devoted to dealing with this objection. It argues that the main arguments for
the indispensability of mental representations in every cognitive explanation are flawed. If
that analysis proves sound there are no substantive reasons to neglect, prior to further investigation, the possibility that at least some cognitive behaviors might be best explained in
radical, non-representational terms.
Those convinced of the possibility of non-representational explanations of cognitive
activity may think of radical embodied cognitive science as a sort of counter-revolution. I
think this picture is only partially accurate. For one thing, it is true that radical embodied
theories of cognition are pushing to invert the tendency of assuming that all forms of cognition involve and are best explained by mental representations. But it is a mistake to define
such theories by what they reject only. Instead, radical embodied theories seek to overcome
representational theories of mind by advancing new explanatory hypotheses, tools, models,
practices, and concepts for the study of cognition-driven behavior. Hence, rather than a simple revolution in reverse, radical embodied cognitive science seems to constitute a genuine
paradigm shift in the discipline.
I think that articulating this paradigm shift—namely, determining what concepts and
explanatory constructs are required to make sense of the different varieties of cognitive activity, showing how these concepts and constructs fit the available empirical evidence, and
so on—is a task about which philosophers have much to say. This thesis aims to contribute
to this philosophical work. It does so by focusing on one specific radical approach: the radical
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enactive account of cognition, or REC, as recently developed by Hutto and Myin (2013,
2017).
Usually, critics of REC accuse it of either not bringing forth any positive hypothesis
or offering merely sketchy explanations for the kind of cognitive phenomena it targets. Under such a lens, REC is seen as being at a clear disadvantage in regard to other radical
embodied approaches, and it is charged for not being a genuine scientific alternative. My
overall goal in the second part of the thesis [Chapters 4 to 6] is to defend that REC can
address this objection if it is complemented with already-existing scientific approaches in
cognitive science. In making this case I focus on similarity-based theories in cognitive neuroscience and ecological psychology. My main thesis is that by partnering these scientific
approaches with a REC framework we can build a theoretically sound, empirically robust
positive alternative to both representationalism and other forms of enactivism.

Literature review
The Embodiment Thesis

Ask not what’s inside your head but what your head’s inside of.
— William Mace
The view that cognition is embodied has grown in popularity among philosophers and cognitive scientists in recent times. Embodied cognition, Adams (2010a) tells us, “is sweeping
the planet” (p. 619). But, what is embodied cognition? Due to the diversity of approaches
that fall under the banner of embodied cognition, it seems reasonable to understand it as a
research program, instead of as a well-defined theory of cognition, as Shapiro (2011) proposed. The various approaches to cognition that fall under that banner are nonetheless
unified by a common thesis—namely, that naturally occurring cognitive phenomena emerge
from the complex causal interaction between the organisms’ nervous system, the extra-neural
body, and the environment, including the socio-cultural environment. This being so, the machinery responsible for carrying out such cognitive functions is assumed not to be located
wholly inside the organism’s brain, but, instead, it spreads out onto the body and the environment. Call this the “Embodiment Thesis.”2
The idea that cognition depends on the organism’s interaction with the environment is also referred to as embeddedness. This idea is sometimes advanced as an independent thesis (see, e.g.,
Haugeland, 1998). For simplicity, I speak of the Embodiment Thesis as something that unifies both
claims (see Chemero, 2009; Gallagher, 2011, 2017).
2
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Yet, to some extent, all cognitive processes can be said to causally depend on the organism’s body and environment. Even those who think that cognition occurs exclusively in
the brain agree that neural structures have evolved to function in conjunction with specific
extra-neural elements. These extra-neural elements, some might argue, “provide the sort of
bodily context in which these cognitive processes are situated […]. But this does not mean
that there is no distinction between cognition and its bodily context” (Rowlands, 2010, p.
55).
If that is all that the Embodiment Thesis implies, then it is trivially true. Also, formulated that way the Embodiment Thesis remains fully compatible with orthodox, neurocentric
accounts of cognition—those that focus their explanatory efforts in describing what is going
on inside the organism’s head, while conceiving of the body and environment as mere contributors, being only partially relevant for explanatory purposes.3
The Embodiment Thesis can nonetheless be articulated in a stronger way. Defenders
of embodied cognition assert that cognitive behaviors are the outcome of complex causal
interactions between the agent’s nervous system, its body, and the environment. In such
cases, they argue, these extra-neural elements cannot be interpreted as just being the normal
ecological backdrop the cognitive mechanism needs to achieve its function. Rather, they
must be seen as constitutive parts of the cognitive machinery itself.4

To see why this is the case, think of Marr’s classic theory of vision (Marr, 1982). As Marr describes
it, visual perception consists of a series of well-defined computational tasks that allow the visual
system to infer a reliable 3-D image of the external world from the 2-D images received via the retina
cells. Although this process is thought to occur entirely in the brain, it does not mean that the brain
alone suffices for vision to be accomplished. On the contrary, visual perception is possible only because the retina cells are presented with the right kind of physical stimuli, that is, the ones they evolved
to process and transmit in order for the brain to perform the required computation. It follows that
visual perception, albeit fully internal, causally depends on extra-neural factors to some extent. Remove the bodily and environmental factors that support vision and vision will be impossible.
4 The distinction between causal and constitutive relations is a matter of controversy. Adams and
Aizawa (2008), for instance, state that causation and constitution are independent relations, and claim
that facts about the former are uninformative about the latter. Based on this distinction, Adams and
Aizawa accuse theorists of embodied cognition of conflating causality and constitution, thereby assigning a false constitutive role in cognition to the body and environment. They dub this the “CausalConstitution Fallacy.” Defenders of embodied cognition have nonetheless argued that the notion of
constitution defended by Adams and Aizawa (2008) is too narrow, for it only covers cases of material
(or synchronic) constitution—namely, if x constitutes y, then x and y must exist at the same place at
the same time and share the same properties (Kirchhoff, 2015; Gallagher, 2017). Against this notion,
defenders of embodied cognition propose “[a] notion of diachronic constitution, where causality and
constitution are not independent. Embodied mental processes […] distributed across different factors/levels (neural, behavioral, environmental), and across different timescales, are constituted in a
temporally integrated dynamical system. The constituents may very well be in complex, reciprocal
causal relations with each other, but just these reciprocal causal relations make the mental process
what it is” (Gallagher, 2017, pp. 9–10).
3
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The view that body and environment can be constitutive parts of cognition is partly
motivated by the discovery of cognitive phenomena that display what Clark and Wheeler
(1999) dub “Nontrivial Causal Spread” or NtCS. This NtCS “obtains when some phenomenon of interest turns out to depend, in unexpected ways, upon causal factors external to the
system previously/intuitively thought responsible” (1999, p. 106). As Wheeler (2005) explicates, this is the case of cognitive behaviors that “are the product not exclusively of, say,
mechanisms located in the agent’s brain, but rather of massively distributed mechanisms that extend
across brain, body, and environment” (p. 200, emphasis added).
Cricket phonotaxis—i.e., sound-seeking behavior—is said to display NtCS.5 To attract
mates, male crickets produce a series of species-specific acoustic signals called “syllables.”
These syllables are to be detected by females which have to identify them against other background sounds and track them to find the male’s location. How does this process work?
How can female crickets successfully find their mates?
Roboticist Barbara Webb (1995) has offered an elegant explanation of this phenomenon by focusing on the morphology of the female’s auditory system and the physical
structure—rhythm and frequency—of the male’s auditory signals. In what follows, I summarize the account of Webb.
Female crickets’ auditory system consists of two eardrums situated in the tibiae of their
front legs. These eardrums are connected via a fixed-length tracheal tube to a series of openings (called ‘acoustic spiracles’) situated on the thorax. Due to this configuration, the sound
arrives at the eardrums both externally—directly from the sound source via the front legs’
ears—and internally—via the tracheal tube (see Figure 1.1).

Other famous examples of NtCS are provided by Kirsh and Maglio (1994), Beer (1995), Chemero
and Heyser (2005).
5
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Figure 1.1 Illustration of the structure of the female cricket’s auditory system. Continuous arrows

represent external sound waves. Discontinuous arrows represent the internal sound waves (from
Barrett 2015a, Fig. 3.1, p. 52, with permission)

When the sound arrives at the female, a significant event takes place. On the side that
is nearer to the sound source, the externally arriving sound travels less distance than the
internally arriving sound, whereas, on the side that is further away from the sound source,
the two sounds travel approximately the same distance. This causes the arrival of sound on
the nearer side to be out-of-phase, and in-phase on the further side. This difference in phase
causes the amplitude of the eardrum’s vibration to be higher on the side nearer to the sound
source.
Furthermore, each eardrum is connected to a dedicated neuron. The function of the
neuron is to fire when the level of vibration reaches a certain intensity, causing the female
cricket to turn towards the side closer to the sound source. Crucially, because the eardrum
that is closer to the sound source vibrates more strongly, its dedicated neuron fires first.
Thus, the female cricket can track and navigate towards the male by steering in the direction
of the firing neuron.
But how does the female discriminate the male’s signal out of the background noises?
Importantly, the males’ syllables have a specific rhythm and frequency, and these rhythm and
frequency have evolved to ‘match’ the activation profile of the females’ neurons. Because of
this matching, the female’s auditory system is sensitive to the sounds of the right kind only
while she ‘ignores’ the other background noises (Webb, 1995, pp. 120-123). Likewise, since
the female’s auditory system is reactive to the amplitude of the vibrations caused by the syllables, it enables the female to approach to the male with the loudest song, ensuring the best
mate—the one that ensures that their offspring will inherit the best possible genes.
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Webb used robotic models to test her hypotheses, and reported that the robots “performed like the cricket[s], completely and robustly finding a particular sound source under a
variety of conditions” (1995, p. 132). Arguably, one of the most interesting aspects of Webb’s
robots is that they have “no stored information about the male cricket’s songs, and simply
perceive and act using a particularly arranged body” (Wilson & Golonka, 2013, p. 4). Hence,
Webb’s experiments suggest that the success of cricket’s tracking behavior depend on implementing the suitable perception-action cycles rather than, say, having a relevant set of prestored data and use it to make inferences about the male’s location.
Elaborating on this example, Barrett (2015a) tells us that
the females’ “mate-choice” behavior was a truly emergent property; that is, there
was no “choice” mechanism explicitly programmed into the robot; it showed this
behavior purely as a consequence of the way its internal mechanism interacted with
the environment. (p. 54)
Cricket phonotaxis thus presents a compelling example of NtCS in animal intelligent
behavior. The cognitive process responsible for cricket phonotaxis reveals to be embodied
in a robust, non-trivial way, for it spreads across the nervous system, body, and environment.

Embodied cognitive science: General principles

What theoretical and explanatory principles follow from taking an embodied perspective of
cognition? In what follows, I detail four explanatory tenets that are almost unanimously accepted by all theories of embodied cognition.
First, theories in embodied cognitive science reject the neurocentric perspective of
classical cognitive science. Whereas orthodox explanatory models in cognitive science seek
to explain cognition exclusively in terms of what happens inside the organism’s head, embodied cognitive explanations focus on the interrelated activity of the whole brain-bodyenvironment system.
Second, defenders of embodied cognition argue for the reconsideration of the role of
perception and action in cognition. To use Hurley’s words (1998), classical approaches to
cognition tend to subscribe to a “sandwich architecture,” where cognition is taken to be what
‘fills’ the in-between of perception (input) and action (output). Embodied cognitive scientists,
by contrast, cast doubt upon this distinction and suggest that sensorimotor processes ought
to be considered a constitutive part of the cognitive processes. As Gomila and Calvo (2008)
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explicate, “as a result of their embodied-embedded nature, cognition […] cannot be accounted for without taking into account the perceptual and motor apparatus that facilitates
the agent’s dealing with the external world in the first place” (p. 5).
Cricket phonotaxis clearly illustrates this point. According to Webb (1995, p. 132),
female crickets do not simply react to the auditory signs they hear by turning in the direction
of the sound. Rather, the female’s bodily movements also function to provide additional
phase and amplitude information. This information is crucial to track the location of the
sound source. As Chiel and Beer (1997) point out, this is a common strategy in different
species: “In general, animals that must discriminate sounds whose wavelength is small relative to their body size take advantage of measurements of pressure differences, utilizing whole
body structures to provide additional phase and amplitude information” (p. 553, emphasis added).
Third, defenders of embodied cognition invite us to reconsider the role of the brain
and the central nervous system in bringing about cognitive activity. As they suggest, the brain
should be primarily seen as an action controller whose main function is to coordinate the
behavioral responses of the organisms in context-sensitive ways. Chiel and Beer (1997) nicely
capture this idea as follows:
The nervous system is often seen as the conductor of the body, choosing the program for the players and directing exactly how they play. The results reviewed above
suggest a different metaphor: the nervous system is one of a group of players engaged in jazz improvisation, and the final result emerges from the continued give
and take between them. In other words, adaptive behavior is the result of the continuous interaction between the nervous system, the body and the environment,
each of which has rich, complicated, highly structured dynamics. The role of the
nervous system is not so much to direct or to program behavior so as to shape it
and evoke the appropriate patterns of dynamics from the entire coupled system. (p.
555)
According to Engel and colleagues (Engel, Friston, & Kragic, 2015; Engel et al., 2013),
this re-evaluation of the role of the brain is a sign of a more profound transformation in the
field. Cognitive science, they claim, is living a “pragmatic turn.” As they describe it, the key
premise of this turn is that neural activity should be primarily understood not as constructing
and providing the agent with objective models of the environment, but, instead, “as subserving action and being grounded in sensorimotor coupling” (Engel et al., 2013, p. 1; see also
Anderson, 2014).
18

Fourth, and finally, most embodied cognitive scientists tend to promote the use of
Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) as a valuable tool for the study of cognition (Beer, 1995;
Chemero, 2009; Clark, 1997; Keijzer, 2001; Di Paolo, Buhrmann, & Barandiaran, 2017; Port
& van Gelder, 1995; van Gelder, 1998; Wheeler, 2005; Thelen & Smith, 1994). DST is a set
of mathematical tools that allow us to describe a target system in terms of a finite set of state
variables and the set of differential equations that govern how the value of the variables
changes over time. Given these state variables, we can produce a geometric model that captures all potential states of the system. This model is called the “state space” of the system,
where each possible state is represented by a single point. Also, given the differential equations and taking some initial conditions, we can represent the evolution of the system as a
set of curves—“trajectories”—in the state space.
Using DTS we can model the agent (brain and body) and the environment as a single
dynamical system composed of two coupled dynamical systems (see Figure 1.2). Two dynamical systems are said to be coupled whenever at least one parameter of a system is also a
parameter of the other system. Two coupled systems reciprocally perturb each other’s dynamics over time, giving rise to complex reciprocal interactions that lead to the emergence
of new behavioral patterns.

Figure 1.2 Schema of the brain-body-environment conceptualized as a dynamical system. The arrows

represent the continuous interactions between the single components. (From Beer, 2003, Fig. 1, p.
211, with permission)
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From a DST perspective, cognitive behavior is thought to emerge from “the global
order produced through multiple local interactions between contributing components located throughout a highly distributed brain-body-environment system” (Wheeler, 2005, p.
245), and it cannot be properly attributed to any single component in isolation.

A tale of moderates and radicals

So far, I have explained what distinguishes embodied approaches to cognition from orthodox
(neurocentric) ones. In this section, I shall focus on a difference that cuts embodied cognitive
science in twain: the difference between embodied and radical embodied theories of cognition. This distinction hinges on the role that mental representations are meant to play in
cognitive explanations.
Clark (1997, 2008) and Wheeler (2001, 2005) are well-known exponents of the nonradical (or moderate) approach. As Clark (2008) asserts, even though conceiving of cognition
as an embodied process entails that “the kinds of internal representations we deploy, and the
forms of computation and control required of the biological brain, are often importantly
transformed,” there are no reasons “to take a fast track toward radical antirepresentationalism” (p. 165).
So, how does adopting an embodied approach to cognition transform our notions of
representation and computation?
Regarding the first notion (representation), Wheeler and Clark defend the view that it
should be conceived of as being action-oriented. Action-Oriented representations, AORs, differ
from traditional representations in that they do not consist of detailed and purely descriptive
models of the world. Instead, AORs are on-the-fly internal structures that “are simultaneously encodings of how the world is and specifications for appropriate classes of action”
(Clark, 1997, p. 151; see also Mandik, 2005, p. 285). As Wheeler (2008) explicates:
An action-oriented representation is one that is (i) action-specific (tailored to a particular behavior and designed to represent the world in terms of specifications for
possible actions), (ii) egocentric (features bearer-relative content as epitomized by
spatial maps in an egocentric coordinate system) and (iii) intrinsically context-dependent (the explicit representation of context is eschewed in favour of situated
special-purpose adaptive couplings that implicitly define the context of activity in
their basic operating principles). (p. 371)
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Along with this action-oriented account of representations, some embodied cognitive
scientists advocate for a kind of “extended,” “soft” (Clark, 2008), or “wide” (Wilson, 2004)
computationalism. Computationalists of this kind seek to combine the tools of DST with
computational theories of cognition and hypothesize that the processing of representations,
rather than occurring solely in the brain, heavily relies on the dynamics of the embodied
system. According to this view, some of the actions we perform are “designed to change the
input of an agent’s information-processing system” (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994, pp. 541-542),
thus altering the computational states of the system.
By contrast, authors working in the traditions of enactivism and ecological psychology
have defended the possibility of a radical embodied cognitive science (Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009; Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017; Di Paolo, Buhrmann, & Barandiaran, 2017). In a nutshell, these radical approaches are driven by the
hypothesis that some cognitive activities can be accounted for by appealing to the dynamic
interaction of nervous system, body, and environment, with no need to posit mental representations and computational processes. We can see the difference between orthodox,
embodied, and radical embodied approaches to cognition by focusing on two pivotal questions:
Table 1.1 Differences between orthodox, embodied, and radical embodied approaches to cognition

Should cognitive explanations
be restricted to the brain?

Orthodox Cogni-

Embodied Cogni-

Rad. Embodied

tive Science

tive Science

Cognitive science

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Should all cognitive explanations posit mental
representations?

Radical embodied cognitive scientists provide three main reasons to justify this view.
The first reason has to do with the lack of a scientific explanation of the contentful properties
of mental representations—namely, the fact that representational states can be true or false,
veridical or non-veridical, right or wrong, etc., about what they target or represent. This concern has been voiced by radical enactivists (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017), and remains as an
unsolved puzzle for those who think that all cognitive behaviors are to be explained by appealing to representations. As Shea (2018) acknowledges:
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That mental representations are about things in the world, although utterly commonplace, is deeply puzzling. How do they get their aboutness? The physical and
biological sciences offer no model of how naturalistically respectable properties
could be like that. This is an undoubted lacuna in our understanding, a void hidden
away in the foundations of the cognitive sciences. (p. 5, emphasis original)
Second, some authors have suggested that the interactions between the parts of the
embodied cognitive system—the organism’s brain, if any, the body, and the environment—
may involve non-linear and reciprocal causal loops. If this is the case, the causal contribution
of each systemic component—i.e., its function regarding the system’s overall behavior—
both determines and is partially determined by the causal contributions of other systemic
components.
Systems of this stripe are commonly known as “interaction-dominant” systems (see
Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 2003). The key aspect of these systems is that they are functionally non-decomposable, meaning that we cannot assign specific and stable functional
roles to individual systemic components to explain the overall behavior of the system. If
cognitive systems turn to be “interaction-dominant” in this sense, this is likely to be a difficult
problem for defenders of representationalism, whether classical or action-oriented. The rationale for this is as follows: if the system responsible for bringing about a cognitive behavior
is functionally non-decomposable, then it is impossible to identify a component whose function relative to the whole system is to represent (see Wheeler, 2005, p. 251).
Finally, defenders of radical embodied cognitive science suggest that once we have a
dynamical model of the system whose behavior we seek to explain, assigning representational
functions to certain systemic components gives us no additional explanatory power. Chemero (2009) makes this point clear:
Once we have the full dynamical story, we can predict the behavior of the [organism] in its environment, and we can do so without making reference to the
representational content of any states of its control system. […] Despite the fact
that we can cook up a representational story, once one has the dynamical explanation, the representational gloss does not predict anything about the system’s
behavior that could not be predicted by the dynamical explanation alone. (p. 77)
Nonetheless, there are two problems with this position. First of all, DST is not by itself
a theory of cognition. Instead, DST is a mathematical tool, and, as such, it can be used to
model and explain the behavior of various open systems, ranging from hurricanes to colonies
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of bees and neural networks. Defenders of radical embodied cognitive science thus need a
theory of cognition that, in combination with DST, can offer a positive alternative to representationalism.
Some enactivists (Di Paolo et al., 2017) have relied on sensorimotor theory (O’Regan
& Noë, 2001; O’Regan, 2011) to do this job, at least with respect to perception and motor
control. In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that ecological psychology can serve as the
theory for radical enactivism (for a contraposition between ecological psychology and sensorimotor theory see Mossio & Taraborelli, 2008).
A second problem with DST is that its explanatory power has been questioned. Although Chemero (2009) emphasizes the predictive power of dynamical models to justify their
adequacy as explanatory tools for cognitive science, we ought to be careful of not conflating
prediction and explanation in this context (Kaplan & Bechtel, 2011; Kaplan & Craver, 2011).
Proponents of DST in cognitive science thus need to show that dynamical models can explain, and not only predict, the behavior of cognitive systems or organisms. I will address
this issue in Chapter 6.

The varieties of enactivism

Arguably, the official story of enactivism begins with the notion of “autonomy.” This concept was first introduced by Varela (1979) to capture the peculiar dynamics of living systems.
On Varela’s view, living systems owe their existence to what he dubs “organizational closure.” A system is organizationally closed when it is composed of a number of internal
dynamical processes such that (i) they recursively depend on each other—viz., each process
is simultaneously a causal enabling condition for, and an effect of other processes—, and (ii)
they constitute the system as a unity that is recognizable and identifiable against its medium.
The most basic form of autonomy can be seen in the capacity of living organisms for
“autopoiesis” (see, e.g., Froese & Di Paolo, 2011).6 Autopoiesis, also referred to as “material
self-production,” refers to the capacity of living systems to generate and maintain their own
identity as something distinct from the environment. As Thompson and Di Paolo (2014)

Although the notions of “autonomy” and “autopoiesis” are often presented together, we must be
careful not to conflate them. As Thompson (2007) writes: “An autopoietic system is a specific kind
of autonomous system—one having an organizational closure of production processes in the molecular domain—but there can be autonomous systems that are not autopoietic if their constituent
processes exhibit organizational closure in their domain of operation. For example, an insect colony
or animal group might qualify as autonomous in this sense” (pp. 106-107). Other candidates for
autonomous systems include the nervous system or the immune system (Barandiaran, 2017).
6
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explicate, in autopoietic systems “their ongoing processes of material and energetic exchanges with the world, and of internal transformation and metabolizing, relate to each other
in such a way that the same organization is constantly regenerated by the activities of the
processes themselves” (p. 69). An autonomous-autopoietic system is thus a system defined
“by its endogenous, self-organizing and self-controlling dynamics” (Thompson, 2007, p. 43).
Crucially, it is because all living beings need to interact with the world to maintain their
integrity that they develop an individual subjective perspective of the environment. At the
very least, a system must be able to distinguish those aspects of the environment that are
valuable or meaningful to its survival. The appearance of this individual “point of view”
(Weber & Varela, 2002, p. 116) from which features of the world become meaningful or
valuable is what enactivists call “sense-making.” This capacity for sense-making is, according
to enactivists, what distinguishes cognitive from non-cognitive systems.
Bacterial chemotaxis is a canonical example of sense-making (Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1991/2016; Thompson, 2007). Because the bacterium exploits sucrose as a source of
nutrient, sugar concentration becomes salient or valuable to it, whereas other chemicals are
neutral or harmful. This ‘perspective’ determines how it interacts with its environment:
although sucrose is a real and present condition of the physicochemical environment, its status as food is not. That sucrose is a nutrient is not intrinsic to the status
of the sucrose molecule; it is rather a relational feature, linked to the bacterium’s
metabolism. Sucrose has significance or value as food, but only in the milieu that
the organism itself brings into existence. […] Living is a process of sense-making,
of bringing forth significance and value. In this way, the environment becomes a
place of valence, of attraction and repulsion, approach or escape. (Thompson, 2007,
p. 158)
According to enactivists, in producing and maintaining itself as a living being the bacterium must evaluate or make sense of the environment according to its own biological
perspective, enacting a domain of meaning or significance.7 Hence, cognition, understood as
sense-making, is deemed continuous with the biodynamics of life itself: “Living systems are

Talk of evaluation and interpretation are common among enactivists. For example, Varela et al.
(1991/2016) write: “We use the words significance and relevance advisedly, for they imply that there is
some kind of interpretation involved in the encounter” (p. 155, emphasis original). Likewise, Di
Paolo, Rohde, and de Jaegher (2010) define sense making as “the evaluation of the consequences of
interaction for the conservation of an identity” (p. 45). Finally, Di Paolo and Froese (2011) write that
“the normativity inherent in sense-making implies that perturbations are somehow evaluated in relation to the autonomous system’s viability” (p. 8).
7
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cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition” (Maturana & Varela,
1980, p. 13).
Not all enactivists agree that autopoiesis suffices for sense-making or cognition.8 For
example, Di Paolo (2005, 2009) argues that cognition only comes into play when autopoiesis
is combined with “adaptivity.” A system is deemed adaptive when it is able “to regulate itself
with respect to the boundaries of its own viability” (2005, p. 430). To do so, the system must
be able to actively monitor internal and external perturbations, recognizing in them the
tendencies that can lead to the loss of its autopoiesis, and compensating for them by regulating its relationship with the environment. As Di Paolo writes: “Both elements, selfmonitoring and appropriate regulation, are necessary to be able to speak of meaning from
the perspective of the organism” (2005, p. 438).
So far, I have succinctly presented the main theoretical principles of autopoietic-adaptive enactivism as a research program for the study of cognition. These principles, however,
have raised significant concerns among those who recognize themselves as enactivists or
enactivist-friendly.
According to De Jesus (2016), for example, the fact that autopoietic-adaptive enactivists seek to ground cognition in the alleged capacity of all living beings to make sense,
interpret, and evaluate the environment, reveals an underlying commitment to anthropocentric and anthropomorphic views of cognition. This form of enactivism, he writes, “appears
to simply be projecting teleology and other forms of human experience unto nonhuman lifeforms”
(p. 285, emphasis original).
Another concern has been raised by radical enactivists (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017).
Although REC agrees with autopoietic-adaptive enactivism that mentality or cognition
should be conceived of as emerging from the self-organizing and self-preserving embodied
activities of living organisms, there are also important divergences between the two. The
most important one has to do with the very idea of sense-making as the basis of cognition.
According to Hutto and Myin, talking of simple organisms such as bacteria as “interpreting”
8 Di Paolo (2005, 2009) offers two main reasons for this. First, the operational definition of autopoiesis leaves no space for the possibility that organisms act to actively avoid or seek specific
situations on the basis of physical encounters that are not inherently involved in autopoiesis and yet
can be a proxy of something else that it is. For example, animals are attracted by the smell or food,
and repelled by the smell left by a predator. These features are meaningful for animals and play a
decisive role in the way they interact with the environment, but they don’t by themselves play a role
in the system’s autopoiesis. Second, the operational definition of autopoiesis does not conceive of
the possibility that the system actively seeks to improve its current situation—e.g., by swimming up
the sucrose gradient. Because the ability to act regarding the virtual consequences of current conditions or tendencies is, according to Di Paolo, “the hallmark of cognition” (2009, p. 15), it follows that
“a bare autopoietic system cannot be a cognitive system” (p. 13, emphasis original).
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or “evaluating” environmental encounters and “bringing forth” or “creating” meaning is
misplaced and misleading, for it invites the reading that cognition, even at its most basic
forms, already involves the manipulation of mental representations.
The same objection applies to other forms of enactivism, such as sensorimotor enactivism (O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004). Interestingly, sensorimotor enactivists share with
ecological psychologists the idea that perception is a skillful activity but hypothesize that it
requires some sort of “sensorimotor knowledge” or “understanding.” As Noë (2007) explicates: “Mere sensation does not rise to the level of perceptual experience. For perceptual
experience we need sensation that we understand” (p. 532).
Crucially, although this knowledge is often presented as a form of know-how, sensorimotor enactivists think of it as being representation-based. For example, whereas Noë
(2004) argues that sensorimotor enactivism rejects the assumption that the function of perceptual systems is to construct an internal representation of the world, it “is compatible with
there being all sorts of representations in the brain, and indeed, with the presence of such
representations being necessary for perception” (p. 22). By assuming that mental representations are necessary for perception, sensorimotor enactivists fall prey of the same trap as
classical, representational theories of mind—they must explain, in naturalistic terms, how
brain states can represent or have content.9
To avoid these difficulties, REC proposes to radicalize enactivism, purging all the concepts and explanatory constructs that may suggest that all cognitive activities require
organisms forming and manipulating representations. Doing so, however, requires abandoning crucial assumptions made by other enactivists:
We are inclined to take the harder line: [Basic cognition] is no kind of interpretation.
The simplest life forms are capable of an intentionally directed responding of a kind
that when suitably augmented provides a necessary platform for cognition, interpretation, understanding, sense-making, and emoting; however, their activities do
not, in and of themselves, qualify as these forms of mentality. (Hutto & Myin, 2013,
p. 36)
Instead, REC proposes that cognition, at its basic roots, can be explained by appealing
to the organisms’ sensitivity and responsivity to information in the form of covariances, and

Noë makes clear that “the claim [of sensorimotor enactivism] is not that there are no representations in vision. […] The claim rather is that the role of representations in perceptual theory needs to
be reconsidered” (2004, p. 22).
9

26

the previous history of interactions of these organisms. This informational sensitivity constitutes the platform over which other more sophisticated forms of cognition can emerge,
including some forms of imagination and memory, but representation-involving forms of
cognition only come into play when individuals engage in collective normative behaviors
such as those that involve the using of public symbols, words, images, and so on. Hence,
according to radical enactivists, the move from basic (non-representational) to non-basic
(representational) forms of cognition is only possible thanks to the existence of social and
normative practices. It is only when the individuals master these practices that they are able
of interpretation, understanding, and sense-making.
As mentioned before, critics of REC have argued that it offers, at best, merely sketchy
explanations for the kind of cognitive phenomena it targets. One of the main ambitions of
this thesis is to fill this gap, showing how REC can be enriched by other scientific approaches
in cognitive science.

Overview of the thesis

The main body of this dissertation is composed of five autonomous but thematically intertwined papers, all of them presented as independent chapters. The first two chapters target
radical embodied cognitive science broadly speaking and are devoted to debates concerning
the very possibility of a non-representational science of cognition. The remaining three chapters focus primarily on REC. The overall purpose of these chapters is to pave the way for a
radical enactive cognitive science, exploring the complementarities between REC, similaritybased theories in cognitive neuroscience, and ecological psychology. The structure of the
thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2 discusses a general objection to radical embodied cognitive science. Many
philosophers of mind have argued that positing mental representations is indispensable to
explain any form of cognitive activity. Call this the Indispensability Thesis or IT. Crucially, if
IT is true, it follows that all radical embodied theories of cognition are untenable. The goal
of this chapter is to evaluate whether there are substantive reasons to endorse IT. The chapter evaluates the three main kinds of argument in favor of this thesis and concludes that each
type of argumentative strategy is problematic. This chapter plays a pivotal role in the overall
thesis for it shows that there is, as yet, no justification for thinking that mental representations
are indispensable for explaining all forms of cognitive activity. Therefore, whichever cognitive activities, if any, are best explained by positing mental representations is something to
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be discovered by comparing the explanatory merits of representational theories against those
of their radical embodied counterparts.
Building upon the conclusions of the previous chapter, Chapter 3 takes issue with a
series of pronouncements made by Adams (2018) regarding the possibility of plant intelligence. According to Adams, whenever scientists speak of plant intelligence, they must do so
in figurative or metaphorical ways. He offers two main reasons for this. First, he argues that
the behavior of plants is not sophisticated enough to be regarded as intelligent or cognitive.
Second, he argues that because plants do not have mental representations, what they do does
not qualify as cognitive behavior. To defuse the first reason, the chapter analyzes the current
empirical evidence concerning memory, decision-making, and anticipatory behavior in plants
and concludes, contra Adams, that plants’ behavior is sophisticated enough to be considered
cognitive or intelligent in a non-metaphorical way. After this, the chapter introduces the
reader into the discussion concerning the (phyto-)nervous system of plants. To conclude, it
shows why Adam’s second line of argument is untenable and sketches the principles of a
radical embodied approach to plant intelligence.
Chapter 4 targets a widespread thesis in contemporary cognitive neuroscience; namely,
that patterns of neural activity can play a causal role in enabling the achievement of a cognitive task in virtue of mirroring the relevant structural properties of some target domain. Call
this Similarity Based Cognition, or SBC. SBC has attracted a lot of attention from contemporary philosophers of cognitive science. One reason for this is that, for many, the very
existence of causally potent structural similarities at the neural level entails the existence of a
special kind of mental representation called “structural” or “S-representations.” This chapter
problematizes the view that neurally-based structural similarities entail the existence of Srepresentations. First, it is argued that mere structural similarities do not suffice for representational content, and that no alternative has been provided that offers a satisfactory
solution to this problem. Second, it is argued that, according to what we know of how such
structural similarities are exploited in driving cognitive activity, there are no substantial
grounds for thinking that they play a representational role. This argument is substantiated by
analyzing recent empirical discoveries concerning the place cells in the hippocampus of rodents. Finally, it is revealed how SBC can play a role in a radical embodied theory of cognition
if understood through the lens of REC and neural reuse (Anderson, 2014).
The last two chapters focus on the relationship between REC and ecological psychology. The goal of these chapters is to show that it is possible to forge a positive alliance
between both approaches, even if some issues need to be ironed out.
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Chapter 5 addresses a series of objections made by radical enactivists to ecological
psychology. According to defenders of radical enactivism, the way Gibsonians describe perceptual information as being specific and meaningful makes ecological psychology akin to
representational theories of perception and cognition (Myin, 2016; Hutto, 2017; Hutto &
Myin, 2017; see also van Dijk, Withagen, & Bongers, 2015). If this is the case, it follows that
ecological psychology cannot be part of the kind of non-representational, radical embodied
approach to cognition REC seeks to build. This chapter argues against this objection. To
achieve this, it offers a detailed analysis of the notions of perceptual information, specificity,
and meaning as they are presented in the specialized ecological literature and defends that
these notions remain free of any representational commitment. It is concluded that ecological
psychology is radical enough and that it is apt to be included in a full-blown radical embodied
approach to cognition.
Once the concerns of radical enactivists have been defused, Chapter 6 presents the
case for the unification of REC and ecological psychology. The chapter starts by acknowledging some pronouncements made by critics of REC (Baggs, 2017; Miłkowski et al., 2018;
Thompson, 2018). Critics of REC accuse it of not bringing any substantive change to cognitive science. At the core of this objection is the idea that REC offers neither empirically
testable hypotheses nor explanatory models for the cognitive phenomena it targets. This
chapter aims to address this objection. I provide a two-pronged argument. First, I argue that
REC ought not to be conceived of as a scientific theory of cognition but as a philosophical
framework. It follows from this that charging REC for not providing explanatory models
and testable predictions is misguided. This, however, can be unsatisfactory. The reason for
this is that one can accept that REC is a philosophical framework and still maintain that REC
is irrelevant for cognitive science unless it is grounded in or incorporates a scientific theory
of cognition. I hold that this second concern can be addressed by incorporating ecological
psychology into the theoretical framework of REC. I will show that ecological psychology
can provide REC with empirically testable hypotheses and explanatory models that are compatible with its philosophical tenets regarding how to best account for perception and motor
control.
In summary, this thesis aims to achieve two major outcomes. First, it aims to contribute to the establishment of radical embodied theories of cognition by showing that there are
no tenable arguments for assuming that positing mental representations is indispensable for
explaining all cognitive activities. Second, it defends the thesis that the philosophical program
of REC can be successfully complemented with productive research programs in cognitive
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science—at least in the domains of cognitive neuroscience and sensorimotor psychology.
This is a substantive advance for REC, for it shows, against its critics, that there can be a
radical enactive cognitive science.
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Chapter 2
No cognitive science without representation?

Despite the emergence and popularity of radical (non-representational) embodied theories
of cognition, many in the field remain persuaded that mental representations are indispensable to explain any form of cognitive activity scientifically. In this paper, I refer to this thesis
as the Indispensability Thesis or IT. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether there are
solid grounds to assume IT. The paper analyzes the three most compelling argumentative
strategies in favor of this thesis. The first strategy takes the form of a deductive inference.
The second type of arguments take the form of a negative abduction, or an argument from
an inference to the only explanation. Alternatively, the last strategy takes the form of a positive abduction. I shall show that each of these strategies is problematic. Therefore, it is
concluded that none of them provides substantial reasons for dismissing the possibility of
explaining various forms of cognitive activity in radical embodied, non-representational
ways.

Segundo-Ortin, M. (in prep.). No cognitive science without representation? Assessing the Indispensability Thesis.
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Chapter 2
No cognitive science without representation?

We say that we are only criticizing some antiquated, specifically philosophical dogmas. But, of course, what we call dogmas are exactly what our opponents call
common sense. Adherence to these dogmas is what they call being rational.
— Richard Rorty

Introduction

Can we explain any form of cognitive behavior without positing mental representations?
Most philosophers and cognitive scientists answer this question negatively. Since the socalled “cognitive revolution,” the received view has been that all cognitive activities are to be
explained by appealing to processes that involve mental representations (Bermúdez, 2010;
Shea, 2018; Thagard, 2014).
This assumption is currently under attack. Many theorists now take seriously the possibility that some cognitive activities, ranging from perception and motor control to forms
of memory and imagination, can be explained without reference to mental representations.
This movement is epitomized by the emergence of the so-called radical embodied theories
of cognition (see, e.g., Chemero, 2009; Di Paolo, Buhrmann, & Barandiaran, 2017; Hutto &
Myin, 2013, 2017; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991/2016).
Radical embodied approaches face much resistance. For some, it is simply undeniable
that all forms of cognitive activity must be explained in terms of representational states and
the series of computational processes by which these states are manipulated and transformed.
Mental representations are taken to be indispensable to the scientific explanation of any and
all kinds of intelligent behavior. Call this the Indispensability Thesis, or IT.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether there are solid grounds to assume IT. The
paper analyzes the three most prominent and widely endorsed argumentative strategies that
have been given in favor of this thesis. I shall show that each of these strategies is problematic
and, therefore, that there are no substantial reasons for dismissing the possibility of explaining at least some cognitive activities in non-representational ways.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explicates IT and offers a sample of
the sort of claims authors committed to IT advance. Section 3 analyzes the first argumentative strategy in favor of IT. Arguments of this sort take the form of deductive inferences.
Authors committed to this strategy posit a necessary conceptual link between cognition and
mental representation. Two consequences follow from positing this conceptual link. First,
only those behaviors that are driven by representational processes qualify as cognitive behaviors. Second, only those theories that invoke mental representations are theories of
cognition. I argue, however, that this position conflicts with adopting a naturalistic methodology for the study of cognition. Therefore, naturalistic minded philosophers should reject
such a conceptually-based argument for the indispensability of representation on methodological grounds.
Section 4 analyzes the second argumentative strategy. Arguments of this stripe take the
form of an eliminative abduction. Assuming that a general feature of all cognitive-driven
behaviors is that they are flexible, authors committed to this second strategy asserts that we
can only explain such flexibility if we invoke representations of some sort. To prove this,
these authors argue that there is no explanatory difference between radical embodied theories
of cognition and stimulus-response (S-R) behaviorism. I will argue that this assumption is
erroneous and then, that in the absence of an alternative argument that shows that all current
non-representational accounts of cognition are explanatory defective we have, as yet, not
reasons to assume that radical embodied theories of cognition, as a class, are untenable.
Finally, section 5 analyzes the last argumentative strategy for IT. Arguments of this
kind take the form of a positive abduction. Scholars committed to this strategy try to demonstrate that representational theories are better suited to account for all forms of cognitive
behavior than their non-representational counterparts. This section analyzes two prominent
attempts for IT in this way, both focusing perception and motor control. Authors reviewed
in this section claim that since classical computational and Bayesian theories provide the best
explanations for perception and motor control this suffices to demonstrate that mental representations are explanatory indispensable in these domains. Two arguments are offered
against this view. First, it is argued that there are no solid reasons to assume that either
Bayesian or classical computational theories provide the best explanations for perception and
motor control. Second, it is argued that even if it turned to be the case, it does not suffice to
prove that mental representations are explanatorily indispensable for these domains, for it is
an open question whether these accounts need to be cashed out in representational terms.
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If the analysis of each of these argumentative strategies proves correct then there is no
justification for IT, as we have yet to be supplied with compelling reasons to thinking that
mental representations are indispensable for explaining any and all forms of cognitive activity.

No cognitive science without representation: The Indispensability Thesis

Representational theories of mind aim to explain cognitive behavior by positing mental representations and a series of mechanisms by which these representations are manipulated and
transformed (Bermúdez, 2010; Ramsey, 2007; Shea, 2018; Thagard, 2014). Canonically, mental representations are taken to bear content. To say that mental representations bear content
is to say that they have conditions of satisfaction of a special sort—viz., they can be true or
false, veridical or non-veridical, right or wrong, and so on, regarding what they target or
represent.
Representationalism is widely regarded as an empirical hypothesis about the underlying
processes and mechanisms that drive intelligent behavior. On this view, representational
states are posited in order to scientifically explain specific instances of intelligent or cognitive
behavior.
Representationalism constitutes one of the cornerstones of mainstream cognitive science. In fact, a number of theorists argue that we cannot scientifically explain any bona fide
cognitive behavior of an agent or system unless we assume that such an agent or system has
mental representations of some sort. Call this the Indispensability Thesis, or IT. According
to IT, positing mental representations is indispensable for any scientific explanation of intelligent behavior.
IT can be expressed in stronger and weaker forms. For instance, Bermúdez (2003) tells
us that “[t]he essence of a psychological explanation is that it explains behavior in terms of
how the creature in question represents its environment” (p. 8, emphasis original; see also
Thagard, 2009, p. 241). In a similar vein, Shapiro (2013) holds that any theory that fails to
posit mental representations “cannot possibly be explaining cognitive capacities” (p. 364).10
And O’Brien and Opie (2009) write the following:

Shapiro applies the same logic when discussing enactivism: “As I understand embodied cognition,
of which enactivism is a species, it remains for the most part compatible with a representational
characterization of the mind. Indeed, if it did not, I am not sure how it could be a science of the mind
rather than, say, behavior” (2014, p. 219).
10
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In our view, without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for
explaining natural intelligence. We would go further: without representation there
is no cognitive (as distinct from behavioral, biologic, or just plain physical) science
in the first place. (p. 54)
In what follows, I examine the three main kinds of argument that have been offered
in defense of IT. My aim is to show that each of these strategies fails and thus that IT is not
a well-supported thesis. If the analyses prove sound, then we have, as yet, no solid reasons
to rule out the possibility that at least some cognitively-driven activities might be explained
without positing mental representations.

The deductive argument

Some authors have tried to secure IT by arguing that there is a necessary conceptual link
between cognition and mental representation. This first argumentative strategy takes the
form of a deductive inference.
The question of whether there is a necessary conceptual link between mental representation and cognition is at the heart of debates about whether there is such a thing as the
“mark of the cognitive.” Some theorists think that cognitive science lacks a proprietary notion of ‘cognition’ that enables us to distinguish the kinds of phenomena that are cognitive
from those that are not. Why is imagination a cognitive activity whereas digestion or breathing are not? What does it take for a process to be cognitive? Answering these and other
related questions, these theorists argue, requires that we provide a mark of the cognitive—
this is, a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a process to qualify as cognitive (Adams, 2010b; Adams & Garrison, 2013; Rowlands, 2010).11
Adams, one prominent voice in this debate, holds that we can provide such a list of
necessary and sufficient conditions for the mark of the cognitive:
(1) “Cognitive processes involve states that are semantically evaluable”
(2) “The contents carried by cognitive systems do not depend for their content
on other minds”

Some scholars have argued against the necessity of a mark of the cognitive. According to Allen
(2017), for example, “cognitive scientists need neither an abstract definition of ‘cognition’ nor a theoretically pure conception of ‘cognitive system’” (p. 4237). Elaborating on the same issue, Clark
(2008) compares cognitive science with other scientific disciplines and wonders whether we need a
mark of the cognitive while we don’t have, for example, a mark of the physical (fn 3, p. 239).
11
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(3) “Cognitive contents can be false or even empty, and hence are detached
from the actual environment”
(4) “[Cognitive processes] cause and explain in virtue of their representational
content.” (2010b, pp. 238–239)
Allegedly, having such a representational demarcation criterion of the cognitive is useful for two reasons. First, it enables us to determine, in principle, what kinds of behaviors
are cognitive. The argument goes like this. For a particular behavior to qualify as cognitive it
must be driven by a cognitive process. Only those processes that involve mental representations are cognitive processes. Therefore, only those behaviors that are driven by processes
that involve mental representations qualify as cognitive (Nanay, 2013, pp. 3, 17).
Aizawa (2014) brings these considerations to the fore when discussing the possibility
that plants display cognitive behavior. Since, according to Aizawa, the behaviors of plants
are not driven by processes that involve mental representations, these behaviors cannot be
cognitive (see Adams, 2018, p. 23 for a similar argument, but see Segundo-Ortin & Calvo,
2019 [Chapter 3] for a reply). As he writes:
[Plants] might display adaptive behaviors, such as phototropism, without deploying
representations to do this. Such cases would be the cases in which plants produce
behaviors that are not cognitive behaviors. They are not behaviors that are produced, in part, through cognitive processes. (Aizawa, 2014, p. 36)
Second, this representational mark of the cognitive enables us to determine what kind
of theories are theories about cognition. If cognition necessarily requires the manipulation
of mental representations, then if there is a model or theory that does not include mental
representations it cannot explain cognitive capacities (Shapiro, 2013, p. 364). By these lights,
radical embodied theories are automatically debarred from being explanatory contenders (Aizawa, 2014, p. 37).
At this juncture, however, we might ask what justifies this position. What warrants
thinking that mental representation is a necessary condition for cognition? It might be
thought that this is justified by appeal to our a priori intuitions about possible cases. According to defenders of conceptual analysis, we can formulate definitions of our everyday
concepts by analyzing our intuitions regarding the possible cases to which these concepts
apply (Jackson, 1998, 2017). If defenders of conceptual analysis are right, we might consult
our intuitions to determine what is necessary and sufficient for something to count as cognitive.
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Yet appealing to intuitions about possible cases when deciding on scientific issues faces
evident shortcomings (see, e.g., Papineau, 2013). One major issue is that nothing guarantees
that our intuitions, even those that strike us as the most obvious ones, are on the right track.
Even if everyone’s intuitions agreed that mental representation is necessary for cognition, it
does not follow that such intuitions are true.
Whether or not representation is necessary for cognition is a contingent matter that
needs to be discovered by looking at the world, not something to be established from the
armchair by consulting our intuitions about how we use our concepts. Most likely, this can
be done only by examining the explanatory merits of representational proposals against their
non-representational contenders in different domains. Hence, philosophers who are interested in determining what cognition is like, and not only “what the users of a language mean
by the word [‘cognition’]” (Jackson, 1998, p. 30), should not be interested in what their intuitions say, but, instead, in what the analysis of the empirical evidence reveals.12
Moreover, appealing to armchair intuitions about possible cases and a priori definitions
of concepts to establish contingent empirical facts deductively conflicts with the kind of
methodology to which the natural sciences, including the cognitive sciences, subscribe
(Kornblith, 2017, pp. 144–145).13 This is reason enough for methodologically naturalistic
philosophers of mind14 to avoid taking this strategy in order to defend IT.
There are additional reasons as to why philosophers who embrace methodological naturalism should avoid assuming IT as a conceptual truth. As mentioned in the previous
section, for methodologically naturalist philosophers of mind representationalism constitutes
an empirical hypothesis about the underlying processes that drive intelligent behavior. On
this view, representational states are posited to explain specific instances of intelligent or

As Jackson argues, the goal of conceptual analysis must be to elucidate what our folk concepts
mean. Such an approach contrasts with what he dubs a “non-modest” account of conceptual analysis—namely, one that “gives intuitions about possibilities too big a place in determining what the
world is like” (1998, pp. 43-44).
13 To make it clear, none of the foregoing is meant to imply that armchair reasoning cannot contribute to the progress of science. Thought experiments, for example, have a venerable tradition in
the history of physics, having been used to explore theoretical and empirical possibilities, and I see
no reasons as to why they could not be used in cognitive science as well (Brook, 2009). What I am
arguing, instead, is that for any philosophical investigation to be compatible with the principles of
methodological naturalism, such a priori intuitions must be subordinated to further a posteriori evaluations (see Levin 2013; Shepard 2008 for different articulations of this idea).
14 Here, I refer as “methodological naturalism” to the rather general thesis according to which the
methods of philosophy must be somewhat continuous with the ones employed by natural scientists.
In the very minimal sense, this entails that philosophical theses must be open to a posteriori evaluations in pretty much the same way as the theses of natural sciences are (Carruthers, 2011; Fischer,
2015; Kornblith, 2017; Papineau, 2015).
12
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cognitive behavior. This methodologically naturalistic approach, however, conflates with taking mental representations as part of what conceptually demarcate the cognitive. As Ramsey
(2017) points out, theorists that invoke mental representations as for the mark of the cognitive often assign a dual role to mental representation: “it functions as an explanatory posit in
various information-processing accounts of cognition. But it also functions as part of the
explanandum—as a defining element of the very phenomenon we want to understand” (p.
4204). Doing so may lead these theorists to conflate explanandum and explanans (see also
Zahnoun, 2019).15 One major consequence of this conflation is that representationalism becomes an unfalsifiable hypothesis.
To see this more clearly, imagine that we are interested in the study of episodic
memory. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which, after conducting several empirical studies, we find no convincing reasons as to why the processes involved in episodic memory are
best characterized as involving mental representations. It appears that we have three options
at such a juncture if we abide by the idea that IT constitutes a conceptual truth.
First, we can simply dismiss our reasoning. We can for example hold that episodic
memory is a cognitive phenomenon, deducing that since all cognitive phenomena must involve representations, it follows that episodic memory cannot be non-representational in
character. No matter what the evidence might say, such a result cannot be true. A second
option, slightly more nuanced than the previous one, is to state that our account is incomplete. If episodic memory is cognitive, and if cognition necessarily entails mental
representation, then it follows that our non-representational account is providing only part
of the explanation. A full explanation of episodic memory will necessarily include mental
representations that, in combination with other physical or biological processes, bring about
episodic memory. Alternatively, we can accept that our account is correct and complete, but
then conclude that episodic memory is not cognitive. If mental representation is necessary
for cognition, it follows that if it turns out that episodic memory does not involve mental
representations then it is not a form of cognitive activity.
The problem is thus clear. Invoking mental representations as part of the demarcation
criteria of the cognitive undermines the scientific, explanatory status of representationalism,
rendering the representational hypothesis empirically vacuous (Ramsey, 2017, p. 4204). I

Burge (2010) manifests this conflation while describing perceptual psychology. As he writes: “Explanations [in perceptual psychology] make basic reference to perceptual states by way of reference
to conditions of successful representation—representational content. So representational function is
associated with both explanans and explanandum in the science of visual perception” (p. 311).
15
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conclude that philosophers who subscribe to methodological naturalism—those who advance mental representations as empirically robust explanatory posits—should avoid
invoking mental representations as for the mark of the cognitive in order to defend IT.

The inference to the only explanation

There have been other attempts to justify IT that do not treat it as conceptual truth and
which are in tune with the kind of naturalistic methodology endorsed by the cognitive sciences. One such attempt tries to justify IT on explanatory grounds by appeal to an eliminative
abductive argument—an argument from an inference to the only explanation. Those who
adopt this strategy argue that IT follows from the fact that non-representational accounts of
mind, as a class, are not remotely plausible for explaining intelligent behavior. If this negative
argument succeeds, then it follows that all kinds of intelligent behavior must be explained by
processes that involve the manipulation of mental representation of some sort.
Fodor (1975, pp. 27-32) famously advances a version of this argument. According to
him, the defining feature of intelligent behavior is that it can be varied in plastic, contextsensitive ways to achieve a goal. Intelligence requires more than a simple capacity to react to
the impingements of the environment. It requires being able to act autonomously, deploying
novel responses in the presence of familiar stimuli.
For this to be possible, Fodor asserts, an agent must have the capacity to distinguish
different possible courses of action in a way that allows for the evaluation of their likelihood
to achieve the desired goal. Accordingly, only after having compared the possible options an
intelligent agent can come up with a plan regarding how to act (see also Fodor, 2008, p. 13).
Thus, for Fodor, truly intelligent behavior requires being capable of practical reasoning
and planning, however rudimentary. From this, it is argued that the only explanatory models
“that seem even remotely plausible” (p. 27) in what comes to explaining planning and practical reasoning are those that invoke mental representations. On his account, we cannot
explain the organisms’ capability to act in intelligent ways unless we “presuppose the availability, to the behaving organism, of some sort of representational system” (p. 31).16

In a similar vein, Sterelny (1991) writes: “There can be no flexible and adaptive response to the
world without representation. To learn about the world, and to use what we learn to act in new ways,
we must be able to represent the world, our goals and options. Furthermore we must make appropriate inferences from those representations” (p. 21). The same conviction is expressed by Adams
for whom intelligent behavior “is surely due to representations in the mind of the organism that
represent desirable outcomes and possible strategies for achieving those outcomes” (2018, p. 23).
16
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Carruthers (2004, 2006) also illustrates how this argumentative strategy works. After
analyzing the different cognitive abilities exhibited by insects, Carruthers holds that being
minimally intelligent requires embodying a cognitive architecture composed by representational states that causally interact “in ways that depend upon their contents” (2004, p. 207).
As he explicates, perceptual systems take information transduced via the senses to create
representations of salient properties of the environment. These representations are then
made available to a series of concept-involving belief-generating and desire-generating systems. The resulting beliefs and desires are in turn made available for the constructions of
plans that are used to control behavior. According to Carruthers, that being minimally intelligent requires embodying such a cognitive architecture can be seen from the fact that this
explanation provides “[t]he only remotely plausible interpretation for the data” (2004, p.
215). Were the behavior of insects inflexible, he adds, “then there would be no warrant for
believing that insects have minds that exemplify a [representational] architecture” (2006, p.
70).
So instead of an argument from an inference to the best explanation (IBE), we are
being offered something seemingly more powerful—namely, an argument from an inference
to the only explanation (IOE). In short, whereas an IBE proceeds by sorting out the previously considered plausible explanations according to their capability to account for the
available evidence, in an IOE “the sorting is extreme: the best explanation comes to the top
because all its competitors are rejected as explanations of the evidence since they are inconsistent with it” (Bird, 2010, p. 352). An IOE is thus a particular case of an IBE, whereby the
evidence leaves us with only one explanatory hypothesis—or, in this case, one type of explanatory hypothesis. Once the other alternatives have been ruled out, the remaining
explanation turns to be “the best by default” (Bird, 2010, p. 352).
Yet for any argument to the conclusion that representational theories of cognition
provide the only plausible explanatory models for intelligent behavior to work, we have to
be shown that all currently available non-representational theories of cognition are explanatory defective.
A number of authors have tried to secure this position by arguing that once we abandon the view that mental representations mediate sensory input and behavioral output, all
we have left in terms of explanatory resources reduces to either hard-wired or learned stimulus-response (S-R) associations (see Carruthers, 2006, p. 70; Spaulding, 2011, p. 156;
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Bermúdez, 2003, p. 8; Byrne & Bates, 2006, p. R445). Accordingly, then, any non-representational theory of cognition, including radical embodied theories, must necessarily collapse
into a form of S-R behaviorism.
O’Brien and Opie (2015) have explicitly argued for this view. They claim that the possibility of explaining intelligent behavior without positing representations “has been tried
before, and it does not work. Back then the scheme was known as “behaviorism” […] but
the two ideas are of one piece” (p. 724, emphasis added; for similar claims see Adams, 2018, p. 21;
Block, 2001, p. 978). As they explain, the signature mark of behaviorism—or, more specifically, S-R behaviorism17—is that it seeks to explain intelligent behavior solely “in terms of
the history of stimulus-response events to which organisms (of each kind) are typically exposed” (2015, p. 724).
Explanations in terms of S-R associations were long ago discarded by cognitive scientists precisely because they could not account for flexible, intelligent behavior, and
representational theories of cognition replaced them. It follows that if current radical embodied theories of cognition offer no new explanatory resources regarding S-R behaviorism,
they must suffer from the same explanatory limitations. This leads to the conclusion that
representational theories of cognition of some kind are the only viable option for explaining
intelligent behavior:
It just isn’t possible to explain the ability of evolved creatures to selectively engage
with features of the environment—in other words, engage in targeted behavior—
without supposing they employ internal states that in some way represent those
features. (O'Brien & Opie, 2015, p. 724)
S-R behaviorism is most commonly associated with the work of early behaviorists such
as Watson (1913, 1924; Costall, 2004). Since S-R behaviorism stands against “mentalistic”
explanations for behavior—explanations that posit mental representations as mediating entities—S-R behaviorism can be regarded as a form of non-representationalism (Barrett, 2012,
p. 19).18 But it does not follow that every non-representationalist theory of cognition is a
form of S-R behaviorism. We need an additional argument to prove that this is the case,

Even though O’Brien and Opie (2015) speak of “behaviorism” in general, the way they describe
it only captures behavioral theories based on stimulus-response associations. For a comprehensive
account of the different theories comprised under the banner of behaviorism see Staddon (2014) and
Barrett (2012; 2015b).
18 Although behaviorism is usually associated with the rejection of mental representations, not all
behaviorist theories are equally hostile towards them. Tolman (1948), for example, is famous for
hypothesizing the existence of internal cognitive maps to explain the navigating skills of rats.
17
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which the authors do not provide. In fact, I contend that contrary to what the previous
authors assert there are substantive differences between the kind of explanations offered by
radical embodied theories of cognition and the ones offered by S-R behaviorists.
For illustration, consider the case of ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979/2015)—
arguably, one of the most influential approaches in the current radical embodied theories of
cognition (see Chemero, 2009; Richardson et al., 2008). Although in his early works Gibson
was sympathetic to behaviorist theories, some of the principles that motivate his ecological
theory of perception radically differ from the ones defended by S-R theorists (Gibson,
1967/1982, pp. 12-14; see also Costall & Morris, 2015; Heft, 2001).
To begin with, ecological psychology rejects the assumption that the raw data of perception are discrete, physical stimuli. As Gibson explicates, although perception involves
physical stimulation, physical stimulation alone does not suffice for perception (1966, p. 48,
1979/2015, p. 49).19 Rather, perception is thought to be possible only on the basis of “stimulus information.”
The difference between stimulus and stimulus information is crucial for ecological psychologists [see Chapters 5 and 6]. Whereas the first depends on the existence of ambient
energy capable of stimulating the organism’s sensory organs—namely, light—, the second is
contingent on the existence of a structured ambient energy array—namely, an ambient optic
array.20 Thus, according to the ecological approach, it is the structure of the ambient optic
array that contains information for perception and action and not the light per se. This ambient array, in addition, can undergo transformations and changes, which serve to reveal new
information in the form of flux and invariant patterns (see Figure 2.1).
Importantly, because ecological psychology rejects the assumption that stimuli are the
basis of perception,21 the classical objection that “moment-by-moment stimuli are simply too
impoverished to account for the richness, variety, and specificity of the [intelligent] behaviors
that animals exhibit” (O’Brien & Opie, 2015, p. 724) does not undermine it. The reason for
this is that ecological psychologists can agree that moment-by-moment stimuli might be too
impoverished to guide action while, at the same time, disagree that stimuli are all that it is
given for the behaving organisms. Unlike stimuli, the ambient energy array is thought to be
In fact, Gibson wrote an extensive critique of the very notion of “stimulus” as applied in experimental psychology (Gibson, 1960/1982). As he argues, the notion of stimulus remained ill-defined
in the scientific literature, being flawed by inconsistencies and contradictions.
20 The phenomenon of all reflections and refractions of light on the surfaces of the environment
generates what Gibson dubs the “ambient optic array” (see Gibson, 1979/2015, Ch. 5).
21 As Gibson (1960/1982) explicates: “We must learn to conceive an array not as mosaic of stimuli
but as a hierarchy of forms within forms, and a flux not as a chain of stimuli but as a hierarchy of
sequences within longer sequences” (p. 343).
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informationally rich and sufficient to guide behavior without needing mental representations
(Gibson, 1979/2015, Ch. 4; see Segundo-Ortin, Heras-Escribano & Raja, forthcoming
[Chapter 5]).

Figure 2.1 The schema represents the transformations in the ambient optic array brought forth by

the movement of the observer (from Gibson, 1979/2015, Fig. 5.4, p. 65, with permission).

Second, ecological psychology is famous for rejecting the depiction of perception as a
passive process that occurs ‘inside’ the organism after sensory stimulation. Instead, Gibsonians conceive of perception as a kind of action, something that animals do (Gibson, 1974).
According to the ecological picture, an important part of perception involves the active exploration of the environment by the organism. Perceptual processes are often taken to
involve the observer moving around to produce transformations in the ambient array—the
so-called “perception-action loops”—as well as actively paying attention to (“picking up”)
some informational patterns instead of others.
Ecological psychologists thus reject the picture according to which perception and action constitute the input and output of cognition, and, with it, the explanatory schema put
forth by S-R theory—and kept by most representational theories of cognition (see Reed,
1996, pp. 99–100; Hurley, 1998).22

Turvey (2019) makes the distinction between ecological psychology and S-R behaviorism especially clear. As he explains, in the ecological approach “the surroundings with respect to which
organisms behave are not to be understood as collections of so many triggering stimuli, and the
behaving organisms are not to be understood as collections of so many conditioned and unconditioned reflexes. Rather than simply reacting to triggering stimuli, organisms cleverly exploit the
information about their surroundings and their movements to control their actions both retrospectively (“after the fact”) and prospectively (“before the fact”)” (p. 376).
22

43

The case of ecological psychology suffices to show that it is erroneous to assume that
there is no difference in explanatory resources between S-R behaviorism and all other nonrepresentational theories of cognition. I have shown the flaw in the eliminative abductive
argument for IT by focusing on ecological psychology and the radical embodied theories of
cognition that are based on it, but similar arguments have been made in regard to other
radical embodied approaches such as autopoietic enactivism (see Di Paolo et al., 2017, pp.
142–146). Therefore, in the absence of an alternative argument that shows that all current
non-representational accounts of cognition are explanatory defective, the view that representational theories of cognition, whatever form they take, provide the only remotely plausible
explanations for intelligent behavior is unjustified.

The argument from positive abduction

The third and final type of argument for establishing IT takes the form of a positive abductive
argument. Scholars who endorse this argumentative strategy try to demonstrate that representational theories are better suited than their non-representational counterparts to account
for all forms of cognitive behavior.
This section analyzes two prominent attempts to argue for IT in this way. These attempts focus on perceptual and sensorimotor psychology, and advance the claim that our
most well-agreed upon and empirically confirmed theories in these domains show that mental representations are indispensable to explain perception and motor control. The focus on
these domains is not arbitrary or casual; rather, it is motivated by the fact that it is in these
domains that radical embodied theories of cognition are more relevant. Thus, the authors
committed to this positive abductive strategy argue that if we can show that representational
theories of cognition as better suited to account for perception and motor control than their
non-representational counterparts we have good reasons to think, in general, that representations “are scientifically indispensable aspects of mentality” (Rescorla, 2016, p. 4, emphasis added).
A first pass objection to this reasoning is that even if it turned out that mental representations are indispensable to explain perception and motor control, it would not follow
that mental representations are indispensable to explain all forms of cognition. I will not
press this issue here. Instead, I will note the following. Because IT is a thesis about all forms
of cognitive activity, if it can be shown that the positive abductive arguments for the explanatory indispensability of mental representations are unsuccessful in the domains of either
perceptual or sensorimotor psychology, then this argumentative strategy for IT can be safely
put to rest. In what follows I elaborate on this point further.
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Burge (2010) illustrates this positive abductive strategy. As he writes, “psychological
states described in [representational] terms are explanatorily indispensable. Some of the most
rigorous, powerful parts of psychology use representational terms. […] Such terms are a
secure part of science” (pp. 82-83, emphasis added).
Burge defends this view by appealing to the explanatory influence that classical computational theories of perception have in current perceptual and sensorimotor psychology.
One such classical computational theory is Marr’s theory of vision (1982). On Marr’s theory,
visual perception is explained as consisting of a series of computational processes for the
construction of 3-D image of the distal environment from the 2-D images projected on the
retina. It is usually assumed by defenders of classical computational theories of cognition
that cognitive computations, including the kind of computations involved in vision, take
place over mental representations.
In light of this assumption, Burge (2010) claims that since perceptual psychology is
committed to a classical computational explanatory paradigm, “[t]his science uses an explanatory paradigm that makes attribution of perceptual states, with specific representational
contents and veridicality conditions, fundamental to its explanations” (2010, p. 318). On this
basis, Burge asserts that the empirical successes gathered by these classical computational
theories evince that mental representations are indispensable to explain vision (p. 318; see
also Shapiro, 2014, p. 213). This conclusion is further generalized to sensorimotor psychology where, according to Burge, it is empirically well-confirmed that there are representational
states that have “a causal role in engendering animal action” (2010, p. 310).
Rescorla (2016) subscribes to this same sort of argumentative strategy. Yet, unlike
Burge (2010), he does so by appealing to Bayesian theories of perception and motor control.
The reason for this is that, according to Rescorla, Bayesian theories are widely recognized as
“our best current theories in sensorimotor psychology” (p. 4).
Bayesian sensorimotor theories differ from classical Marr-like approaches in significant
ways. Unlike classical computational theories, Bayesian theories posit prediction and errorminimization as key aspects to understanding perception and motor control. This error-minimization process takes the form of Bayesian belief optimization. The core notion of
Bayesian belief optimization is “subjective probability,” p(h), where h is a hypothesis that
reflects a possible state of the world—a possible shape of an object, a possible position of
my hand, and so on—, and p(h) the probability the system assigns to h. Bayes’ rule dictates
that when the system receives a sensory input, e, it must update p(h) replacing it with the
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posterior probability p(h|e)—the probability of h given e.23 This allows the system to optimize
the distribution of probabilities among its hypotheses, generating more reliable predictions
about the distal causes of its sensory inputs.
Although Rescorla acknowledges that Bayesian sensorimotor psychologists do not use
locutions such as “truth,” “accuracy,” or “veridicality conditions,” when explaining perception and motor control, he asserts that a philosophical analysis of their methods and results
reveals that such scientists are neck deep into a representational viewpoint of cognition. As
he explicates, since Bayesian sensorimotor theories explain perception and motor control by
positing sub-personal hypotheses with truth or veridicality conditions they “assign a central
explanatory role to representational content” (p. 24).
So, if Bayesian theories constitute our best current theories in sensorimotor psychology, and if such theories assign a central explanatory role to mental representation, it follows
that mental representations play a central explanatory role in our best current sensorimotor
psychology. According to Rescorla, it entails that “[w]e should embrace representation as a
genuine, scientifically indispensable aspect of mentality” (p. 24).
The argument of Burge (2010) and Rescorla (2016) can be summarized as follows.
Assuming that a given theoretical framework, F, provides the best current empirical explanation for perception and motor control, if it can be shown that F takes mental
representations as being explanatorily indispensable, then it follows that mental representations are indispensable to explain perception and motor control, according to our best
current empirical science.
Both premises of the argument are problematic. To begin with, neither of these authors give reasons for thinking that their preferred frameworks provide the best explanations
for perception and motor control. On the contrary, this is simply assumed to be true in light
of the “stunning empirical successes” (Shapiro, 2014, p. 213) gathered both by classical computational and Bayesian theories.
Yet in assessing what best explains perception and motor control, we must also take
into account the empirical successes yielded by explanatory models inspired by the enactive
and the ecological approaches to cognition. Consider, for example, the relevance of General
Tau Theory in accounting for activities involving the closing of a spatial gap—namely, braking our car before colliding an approaching obstacle (Lee, 2009). According to General Tau
Theory, the optic flow generated as the driver approaches an obstacle contains information
23

Bayes’ rule is standardly formalized as follows:
p(h|e) = p(e|h)p(h)/p(e)
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related to the time remaining until collision (see Chapter 5). By hypothesis, the driver can
manage to brake the car by detecting this information and adjusting her braking on a moment-by-moment basis. According to Lee (2009), the only information a driver needs to
prospectively control braking is τx(t), this is, the rate of change of the time remaining to close
a gap, τx, over time, and this is given in the rate to which the obstacle centrifugally expands
in her optic field as a consequence of the approaching. Lee’s equations predict that if the
agent continuously adjusts braking to maintain τx(t) ≤ 0.5 she will be able to stop the car
before colliding. Studies conducted by Lee and colleagues showed that, on average, expert
drivers stopping at designated points continuously adjust their breaking to keep τx(t) at 0.42.
For empirical applications of General Tau Theory to different sensorimotor tasks see Lee
(2009).
As explained by Fajen (2007), General Tau Theory not only offers an empirically wellconfirmed model to explain behaviors involving closing spatial gaps, it also offers a parsimonious explanation for them. Because the information relevant to successfully perform these
tasks is directly available in the optic flow of the perceiver, internal models of the environment and perceptual estimates are deemed unnecessary. Hence, if we are to be convinced
that classical computational and Bayesian sensorimotor theories provide the best explanations for perception and motor control we have to be shown that these theories can provide
a better explanation for the kind of cognitive tasks covered by General Tau Theory.
Second, even if it turns out that either classical computational or Bayesian approaches
constitute the best theoretical frameworks for explaining perception and motor control, it is
an open question whether such frameworks need to be cashed out in representational terms,
and whether doing so is more explanatorily beneficial. Neither Rescorla (2016) nor Burge
(2010) offer an explicit rebuttal to those argument that claim that classical computational and
Bayesian approaches are best characterized in non-representational terms.
Chomsky (1995) is famous for arguing that the notion of representation does not play
any explanatory role in classical computational theories of cognition. The reason, he argues,
is that the kind of computational states posited by these theories do not refer to anything in
contentful ways. Commenting on Marr’s (1982) theory, Chomsky writes the following:
No notion like “content,” or “representation of,” figures within the theory. […]
The same is true when Marr writes that he is studying vision as “a mapping from
one representation to another, and in the case of human vision, the initial representation is in no doubt—it consists of arrays of image intensity values as detected by
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the photoreceptors in the retina” (Marr, 1982, p. 31)—where “representation” is
not to be understood relationally, as “representation of.” (1995, pp. 52-53)
Egan has provided a similar interpretation (2003, 2010, 2018). According to her, classical computational theories in perceptual (Marr, 1982) and sensorimotor psychology
(Shadmehr & Wise, 2005) “explain a cognitive capacity by appeal to an independently wellunderstood mathematical function under which the physical system is subsumed […] what
gets computed, according to these computational models, is the value of a mathematical
function” (2018, p. 252).24 The computational structures and processes posited by these theories, she asserts, can be said to have “mathematical content,” but not representational
content.25
Egan exemplifies this idea by appealing to the way edge perception is explained by
Marr’s theory (1982). According to Marr, in order to perceive edges, the visual system first
takes intensity values at discrete points in the retinal image. Then, it calculates the rate to
which this intensity varies over the whole image. This process leads to the detection of sharp
intensity gradients across the retinal image, which are taken as proxies for physical boundaries. As Egan explicates, it is this mathematical, “function-theoretic characterization” of the
different computational processes performed by the visual system that provides the explanatory core of the theory, and not the informal description in terms of representational
contents. If Egan is right, then representational contents “are not part of the essential characterization of the device and are not fruitfully regarded as part of the computational theory
proper” (2018, p. 253).26
Similar arguments have been raised concerning Bayesian sensorimotor theories. Consider the on-going debate regarding whether Predictive Processing (PP)—arguably, one of
the most successful and influential approaches among the Bayesian theories—needs to be
understood in representational terms.
According to PP, cognitive systems embody a hierarchical generative model of the
external environment, this is as a probabilistic mapping from sensory inputs (both proprioceptive and exteroceptive) to its most likely causes. This generative model is deemed
24 Functions are here understood as “mappings from sets (the arguments of the function) to sets
(its values)” (Egan, 2018, p. 252)
25 Recall that both Rescorla and Burge conceive of representational contents in terms of truth,
veridicality, or accuracy conditions. A secondary debate would be whether the mathematical contents
envisioned by Egan can be said to constitute mental representations of a different kind. For a discussion about this topic, see Hutto and Myin (forthcoming).
26 Egan nonetheless disagrees with Chomsky (1995) that we should abandon representation talking
altogether. On the contrary, she contends that representational attribution can still play a heuristic
role in cognitive science (2003, p. 100; 2010, pp. 256–257).
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“hierarchical” because it is organized in multiple layers or levels, whereby each upper level
generates predictions about the activity at the levels below.
Authors who subscribe to a representational reading of PP assume that perception and
motor control depend on top-down, knowledge-driven, unconscious inferential predictions
that combine current sensory information with information represented at the different levels of the generative model (Clark, 2016, p. 6; see also Gładziejewski, 2016; Hohwy, 2013;
Williams, 2018; Williams & Colling, 2017). Moreover, prediction errors generated by the mismatches between the top-down generated predictions and the actual sensory data are used
to update the previous probability distributions. Thus, representationalists contend, because
of the on-going agent-environment dynamical interchange, the internal generative model becomes a more accurate representation of the environment, minimizing prediction error and
improving the organism’s overall fitness.
Surely, such representational reading constitutes the canonical approach to PP. And
yet such reading is not obviously inevitable. A number of authors have advanced versions of
PP that are not cast in representational terms. For example, it has been argued that even
though the organisms’ anticipatory capabilities are grounded in structural and functional adjustments at the neural level that occur as a consequence of previous interactions and that
result in prediction-error minimization, “such adjustments need not be representationally
based and evidence-driven” (Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 71; Anderson, 2017). In a similar vein,
Bruineberg and colleagues (2016) have provided an interpretation of PP in which “the function of the generative model is not to provide the agent with a representation of the
dynamical structure of the environment […] but rather to steer its interactions (over multiple
timescales) with its environment in such a way that a robust brain-body-environment system
is maintained” (p. 2440, emphasis original; see also Gallagher & Allen, 2016).
Kirchhoff and Robertson (2018) have further motivated this non-representational
reading of PP by focusing on the Kullback-Leibler (KL)-divergence. The KL-divergence
measures prediction error. 27 It reflects the relative divergence between the prior recognition
density distribution of a variable, q(h), and the posterior density distribution of that variable,
p(h|e), both of which are internal to the system. Assuming that the Bayesian brain is in the
business of minimizing the divergence between q(h) and p(h|e), Kiefer and Hohwy (2018)
argue that the KL-divergence should be understood as providing the brain with an indirect
measure of misrepresentation. As they write: “As long as KL[(q|h)||p(h|e)]>0, the inferred

To simplify, the KL-divergence reflects the extra number of inferences the system needs to perform in order to account for a particular observation.
27
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state of the world given by q(h) is a misrepresentation” (p. 2408). Accordingly, if the KLdivergence is higher than 0, it means that one probability density is misrepresenting another
probability density. Therefore, since the system is meant to adjust its predictions on the basis
of such divergence, it follows that the process of prediction-error minimization needs to be
explained in representational terms.
Against this view, Kirchhoff and Robertson (2018) assert that even though the KLdivergence carries information about the divergence between the probability density of the
two variables, “[i]t is nothing over and above a non-representational measure of Shannon
information” (2018, p. 11). The argument of Kirchhoff and Robertson can be summarized
as follows.
The first step is to note that the KL-divergence reflects the relative entropy between
the two probability distributions, q(h) and p(h|e). In information theory, the entropy of a
variable, X, with a particular distribution, p, indicates the uncertainty or unpredictability of
that variable (Shannon, 1948). The higher the dispersion p of X, the higher its entropy and
unpredictability. Relative entropy is a special case of mutual information: it shows how the
information about q(h) reduces the entropy of p(h|e), and vice versa. Mutual information is
an instance of generalized synchrony, where generalized synchrony indicates the degree of
coupling between both probability distributions (see also Bruineberg et al., 2016). So conceived, then, generalized synchrony is a relation of covariance. To say that q(h) covaries with
p(h|e) is to say that they systematically vary in the distribution of uncertainty—whenever q(h)
has low entropy, p(h|e) has low entropy too, and vice versa. This is of crucial importance, for
covariance is widely recognized, both by representationalists (Lee, 2018; Shapiro, 2014) and
non-representationalists (Hutto & Myin, 2013), to be insufficient for representational content. Therefore, if the KL-divergence is nothing over and above a measure of covariance
then it does not by itself suffice to determine that the Bayesian system traffics on representational contents. If Kirchhoff and Robertson (2018) are right, something in addition to the
KL-divergence must be added to justify a representational take of PP.
Both arguments suffice to show that the claim that mental representations are scientifically indispensable to explain perception and motor control have yet to be justified.
Neither Rescorla (2016) nor Burge (2010) offer substantive reasons to think that Bayesian
and classical computational accounts provide the best explanatory models for perception and
motor control. And, even if it was the case that perception and motor control are best explained either by Bayesian or classical computational theories, it is an open debate whether
these accounts should be characterized in representational terms. In light of this, I conclude
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that the positive abductive argumentative strategy for IT does not succeed in justifying it
either.

Conclusion

Many in the field remain persuaded that positing mental representations is indispensable to
explain any and all forms of cognitive activity. Thorough this paper, I have shown that the
three main kinds of argumentative strategies that have been advanced in favor of IT are
flawed.
The first argument takes the form of a deductive inference. Authors who endorse this
strategy assert that mental representation is a necessary condition for cognition. From this,
it deduced that (i) only those processes that involve mental representations are cognitive
processes, and (ii) only those theories that posit the existence of mental representations are
theories about cognition. I have argued, however, that this conceptually-based strategy is
incompatible with the kind of naturalistic methodology to which cognitive science subscribes. Therefore, philosophers committed to methodological naturalism should avoid
taking this path.
The second type of argument takes the form of an eliminative abduction—an argument from an inference to the only explanation. Authors who endorse this strategy claim
that once we abandon the view that mental representations mediate sensory input and behavioral output, all we have left in terms of explanatory resources reduces to either hardwired or learned stimulus-response (S-R) associations. Accordingly, any non-representational
theory of cognition, including radical embodied theories, must necessarily collapse into a
form of S-R behaviorism. Focusing on the case of ecological psychology I have argued that
it is erroneous to assume that there is no difference in explanatory resources between S-R
behaviorism and all other non-representational theories of cognition. Therefore, in the absence of an alternative argument that shows that all current non-representational accounts
of cognition are explanatory defective, I have revealed a crippling flaw in the eliminative
abductive argument for IT.
The last type of argumentative strategy takes the form of a positive abduction. Scholars
who endorse this strategy try to demonstrate that representational theories are better suited
to account for every form of cognitive behavior than their non-representational counterparts.
I have analyzed two prominent attempts to argue for IT in this way. These attempts focus
on perceptual and sensorimotor psychology, advancing the claim that the most empirically
confirmed theories in these domains—namely, classical computational approaches and
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Bayesian theories—evince that mental representations are indispensable for explaining perception and motor control. Because IT is a thesis about all forms of cognitive activity, if
these specific attempts can be shown to be unsuccessful, then this argumentative strategy for
IT can be put to rest. I have offered a two-fold argument for this. First, I have argued that
there are no substantive reasons to think that either Bayesian or classical computational accounts provide the best explanations for perception and motor control. Second, I have
argued that even if it was the case that perception and motor control are best explained either
by Bayesian or classical computational theories, it is an open debate whether these accounts
are to be characterized in representational terms. In light of this, I conclude that the positive
abductive argumentative strategy does not succeed to justify IT.
To be clear, this paper has advanced no argument that non-representational theories
of cognition constitute better explanations than the representational ones. The spirit of this
paper is purely methodological. It shows that there are no compelling reasons to dismiss the
possibility that some cognitive activities can be explained in non-representational terms. In
light of this, I conclude that naturalistic minded philosophers of mind should be wary of
making pronouncements that declare radical embodied theories of cognition, as a class, untenable.
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Chapter 3
Are plants cognitive?
Plant intelligence from a radical embodied perspective

According to Adams (2018), cognition cannot be realized in plants and bacteria. In his view,
plants and bacteria respond to the here-and-now in a hardwired, inflexible manner, and are
therefore incapable of cognitive activity. This article takes issue with the pursuit of plant
cognition from the perspective of an empirically informed philosophy of plant neurobiology.
As we argue, empirical evidence shows, contra Adams, that plant behavior is in many ways
analogous to animal behavior. This renders plants suitable to be described as cognitive agents
in a non-metaphorical way. Sections two to four review the arguments offered by Adams in
light of scientific evidence on plant adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, as well
as learning and memory. Section five introduces the ‘phyto-nervous’ system of plants. To
conclude, section six resituates the quest for plant cognition into a broader approach in cognitive science, as represented by enactive and ecological schools of thought. Overall, we aim
to motivate the idea that plants may be considered genuine cognitive agents. Our hope is to
help propel public awareness and discussion of plant intelligence once appropriately stripped
of anthropocentric preconceptions of the sort that Adams’ position appears to exemplify.

Segundo-Ortin, M., & Calvo, P. (2019). Are plants cognitive? A reply to Adams. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part A, 73, 64–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.001
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Chapter 3
Are plants cognitive?
Plant intelligence from a radical embodied perspective
There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.
— Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

Extra! Extra! A new war on cognition!

Fred Adams (2018) begins his recent Cognition wars by announcing that “there is a war going
on over what counts as cognition” (p. 20). The conflict has two main battlefields. The first,
a long-standing one, pertains to the discussion between what he calls “the traditional view”
in cognitive science—that is, the view that equates cognition with brain-bound processes—
, and the theories of embodied (Varela et al., 1991) and extended (Clark & Chalmers, 1998)
cognition. The second battlefield is relatively newer and has to do with the kinds of organisms across phyla we deem to be cognitive. As Adams advances, a number of plant scientists
and bacteriologists have recently informed us that plants and bacteria do behave in a cognitive or intelligent way. He focuses on this second battlefield, promising to evaluate both the
scope and plausibility of such claims.
After analyzing different instances of behavior in plants and bacteria, Adams concludes
that scientists who call such behaviors cognitive must mean something entirely different by
‘cognition.’ When scientists say that plants and bacteria ‘learn,’ ‘decide,’ or ‘choose,’ they
necessarily mean something different to what we mean when we say, for instance, that ‘Ana
chooses wine instead of beer.’ Plants and bacteria, he suggests, respond to the here-and-now
in a hard-wired, inflexible manner, meaning that, they are incapable of cognitive activity.
Thus, attributing cognitive abilities to plants and bacteria is a profound mistake, unless such
attributions are figurative or metaphorical:
The use of cognitive terms by plant scientists and biologists who study plant and
bacterial behavior, is likely being used because there is no better term for what these
scientists have discovered, namely, that these organisms use informational exchanges with the environment and other cells in the organism to guide and control
behavior. That is, they are systems whose behavior is informationally driven. […]
It is for that reason that these scientists are taking what Dennett (1987) has called
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the “intentional stance” towards these organisms. Taking this stance is perfectly
harmless if one is using it as a mere heuristic device or metaphor, but if one intends
the cognitive ascriptions to be true, then it is not harmless. (2018, p. 30)
In this paper, we aim to show that Adam’s conclusions with regard to this matter are
unfounded.28
To keep the record straight, we agree with Adams that inflexible, hard-wired reactions
to current environmental stimuli are not interesting from a cognitive science perspective. Yet
recent empirical discoveries suggest that the behavioral repertoire of plants (and bacteria for
that matter) contains much more than hard-wired reflexes.29 Plants appear to behave in ways
that are adaptive, flexible, anticipatory, and goal-directed. Taking this into account, we argue
that plant behavior is in many ways analogous to animal behavior, meaning that plants are
suitable candidates to be described as cognitive agents in a non-metaphorical way.
Survival mandates that organisms must explore the environment and secure life-sustaining resources. Although sessile, plants are no exception. To accomplish this need, plants
have evolved different foraging strategies, and sensitivity to a variety of environmental cues,
that we can appreciate as part of their vast behavioral repertoire (Silvertown & Gordon,
1989). Generally speaking, plant behavior takes the idiosyncratic form of ‘phenotypic plasticity’, courtesy of cell elongation, among other tricks in their bag (Trewavas, 2017, 2014).
Overall, we aim to motivate the idea that plants may be considered cognitive agents.
To do so, our discussion is divided into five sections. The first three respectively deal with
the notions of adaptive behavior and decision-making; anticipation; and learning and
memory. In this first part, we discuss specific claims made by Adams (2018) regarding the
alleged lack of cognitive abilities in plants. We shall then move on to introduce the ‘nervous’
system of plants in the context of the emerging field of Plant Neurobiology (Calvo, 2016).
We end by resituating the quest for plant cognition into a broader approach in cognitive
science, as represented by (post-cognitivist) embodied, enactive and ecological schools of
thought.
Before starting, we advocate that those interested in the debate over plant cognition
take into serious consideration the need to inform theoretical discussion with tools, such as
To build his argument, Adams relies on Ben-Jacob (2009), Calvo Garzón & Keijzer (2011), Calvo
Garzón (2007), Lyon & Keijzer (2007), and Trewavas (2003). In what follows we shall take issue with
Adams’ charges from an empirically informed philosophy of cognitive science perspective.
29 For the sake of concision, our reply focuses exclusively upon plants, although the line of response
to be rehearsed herewith applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case of bacterial cognition. See, for example,
Baluška & Levin (2016), Hung (2017), Tagkopoulos, Liu, & Tavazoie (2008). For a review of the early
history of intelligent behavior in bacteria see Jennings (1906).
28

56

time-lapse photography, that have the potential to unearth patterns of behavior. Generally
speaking, plants’ responses are markedly slower than those of animals. From this, we run the
risk of concluding that plants cannot stand up to animal comparison, only to find out that
the methodologies and tools of observation were inappropriate for the model organism in
question.

On adaptive behavior and decision-making

Traditionally, plant behavior has been interpreted as purely reactive and mechanical, that is,
as an overt manifestation of hardwired instincts triggered by environmental stimuli. Adams
(2018) explicitly shares this view. As he suggests, plants are no more sophisticated than a
garage door equipped with a presence detector. In the presence of a sufficiently large object,
the sensor triggers, causing the mechanism that closes the door to stop automatically. This
behavior, Adams argues, can be said to be informationally-driven, caused by the detection of
a relevant environmental condition, but is not cognitive:
Some plants detect drops in temperature and this causes the leaves to fold, only to
reopen when the temperature climbs. This is a kind of sensor, and it is coupled with
processes that close and open the leaves (no less than closing the garage door). But
the plant thinks not, cognizes not (the same as the garage door). (p. 28)
Scientific evidence, however, calls doubts upon this received view. To begin with, plant
behavior can be directional (e.g., phototropic sun-tracking) or non-directional (e.g., nastic
responses such as the folding of some plant leaves, or the closing of the traps of some carnivorous species). Such responses can also be positive or negative. For instance, whereas
roots are photophobic and exhibit negative phototropic behavior, they are positively geotropic, growing downwards (Burbach et al., 2012). Shoots, by contrast, generally grow away
from the gravity vector, and towards light sources.
It does not mean, however, that plants react to gravity or light on a one-by-one basis—
that is, by producing automatic responses to individual sources of stimulation. As a matter
of fact, multiple experiments show that plants can sample and integrate over 20 diverse biotic
and abiotic parameters. These parameters are continuously monitored by plants with an eye
to deciding how to behave adaptively (Baluška & Mancuso, 2009; Hodge, 2009; Karban,
2015; Karban et al., 2014).
Plant roots, for example, are sensitive to many environmental cues, including gravity,
water, minerals, chemicals and alien roots (Baluška et al., 2006; Yokawa & Baluška, 2018). It
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is by combining information from these multiple vectors that plants can maximize their fitness, eliding responses that involve structural changes at the level of their physiology,
morphology, and phenotype.
For illustration, consider salt-avoidance behavior, as performed by the root apparatus.
Because salinity is a major constraint for plant growth (a high concentration in the substrate
below ground can disrupt rather dramatically cellular biochemistry), roots have evolved sensitivity to abnormal saline conditions, being able to adapt their growth accordingly. Li and
Zhang (2008) tested this capability in Arabidopsis thaliana, the plant lab model par excellence (see
also Sun et al. 2008; Yokawa et al. 2014). Li and Zhang set up a two-layer medium in a growth
bottle, putting a normal nutrient agar medium at the top, and a salt-stressed agar medium at
the bottom. As expected, the roots of seedlings started to grow straight downwards exhibiting a positive gravitropic behavior. However, as soon as the level of NaCl became slightly
higher, the roots of seedlings curved and grew upward toward the medium with lower levels
of salt. Interestingly, roots started to bend upward even before contacting the high-salt medium (250 mM NaCl) of the bottom, which, according to Li and Zhang, indicates “that roots
can sense ion gradients in the growing environment and […] make decisions that enable
roots to stay away from high salt” (2008, p. 352).
In a series of experiments with Pisum sativum, the garden pea, Dener, Kacelnik and
Shemesh (2016) have demonstrated that root growth can also vary with respect to temporal
variance in nutrient availability. For their experiment, Dener and colleagues used split-root
pea plants—that is, plants whose primary root tips are cut off, so that lateral roots can develop from the incision zone and grow in separate containers. One pot received constant
and the other one variable nutrient concentration. What they found is that when the nutrient
concentration in the first pot was sufficient for the plants to meet their metabolic needs, they
grew more roots in this pot. However, when the concentration of nutrients was not enough
for the plant to survive, plants allocated more biomass in the second pot—the one receiving
the variable nutrient concentration. For Dener and colleagues, this suggests that plants “respond strategically to patches varying in their average of nutrient availability” (p. 1765),
switching between risk-prone and risk-averse behavior as a function of resource availability.
Commenting on this experiment, Schmid (2016) claims that it indicates that “theories of
decision making and optimal behavior developed for animals and humans can be applied to
plants” (p. R677).
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Moreover, resources are often sparse, and organisms have to compete for them. To
do so, plants have evolved the ability to detect the presence of others, developing different
responses accordingly.
Cahill et al. (2010) measured patterns of root growth of Abutilon theoprasti, an annual
plant from the Malvaceae family, while manipulating both competition and resource distribution. Exemplars of A. theoprasti were planted into six combinations of soil, depending on
heterogeneity (uniform, patch-center, and patch-edge) and competition conditions (alone
and with a competitor). In all treatments, individuals were planted on opposite sides of the
pot. Cahill and colleagues reported different foraging behavior depending on the conditions.
When plants grew alone, they displayed both maximum root distribution and maximum rooting breadth. This was done independently of how resources were distributed. When a
competitor was present, by contrast, plants adopted restricted foraging strategies (different
root distribution and breadth), depending on the allocation and distribution of resources.
For Cahill and colleagues, these results suggest that root placement in A. theoprasti is determined by the non-additively combination of information regarding the neighbor presence
and resource distribution.
Likewise, Trewavas (2014) reports that when young exemplars of Calamagrostis canadiensis, a species of wetland grass commonly known as ‘bluejoint,’ are offered adjacent habitats
to grow, they choose the habitat with the best conditions of competition, warmth, and light.
Moreover, he mentions, C. canadiensis “also discriminate these conditions in combination […]
choosing light plus warm soil in preference to others” (p. 84).
Light foraging and competition also offer a good study case. Gruntman et al. (2017)
conducted a series of experiments with Potentilla reptans, a clonal plant in the Rosaceae family.
In clonal plants, light competition is well-known for eliciting three types of phenotypic responses: shade avoidance, shade tolerance, and competition-avoidance. Shade avoidance
responses typically involve morphological adjustments that result in vertical growth, thereby
allowing the plant to position its leaves in conditions of higher light exposure. Shade tolerance responses, instead, involve morphological changes that promote plant performance
under limited light conditions. These morphological changes typically involve the increasing
of the leaf area. Finally, competition-avoidance responses typically involve horizontal spread.
Gruntman and colleagues (2017) built an experimental setup that simulated three different light competition settings. The first one simulated similarly sized and dense neighbors,
which can be outgrown vertically but offers limited advantages of horizontal growth. The
second one simulated tall-dense neighbors, offering limited advantages of either vertical or
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horizontal growth. The third one simulated taller but sparse neighbors, which cannot be
outgrown vertically but offers higher light availability in the horizontal direction.
They found that P. reptans can tailor its phenotype according to the relative stature and
densities of their opponents. When subjected to the first setting, plants displayed the highest
vertical inclination—viz., the highest height-per-diameter ratio. When subjected to the second setting, by contrast, plants exhibited a lower vertical inclination, but the highest leaf area.
Finally, exemplars under tall and sparse neighbors displayed low levels of vertical inclination
and leaf area, but longer stolons.
Taking stock, as the previous examples illustrate (but see Trewavas 2014, 2017, and
references therein, for many other examples), we can see that plants’ interactions with the
environment need not be automatic responses to single cues. Plants sample different informational vectors, and respond flexibly by adapting both their morphology and their
phenotype to increase energy intake and efficiency. Crucially, to repeat, plants can respond
not just to the particular magnitude (and direction) of a given environmental variable, but
also to its temporal and relational profile with respect to other variables (Silvertown & Gordon, 1989). This is anything but unsophisticated ‘garage door’ behavior.
A note of caution is needed, though. The possibility that plants combine information
in a pairwise fashion (e.g., gravity vector vs. light; minerals vs. salt concentration) cannot be
discarded beforehand. The fact that plant behaviors are not automatic responses to single
cues (e.g., salt concentration together with gravitation accounts for partly geotropic responses), is compatible with the alternative hypothesis that plants are able to separate the
cues linearly and, in this case, simply allow salt, if present in high concentrations, to override
the gravitational cue. If that were the case, the analogy between plant and animal behavior
would appear unjustified. But, by the same token, it cannot be discarded that the stream of
sensorial information is being integrated and assessed in a richer, contextual manner. Complex configurations of stimuli may need to be discriminated, if the flexible capacities of plants
are to be accounted for.
In sum, more research is needed to distinguish those cases of plant behavior where we
may resort to relatively simple rules from those that defy a linear separation of the problem
space. Our point is simply that, considering what we know empirically, it is not clear that we
can dismiss the hypothesis that plants behave in cognitive manners, as Adams does.
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On anticipatory behavior

Anticipation is another relevant feature of cognition, according to Adams (2018), and we
cannot but concur. As he writes, “[i]f a system has the capacity to anticipate what is going to
happen in its environment, that sounds like the right kind of capacity to be a cognitive capacity” (p. 26). He doubts, however, that plants are capable of doing so, and we cannot but
disagree. Considering (metabolically speaking) how costly mismatches can be for organisms
whose decisions take the form of development and growth over long periods of time, and
whose changes can be flexible but sometimes also irreversible, plants cannot afford not to be
able to anticipate the future.
Although one of us (PC) has recently discussed plant anticipatory behavior at length
elsewhere (Calvo & Friston, 2017), Adams borrows a previous example from [Calvo] Garzón
(2007), and so we shall get started with Adam’s preferred example before we submit to the
reader’s consideration some of the more recent literature.
Echoing Schwartz and Koller (1986), Garzón (2007) reported that leaf laminas of Lavatera cretica, a species of flowering plant in the Mallow family, reorient during the night in
order to face the direction of sunrise ahead of time.30 Heliotropic nocturnal reorientation
constitutes a complex off-line response, and shows that L. cretica “can, not only anticipate
the direction of the sunrise, but also allows for this anticipatory behavior to be retained for
a number of days in the absence of solar-tracking” (Garzón, 2007, p. 210).
For Adams (2018), however, it is misguided to interpret heliotropic nocturnal reorientation as cognitive response. In his own words: “I fail to see why [this behavior] would
constitute the right sort of “anticipation” […] to be within the domain of the cognitive” (p. 26,
emphasis added).
But, why isn’t the offline nocturnal reorienting behavior of L. cretica leaves an instance
of cognitive anticipation? Adams offers no clear answer to this question. Instead, he shifts
the focus from the behavior itself to its underlying causes. As he asserts, whether leaf orientation is cognitive “will depend on what kind of mechanism is involved in the so-called
“anticipation,” and how it is processing information” (p. 26). As he argues, there is a form
of anticipation that is full-blown cognitive, and this is so because it involves future-oriented

This allows L. cretica to optimize sunlight intake whilst avoiding devoting metabolic resources that
are needed for other physiological processes that take place before dawn (Kreps & Kay, 1997). Although Adams only cites Garzon (2007) in this regard, the interested reader may care to consult a
somewhat more recent elaboration of the L. cretica example in Garcia Rodriguez and Calvo Garzon
(2010).
30
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representations (p. 26). Since L. cretica don’t have, presumably, these kinds of representations,
it follows that its anticipatory behavior is not cognitive.
Yet we must be cautious here. On the one hand, we have the question of whether
plants can anticipate what is about to happen in the environment. The issue here is whether
the empirical evidence we have supports this view. On the other hand, we have the question
for the mechanisms that underlie such anticipations. This is an entirely different issue, as it
pertains to what best explains the anticipatory capabilities of plants, if any.
In his analysis, Adams conflates both issues, and infers that plants’ anticipatory behavior is not cognitive because it does not involve cognitive representations.31 By doing so,
however, Adams is conflating explanandum and explanans, begging the question against nonrepresentational theories of cognition; theories that have been proposed in the past together
with representational ones (see, e.g., Calvo, 2016).
To avoid this fallacy, we recommend addressing both issues separately. In what follows, we explore the first issue. Our goal here is to motivate the view that plants do indeed
behave in an anticipatory manner.32
Anticipatory capabilities have been tested more recently at the root level with pea
plants. As reported by Novoplansky (2016), young pea plants grow different roots if subjected to variable temporally-dynamic, and static homogeneous and heterogeneous nutrient
regimes. When given a choice, plants not only develop bigger biomasses in roots located in
richer patches; in fact, they discriminately allocate more resources to roots that develop in
patches with increasing nutrient levels. Strikingly, they do so even if these patches are poorer
in absolute terms than the others. According to Novoplansky, “[t]hese findings demonstrate
that rather than responding to absolute resource availabilities, plants are able to perceive and
integrate information regarding dynamic changes in resource levels and utilize it to anticipate
growth conditions in ways that maximize their long-term performance” (p. 63). Pea plant
roots, so the evidence suggests, do not grow in a blind, hardwired way. Instead, their growth
is sensitive to relative values of resource availability, and is conditioned by the future availability of nutrients.

Adams is particularly clear on this matter. As he argues, commenting on Lyon (2006), “if she has
in mind the kind of mechanism in plants and other organisms that drive their behavior but in ways
that don’t involve cognitive level representations, then I wonder why the term “cognition” is being
used literally, not metaphorically” (p. 26). For similar claims see Aizawa (2014, p. 36 [chapter 1]).
32 Reasons of space prevent us from exploring the second issue—Is the anticipatory behavior of
plants best explained by positing cognitive representations?—but see García Rodríguez and Calvo
Garzon (2010) for an elaboration of the idea that architectural constraints per se do not entail that
cognition is a matter of representations.
31
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This and other examples have led some theorists to conceive of plants as proactive,
“anticipatory engines” (Calvo & Friston, 2017; Calvo, Baluška, & Sims, 2016). According to
this view, plants are constantly monitoring gradients and guessing ahead of time what the world
is like. These predictions enable them to minimize surprise in pretty much the same way as
animals do, and to adapt to the local conditions via phenotypic plasticity.
It goes without saying that the interpretation of plants as anticipatory engines is still a
long shot from equating their behaviors with, for instance, the planning of the western scrub
jay corvid (Aphelocoma californica). With an eye to provisioning itself for future needs, this
corvid can even store away types of foods in hiding in places where they can be retrieved at
will as it becomes hungry the following day (Raby et al., 2007). Again, more research is needed
before we can conclude that, for example, the dynamic foraging behavior of pea plants—
whose roots anticipate growth conditions and develop bigger root biomasses in patches with
an increasing amount of nutrients (Novoplansky, 2016)—can be interpreted along similar
lines, as opposed to being explained by appealing to chemotactic signal integration, as has
been done in bacteria (Khan et al., 1995).

On learning and memory

Relying on Firn (2004) and [Calvo] Garzón (2007), Adams (2018) advocates for a skeptical
position toward the possibility of learning in plants. As he argues, “the term “learn” cannot
mean the same thing in the mouth of plant scientist as it means when used by the animallearning theorist” (p. 21). For him, what plant scientists call “learning” is more accurately
described in terms of mutation—viz., changes in the genotype of the plant. This sort of
learning, he adds, is not of the same kind as the one we find in human and non-human
animals, “who learn in their lifetime and not at the level of the genome” (p. 22).33
Recent empirical evidence, however, contradicts this view, suggesting that plants enhance their chance of survival by modifying their behavioral repertoire through learning and
memory processes.

Other philosophers have shown similar skepticism on this matter. Tye (1997), for example, asserts
that “[t]he behavior of plants is inflexible. It is genetically determined and, therefore, not modifiable
by learning. Plants do not learn from experience” (p. 302). In a similar vein, Sterelny (2005) argues
that changes in the behavior of plants are best explained as the results of mutation at the level of
lineage. If that is the case, there is nothing such as learning at the level of the individual—that is,
learning as consequence of past interactions with the environment.
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The sensitive plant Mimosa pudica—a species that is well-known for its capacity to fold
its leaves when disturbed—is the best-studied model for habituation, a form of non-associative learning. Experimental results date back to Pfeffer (1873) and Bose (1906). The former
showed how the leaflets would diminish their folding response to a frequently repeated mechanical stimulus. Bose, in turn, extended Pfeffer’s insights to electrical stimuli, showing that
the leaflet folding response could be likewise triggered electrically, and not just mechanically
(for a review of the history of learning in plants, see Abramson & Chicas-Mosier, 2016)
More recently, Gagliano et al. (2014) have studied habituation in Mimosa in the context
of light foraging and risk predation. Applying the theory and methodology of animal learning
research, Gagliano and colleagues subjected exemplars of Mimosa to repeated 15 cm falls.
Although harmless, these stimuli were enough to cause leaves to fold. The goal of the experiment was to test whether Mimosa plants can detect that a repeated stimulus is harmless,
ignoring it in subsequent interactions. Like Pfeffer had done a century earlier, Gagliano and
colleagues demonstrated that leaf-folding behavior exhibits habituation, and this habituation
is responsive to environmental conditions. Their research appears to confirm that Mimosa
can learn from past interactions; indicating, in addition, that the studied exemplars developed
more efficient responses—responses for the sake of minimizing energy waste and optimizing
light foraging. Leaf-folding habituation, the study shows, is more pronounced and persistent
for exemplars growing in energetically costly environments.34 Finally, and more shockingly,
they found out that this habituated reflex lasted for up to 28 days, which demonstrates the
acquisition of a long-lasting memory in Mimosa.
And yet, however intriguing the behavior of Mimosa happens to be—the possibility to
study its behavior to the naked eye, as in the case of the Venus flytrap and other carnivorous
species, has certainly contributed to its dissemination—, plant learning is not limited to simple habituation. More sophisticated forms of learning, including Pavlovian classical
conditioning, have been reported in Mimosa exemplars (Holmes & Gruenberg, 1965), as well
as in other less flashy species.

For the experiments, exemplars of Mimosa were randomly assigned to one of the two environments, one with high light (HL) and the other with low-light (LL) conditions. After seeing that a
single drop did not elicit any behavior at change, experimenters subjected both groups of plants to a
series of seven consecutive trains of 60 drops, each at either 5 or 10 s intervals. They discovered that
leaves started to re-open even before the first train of drops was completed, and that leaves had
stopped closing by the end of the first train. They also discovered that the leaf-folding reflex habituated more rapidly under LL, suggesting that leaf-folding reflex habituation is sensitive to the
environmental conditions.
34
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Although in the case of the Mimosa studies researchers were unable to confirm the
presence of classical conditioning (Holmes & Yost, 1966), recent research on the garden pea
(Pisum sativum) has tested, successfully, the ability to learn by associating significant cues.
Gagliano et al. (2016) employed a classical conditioning paradigm where the airflow
produced by a fan (the conditioned stimulus) was predicted by the occurrence of blue light
(the unconditioned stimulus). Training took place inside a custom-designed Y-maze such as
the pattern of growth of pea seedlings could be studied as the exemplars approached the Ybifurcation, and grew either toward one arm or the other (see Figure 3.1). Their results show
not only that P. sativum can anticipate the occurrence of a biologically significant event by
relying on related environmental cues, but also that they can adapt their phototropic behavior
by associating a neutral factor—the presence and position of the fan—with the occurrence
of light.
In particular, plants were randomly assigned to two different groups. In one group,
exposure to light (L) and fan airflow (F) was on the same arm of the maze (L + F), whereas
in the other group L and F were on opposite arms (L v F). The experiment tested for both a
positive association of F with L, resulting in the plant seeking out F as a predictor of L, and
a negative association, resulting in the plant avoiding F. They found out that the majority of
seedlings exhibited a conditioned response to the fan. In the F + L group, 62% of the seedlings grew towards the fan, whereas in the F v L group, 69% of the seedlings grew in the
direction opposite to the fan.

Figure 3.1 Training and testing protocol for associative learning in pea plants. (A) During training,

plants were exposed to light (L) and (F) on either the same or in opposite arms of the Y-maze. (B)
Plants received training for three consecutive days before testing. All training days consisted of three
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sessions of 2 h separated by intervals of 1 h. The 90 min conditioned stimulus (CS) preceded the 60
min unconditioned stimulus (US), meaning that there was a 30 min overlap. (From Gagliano et al.,
2016, Fig. 1, p. 2, image used under a Creative Commons License)

This empirical data appear to contradict Adams’ (2018) views on plant learning.35 As
we have seen, plants can learn in their lifetime, and they can modify their behavioral repertoire on the basis of past events and interactions. Both associative and non-associative forms
of learning are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, and the fact that plants are capable of both
supports our thesis that plants ought to be considered as cognitive agents (see Baluška, Gagliano, & Witzany, 2018 for the most recent review of plant learning and memory).
With that being said, one could argue that it is premature to assume that Gagliano’s
experiments on associative learning in pea plants are to be interpreted alongside conditioning
experiments in the animal literature. For one thing, classical Pavlovian conditioning typically
is the one and only behaviorist perspective that the plant science community takes into account. But other forms of behaviorism could well bring new light to the discussion of plant
learning. Some neobehaviorists make use of intervening variables (see Abramson & Calvo,
2018 and references therein). In fact, altering the meaning of stimulus and response can result
in the merging of cognitive and neobehaviorist approaches (Denny, 1986).
One way or another, closer attention to ecological conditions and experimental replication (a commodity nowadays, Grice et al., 2012) will certainly shed light upon the dispute.
As Affifi (2018) observes:
If Gagliano et al. (2016) experiment is replicated and associative learning by pea
plants triangulated in laboratory settings, we should take these conditioning experiments out to field settings. […] Where and how conditioning breaks down (if it
breaks down) would provide important insights into the nature of plant intelligence.
(p. 30)
Next, we would like to call into question one more aspect of Adam’s analysis. As he
warns us, “if one attributes cognition […] to plants, one must be prepared to find the mechanisms to support such attributions. But I would add that those mechanisms as well must

The careful reader will have noted that “the majority of seedlings exhibited a conditioned response” could be interpreted as a bit of an overstatement. After all, the number of seedlings that
responded to F in the absence of L is only slightly more than half. However, as Gagliano explains
(personal communication), it should be noted that an expectation of 50:50 (random choice) is not
the baseline of reference, as the natural behavior of pea seedlings is to grow in the direction in which
L was experienced for the last time. When provided an ecological baseline, the results are consistent
with the associative learning hypothesis.
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share some similarities, if only in the ways in which they process information or the levels of
information processed” (2018, p. 21). In what follows, we take issue with the all too thorny
issue of the nervous system of plants.

The ‘nervous’ system of plants

As we saw, plants can navigate multiple vectors, producing flexible and context-dependent
responses. This ability, Trewavas (2005) argues, calls for the integration of information
among the different plant structures. Finding the signaling mechanisms that underlie such
cognitive abilities is the target of the emerging field of Plant Neurobiology (Baluška et al.,
2006; Calvo, 2016).
We are well aware that speaking of plant neurobiology can, and indeed has generated a
good deal of controversy in the past (Alpi et al., 2007; Brenner et al., 2007). Although it is
undoubtedly true that plants do not have neurons (and synapses) that could give rise to a
brain or a nervous system, they respond electrically to many different environmental factors.
Plants possess cells capable of electrical signaling and transmission; that is, cells that are functionally equivalent to animal neurons. Plant neurobiologists refer to these cells as
“phytoneurones,” and to the research area as “phytoneurology” (Calvo, Sahi, & Trewavas,
2017).
Moreover, it is important to note that although plant excitable cells lack axon-like
structures, they are capable of producing and supporting action potentials (APs), akin to
animal ones (Baluška & Mancuso, 2009) as well as variation potentials (VPs)—this time,
specific of plant cells—among other sorts of electric, as well as hydraulic and chemical, signals that have been unearthed only in recent years (Huber & Bauerle, 2016; Souza et al.,
2017).36 These electric potentials are propagated in the membranes of plant cells, being transmitted along vascular conduits distributed throughout the whole plant body, courtesy of a
complex network of bundles of phloem, xylem and cambium (Fromm & Lautner, 2007; Trebacz, Dziubinska, & Krol, 2006). Overall, this electrical transmission is crucial for plants, as
it underlies their ability to respond in a fast and yet coordinated manner to the environmental
contingencies (Trewavas, 2014)
APs and VPs relate to non-damaging and to damaging stimuli, respectively. In the case of APs,
and despite the lack of axonal projections in plant cells, information is transmitted electrically in a
wavelike manner (Choi et al., 2016). The initiating signals known to induce the spread of waves of
depolarization include physical damage, leaf and fruit removal, rapid and stressful variations in temperature, changes in light, or mechanical stress from bending, to name a few. In the case of VPs,
these can be induced by herbivore predation, heat or wounding, for instance.
36
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An important debate, in relation to one of Adams’ lines of resistance, pertains to the
form that a plant’s phyto-nervous system can take. Remarkably, plant anatomy and electrophysiology reveal that phyto-neurones are highly cross-linked, forming complex stacks of
interconnected bundles akin to the cellular networks we find in the nervous systems of invertebrates (Volkov, 2012, 2013).
Consider the Papaya tree, to take an illustration from Indian physicist, and father of the
field of plant electrophysiology, J.C. Bose. From his (unfortunately) largely ignored The Nervous Mechanism of Plants, a book that dates back to 1926, we learn that the vascular system (see
Figure 3.1) of the Papaya tree consists of vascular elements cross-linked by numerous, irregularly distributed, tangential connections. In mature stems and trunks, this vascular
architecture becomes very complex, showing tangential connections and anastomoses (crosslinks) between numerous bundles, forming a complex, reticulated system. This vascular system, originally thought to mediate exclusively the transport of water and nutrients, allows
plants to coordinate their behavior, with electric signaling occurring over long distances
through the vascular bundles (Calvo et al., 2017).

Figure 3.2 Distribution and network of vascular tissue in a single stem layer of Papaya. According

to the text in the script, there are 20 such layers of vascular tissue, one inside the other (like Russian
dolls) and surrounding the whole trunk. The bundles are connected through enormous numbers of
tangential connections and perhaps anastomoses to form a complex excitable structure. “The existence of a system of nerves enables the plant to act as a single organized whole” a requirement perhaps
for selection on fitness. (Figure and quote from Bose, 1926, Fig. 54, p. 121, with permission).

Gagliano et al. (2016) speculate as to the physiological and molecular mechanisms that
underlie associative learning, as exemplified by pea plants; epigenetic reprogramming, being
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one key factor (Thellier & Lüttge, 2013). Understood, as in the Papaya case, as a neural-like
network for the sake of information-processing,37 we can easily see how to move on from
plant physiology to plant ‘psychology.’ For illustration, consider the case of learning.
It is well known that synaptic modifiability underlies animal learning (Hebb, 1949).
Interestingly, despite the lack of neurons, it is easy to see how the same functional principles
apply to the information-processing network of Papaya, again under epigenetic principles of
the sort deployed by non-neural systems, more generally (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2009). To
cut a long story short, plant learning can take place courtesy of a phyto-neural network in
which ‘plant synapses’ can get modified as a result of experience.38 Informational signals can
thus flow selectively throughout the vascular system of plants (for a clear-cut parallelism
between plants and neural networks in learning, see Trewavas, 1999). As Trewavas (2014)
puts it:
Just as the process of learning in a brain could be represented as a time series, a set
of snapshots of developing brain connections, in plants, each snapshot may possibly be represented by developing plasmodesmatal connections or equally,
successive new tissues. So, instead of changing dendrite connections, plants form
new networks by creating new tissues, a series of developing brains as it were. (p.
14)
Having a substrate that is functionally equivalent to a nervous system of animals, and
in line with the aforementioned considerations, we submit to the reader’s consideration the
working hypothesis that plant cognition could possibly be realized, at least in part, in such
phyto-nervous system. We say “at least in part” because, following recent post-cognitivist
trends in cognitive science, we do not think that (animal) cognition is realized in the nervous
system alone. Instead, we think that cognition occurs across the brain-body-environment triplet. Applying the same rationality, we hypothesize that plant cognition happens across their
own green triplet: phyto-neuronal structures, plant body, and environment.

37 Although the notion of “information-processing” is usually associated to representational-cumcomputational theories of cognition, here it is used in a more modest and deflationary way to refer
to the transmission and integration of information in the form of chemical and electrical signals.
38 Baluška et al. (2004) consider “acting-based asymmetric adhesion domains specialized for rapid
cell-to-cell communication which is accomplished by vesicle trafficking” (p. 9) to be the functional
equivalent of the animal synapse. For a survey of many other functional similarities between plant
cells and animal neurons, see Baluška (2010).
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Conclusion: Resituating (plant) cognition

Why is the quest for plant cognition relevant? Throughout his article, Adams (2018) repeats
that there is no adequate, unified notion of cognition that fits both the behavior of humans
and the one of plants (and bacteria). On his own words: “I fail to see that there is such a
common core or that the explanation of these “basic behaviors” will yield a unified account
of cognition that will cover equally the behavior of bacteria [and plants] and humans” (p. 29).
If so, accepting that plants are cognitive agents implies using the word ‘cognition’ in equivocal ways—we must mean one thing for humans, and other for plants.
To bypass this problem, and in the absence of this unifying account, Adams suggests
restricting the use of the term, distinguishing between information-driven behavior and cognitive behavior, proper.
But, how does information-driven behavior differ from cognitive behavior? The difference, Adams argues, relies on the kind of underlying mechanisms involved in both. For
him, cognition only comes into play when the system is able to exploit representations—that
is, mental states that are subjected to semantic evaluation, namely, that can be true or false,
accurate or inaccurate, veridical or non-veridical, and so on. Such representational states, he
adds, take the form of propositional attitudes—e.g., beliefs, desires, thoughts, hopes, etc.—
and require the mastery of concepts. In light of this, he concludes, “since [plants and bacteria]
lack beliefs or concepts—the higher-level, discriminating representations associated with
genuine knowledge—what they do isn’t really cognition” (p. 23).
This position is nonetheless problematic. To begin with, there is no reason to assume,
as a necessary truth, that cognition always and everywhere depends on having representations. To do so, we argued before, is simply to beg the question against non-representational
theories of cognition.
Secondly, Adam’s approach to cognition seems overly demanding, for even if we assume that human beings are capable of conceptual competence, we can rationally wonder
whether this capability spans to non-human animals. Thus, by positing conceptual representations as the hallmark of cognition as Adams does (p. 25), we run the risk of advancing
important (and undue) limitations to our cognitive science, leaving out of consideration all
forms of sophisticated behavior that we find in the animal and plant kingdoms, and restricting the domain of the cognitive to human beings exclusively.
Adams appears effectively to fall prey to Morgan’s canon: an appeal to parsimony in
comparative psychology that, although once upon a time a commandment, is increasingly
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being called into question from all quarters in the cognitive science community. In fact, we
can say that Adams is swimming against the stream of contemporary research in comparative
cognition in this respect (Andrews, 2015; Buckner, 2017; Figdor, 2018).
Contra Adams, we propose to go a step further, and call into question not only anthropocentrism, but also zoocentrism. To do so, we suggest to adopt an approach along the
lines of enactivism (Di Paolo et al., 2017; Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017; Thompson, 2007) and
ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979/2015; Chemero, 2009; Turvey, 2019).
Going this direction entails putting the emphasis on agency and adaptivity instead of
representational and conceptual competence, conceiving of cognition primarily as information-guided flexible behavior—that is, as the capability of organisms to actively interact
with the environment in adaptive and sophisticated ways so as to maintain their systemic
autonomy by sensing and responding to informational variables. From this perspective, a
cognitive system is to be understood as an autonomous, open system that explores the environment to meet its own needs and goals, instead of simply reacting to the external
impingements, and that is capable of actively regulating its sensorimotor coupling in contextsensitive ways, both retrospectively and prospectively. Complex intelligent behavior, according to this view, needs not complex forms of cognition such as the ones posited by Adams
(2018).
Importantly, an advantage of this approach is that it invites us to think of complex
cognitive capacities such as the ones that involve representations and concepts as being
deeply rooted in the more basic processes that enable biological organisms to survive and
maintain their integrity in a dynamical environment. It thus offers valuable resources to construct a theory of cognition that reaches all the way from single cell organisms to human
beings, including plants.
Needless to say, such an enactive-ecological approach comes with its own challenges.
First of all, it requires discovering the kind of information plants exploit to cope with the
environment, as well as the sensorimotor mechanisms involved in this exploitation. Second,
it also requires clarifying the specific role that the internal dynamics—the dynamics at the
scale of the phytoneural system—have in how information is exploited and behavior engendered.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, some enactivists have expressed doubts about the cognitive status of plants. According to Froese and Di Paolo (2011), for instance, “a plant does
not have the same kind of relationship with its environment as does an animal which has to
move and perceive in order to sustain itself”(p. 9). For them, because plants need not actively
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regulate their interaction with the environment as animals (and even bacteria!) do, it is not
clear that they have evolved the kind of cognitive resources needed to perceive and actively
explore it.
In a similar vein, Barrett (2015a) compares plants with Portia spiders and asserts that:
[T]he behavior of Portia spiders is very flexible—one could almost say inventive—
and they don’t just respond to the world in a singular, fixed manner. This is true of
all animals, from amoebas to armadillos. All show at least some variability in how
they act and regulate their behavior in the world. They do so because they are animals, and not plants. (p. 71)
Thus, although sympathetic or directly committed to an ecological-enactive approach
to cognition, both Barrett (2015a) and Froese and Di Paolo (2011) align themselves with a
long-standing tradition in philosophy, a tradition that has consistently and continuously seen
plants as being fundamentally different from animals in their relationship with the environment. Patricia Churchland (1989) nicely captures this view as follows: “If you root yourself
in the ground, you can afford to be stupid. But if you move, you must have mechanism for
moving, and mechanisms to ensure that the movement is not utterly arbitrary and independent of what is going on outside” (p. 13).39
Theoretical prejudices aside, in light of the scientific evidence outlined earlier, we hope
to have shown that such a plant-blind view, whichever quarter it comes from, is unmotivated.
From our previous discussion we conclude that there are no empirical or theoretical reasons
to discard beforehand of investigation that certain patterns of plant behavior call for some
form of cognitive agency. Indeed, we think that considering plants as cognitive agents would
enable us to develop a more comprehensive account of cognition, one that sheds light on
how cognitive abilities could have evolved, perhaps differently, across phyla.

Perhaps, somewhat symptomatically, it is worth noting that even researchers such as Harry Heft,
whose work has helped lay the theoretical foundations of the ecological approach, observed in his
Ecological Psychology in Context (2001): “Categorical boundaries are rarely sharp. Where do plants fit into
this conceptual division [animate-inanimate]? Admittedly, they do not fit into either category, but
because they lack agency, for the purposes of an ecological psychology they fit into the inanimate
category” (p. xxiii, fn. 1). Other such as Turvey (2019) or Carello et al. (2012) disagree, and include
Plantae among the species that can be studied from the viewpoint of ecological psychology.
39
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Chapter 4
Similarity-based cognition:
Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience

Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent or system exploits
the similarities that hold between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and so
on—in order to perform some cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to
cognitive neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has advantages over its
representationalist rival, which posits the existence of structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is argued that there are problems both with accounting for the
content of S-representations and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as representations (even if contentless) in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally,
with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radical enactivism can commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of neurodynamics.

Segundo-Ortin, M., & Hutto, D. D. (under review). Similarity-based cognition: Radical enactivism
meets cognitive neuroscience. Synthese.
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Chapter 4
Similarity-based cognition:
Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience

Introduction

Similarity-based cognition occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the similarities that
hold between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on—in order to
perform some cognitive task. It has been proposed that conceiving of representations in
terms of structural similarities provides new resources to overcome traditional puzzles that
have plagued other representational theories of cognition. With respect to the explanatory
needs of cognitive neuroscience, many philosophers maintain that appealing to similaritybased forms of cognition is the most promising strategy for building an adequate representational theory of mind (Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017; Lee, 2018; O’Brien, 2015a, 2015b;
Shea, 2018; Ramsey, 2018; Williams & Colling, 2017).
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it challenges the two main strategies that
motivate conceiving of neurally-based structural similarities of interest to cognitive neuroscience as mental representations. Second, once this clarification is made, the paper explicates
how non-representational structural similarities can play a causal explanatory role in cognition within a radically enactive and embodied account of cognition.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of similaritybased cognition, showing how it is cashed out in cognitive neuroscience. It focuses on the
well-known example of place cells in rats’ hippocampus. Section 3 introduces the arguments
in favor of the idea that neurally-based structural similarities should be conceived of as contentful structural or S-representations. Section 4 problematizes those arguments, showing
that we have yet to be supplied reasons for thinking that structural similarities—including
those that purportedly do explanatory work in cognitive neuroscience—are contentful. It is
argued that defenders of S-representational interpretation of structural similarities presuppose, but do not explain, the origin of the alleged contentful properties of structural
similarities. If this analysis holds good, despite claims to the contrary, S-representations fail
to answer the job description challenge. Section 5 examines a less demanding reason for
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thinking that neurally-based structural similarities should be conceived of as S-representations. Putting aside questions about content, some argue that the alleged fact that structural
similarities are exploited by brains in a way that is analogous to the ways cognitive agents
exploit models or maps suffices to establish the representational status of neurally-based
structural similarities. New empirical findings concerning the future-oriented activity of place
cells are called upon to justify this position. Against this view, it is argued that these empirical
findings provide no support for the claim that place cells are used in anything like routeplanning or surrogative reasoning. It follows that if there is no robust, non-metaphorical
sense in which the brain uses structural similarities as models or maps then the conclusion
that structural similarities have representational status is non-justified. The paper concludes
with some remarks about how similarity-based cognition can be understood under the auspices of a radical enactive, non-representational conception of cognition.

Similarity-based cognition in cognitive neuroscience

Similarity-based cognition, SBC, is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent exploits relations of similarity holding between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and
so on—in order to perform a cognitive task (Cummins, 1994; Cummins & Roth, 2010; Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Ramsey, 2018).
Everyday examples of SBC include navigating to a location by using a cartographic
map or using a mercury thermometer to discover the temperature of a room. A cartographic
map can help us to get around a specific terrain just in case its features are arranged in a way
that systematically mirrors the topographic and metrical relations that hold in the terrain. The
same applies to the way variations in the height of the liquid column of a mercury thermometer correspond to orderly variations in the temperature of the room. In such cases,
similarities between items are exploited by cognitive agents when they treat one item, X, as
a surrogate or stand in for a target item, Y, in order to guide their behavior with respect to
the latter.40 Behavior is understood broadly here as to include an agent making embodied

Swoyer (1991) illustrates this familiar phenomenon with the following example: “By examining
the behavior of a scale model of an aircraft in a wind tunnel, we can draw conclusions about a newly
designed wing’s response to wind shear, rather than trying it out on a Boeing 747 over Denver. By
using numbers to represent the lengths of physical objects, we can represent facts about the objects
numerically, perform calculations of various sorts, then translate the results back into a conclusion
about the original objects. In such cases we use one sort of thing as a surrogate in our thinking about
another, and so I shall call this surrogative reasoning” (p. 449).
40
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responses, taking particular actions, making reliable judgements or inferences, and explicitly
deciding on courses of actions.
Many philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists assume that fundamental varieties of
cognition are similarity-based (Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017; Jacobson, 2015;
Kriegeskorte & Kievit, 2013; Sachs, 2018; Shagrir, 2012; Shea, 2018; Williams & Colling,
2017). The guiding hypothesis, when SBC is pitched at the neural level, is that neural items
make a causal contribution to the processes that drive the behavior of cognitive systems
towards some target items in virtue of holding some similarities with those target items. Call
this neurally-based SBC.
A thing can be similar to another thing in many ways, nonetheless. One item may be
similar to another simply by having shared color, mass, charge, and so on. However, neural
items do not enable cognitive work by possessing just any kind similarities with their distal
targets. Rather, the similarities at issue are thought to be of a second-order or structural kind.
In short, the idea is that neural items can play a causal role in bringing about a cognitive task
in virtue of mirroring the relevant structural properties of some target domain.41 Accordingly,
whether the cognitive task can be successfully achieved depends, at least in part, on the degree to which the neural item at issue structurally mirrors the relevant target domain.
The favorite explanation of rodent spatial navigation invokes such neurally-based SBC
(Bechtel, 2016). Years after Tolman hypothesized the existence of a “cognitive map” to explain spatial navigation in mammals (Tolman, 1948), researchers discovered that individual
neurons allocated in regions DG, CA1 and CA3 of the rats’ hippocampus fire “solely or
maximally when the rat was situated in a particular part of the testing platform facing in a
particular direction” (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971, p. 172). Follow-up studies by O’Keefe
(1976) and O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) also showed that neurons in the CA1 region respond
primarily to location, with some of them—20 out of the 26 firstly reported—firing when the
rats occupy or run past the appropriate location. Scientists called the hippocampal neurons
involved in navigation tasks “place cells” (see Figure 4.1).

It is common in the literature to depict the mapping or mirroring relations in terms of isomorphism. However, current examples in neurocomputational theories of cognition appeal to highly
abstract structure-preserving mapping relations that are considerably weaker than isomorphism (Neander, 2017, p. 176; see also Morgan, 2014). For our purposes, we can remain neutral with respect to
this discussion. We will speak more generally and inclusively of structural similarities or resemblances
(see also O’Brien & Opie, 2004 and Shea, 2013, 2018 for a technical and detailed analysis of these
notions).
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Figure 4.1 Activation profile of a place cell. Spike locations (red dots) are superimposed on the naviga-

tion trajectory of the rat (black lines). (From Moser, Kropff, & Moser, 2008, Fig. 1, p. 71, with
permission)

The current scientific consensus assumes that place cells within the rats’ hippocampus
play a causal role in enabling different navigation tasks—namely, finding shortcuts towards
a food source—because they are structurally similar to the environment. More precisely, it
has been discovered that the patterns of co-activation relationships between the cells mirror
the metric relations among different relevant locations within the environment (Bechtel,
2016; Moser et al., 2008; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013). Accordingly, the structure-preserving mapping relationship holding between place cells and the spatial layout of the environment
contributes to explain the capability of rats to successfully navigate the environment, even in
complete darkness.
Given this, place cells are taken to be the realizers of the cognitive map previously
hypothesized by Tolman (Schmidt & Redish, 2013). For example, it has been claimed that
the whole array of place cells provides other parts of the rats’ brains with “an internal map
of the spatial layout of the environment, encoded in a Cartesian coordinate system”
(Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017, p. 344; O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971, p. 174).42 In the
It is not obvious that place cells constitute a Cartesian coordinate system. For example, Bechtel
(2016) has argued that “[w]hereas in a cartographic map the spatial locations between representations
correspond, albeit only approximately and with distortions, to the spatial relations between the places
represented, this is not true of the map realized in place cells” (p. 1297). Shea (2014) raises similar
doubts, observing that “[t]he mechanism depends on place cell firing correlating reliably with location, but not on any relation between different place cells, nor on spatial relation between locations”
(p. 126).
42
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same vein, Ramsey (2016) holds that place cells function “as component parts of an encoded
map of the environment that the rat is trying to navigate. They […] are serving as surrogative
stand-ins within a broader map-like neural structure” (p. 9).
For cognitive neuroscientists, neurally-based SBC can be called upon to explain a vast
array of cognitive phenomena—including visual perception, motor control, memory, imagination. In recent years, the remarkable potential of such explanations has become evident
with the advent of predictive processing accounts of cognition—those which assume that
the best and most unified explanations of cognitive phenomena need to posit generative
models operating across multiple scales and levels (Clark, 2016; Gładziejewski, 2016; Sachs,
2018; Williams, 2018).

The case for structural representations

For many, the very existence of causally potent structural similarities at the neural level entails
the existence of a special kind of mental representation. Proponents of this idea call these
mental representations “structural” or “S-representations.”
As canonically described, S-representations can be conceived of as components of
larger cognitive mechanisms—where such mechanisms are partly individuated by reference
to the function they perform (Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017). Imagine a mechanism, M,
which is responsible for a cognitive function, F. M is an S-representational system if its ability
to perform F causally depends on the fact that at least one of its components, R, is structurally similar to some target domain, T.43 If that is the case, M can fail to perform F if R does
not mirror the structure of T sufficiently well; and, analogously, if M succeeds in bringing
about F, it is partly because the structure of R is sufficiently similar to the structure of T.44
Nonetheless, despite the popularity and promise of S-representations in cognitive neuroscience, if such neural items are to count as bona fide cognitive representations, they must

43 As Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) points out, “[e]xplanations that invoke S-representations
should thus be construed as causal explanations that feature facts regarding similarity as an explanans
and success or failure as an explanandum. To exploit structural similarity in this sense is to use a
strategy whose success is causally dependent on structural similarity between the representational
vehicle and what is represented” (p. 340).
44 The relationship between similarity and success is not a straightforward one. Consider a cartographic map. A cartographic map does not fully replicate the terrain it is meant to represent. On the
contrary, it simplifies it – only including elements that are relevant for the function it was designed
to achieve. A map that resembles its target too much would become excessively complex and thus
useless. The same rationale applies to S-representations. As Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017)
note, “too much similarity can render the S-representation inefficient at serving its purpose” (p. 344).
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face up to the “job description challenge” (Ramsey, 2007).45 According to this challenge, if
something is to count as a cognitive representation it must satisfy two conditions.
First, it has to be shown that the structure in question possesses content such that it
refers, denotes or depicts something else as being a certain way. Canonically, a cognitive state
or structure bears representational content if and only if it has conditions of satisfaction of a
special sort – namely if it is susceptible to being true or false, accurate or inaccurate, veridical
or non-veridical, right or wrong (Neander, 2017; Shea, 2018; Lee, 2018).46 Moreover, the
class of realistic theories of mental representation we are considering take the content of
such representations is to be inherent—this is, not supplied by external attributions.
Second, it must be shown how this structure plays a causal role in cognition in virtue
of its content. This is because, as Sprevak (2011) reminds us, if content “is just along for the
ride, and does no causal or explanatory work, then there seems no reason to assume that the
state in question is specifically representational, rather than, say, a causal relay with the same
effects” (p. 670). As such, nothing will be a mental representation if it does not play a distinctive causal-explanatory role in cognition in virtue of its content. This is a pivotal point,
for having content is what distinguishes mental representations from other states that can
also causally contribute to bringing about cognitive activity.47
It is claimed that S-representations can answer the job description challenge. Even
Ramsey (2018), who originally issued the challenge, tells us that S-representations will form
“an essential part” of our best representational-cum-computational accounts of cognition (p.
269, see also Lee, 2018; O’Brien & Opie, 2015; Williams & Colling, 2017). Likewise, Piccinini
(2018) observes that there is “an emerging consensus that the best way to understand representation in the context of cognitive explanation is structural” (p. 5).
What, apparently, makes S-representations fit for such special theoretical duty? Why
do so many theorists think that S-representations manage to answer the job-description challenge while all other theories of mental representation fail? Allegedly, S-representations have

45 In order to recognize the scope of the job description challenge it is important to mention that it
does not just trouble S-representational theories in cognitive neuroscience. Instead, serious worries
have been raised in its wake about the tenability of classical cognitivist’s conjecture that cognition is
rooted in digital computation. For, even if cognition proves to be digitally instantiated, there are
deeper unanswered puzzles about how representational contents could be causally efficacious, rather
than being systematically screened off from playing any causal explanatory role.
46 Accordingly, something only counts as a mental representation if it is “used to represent a […]
target as being a certain way that it might or might not be” (Neander, 2017, p. 35).
47 As Thomson and Piccinini (2018) present it, the received view is that “[f]or something to count
as a representation, it must have a semantic content (e.g., ‘‘there is yogurt in the fridge’’) and an
appropriate functional role (e.g., to guide behavior with respect to the yogurt in the fridge)” (p. 193).
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unique properties, and, in understanding them, it becomes evident how such mental representations have inherent content and how those contents can play a genuinely causal role in
driving cognitive behavior.
The favored position in the literature is that S-representational vehicles “are contentful
in virtue of resembling their represented objects” (O’Brien, 2015a, p. 9). Defenders of Srepresentations claim that structural similarities “ground” mental representational content
(O’Brien & Opie, 2004, p. 6, 8-14; O’Brien, 2015a, p. 10). Following Von Eckardt (1993),
this means that structural similarities are the “set of properties or relations that determine
the semantic properties in question” (p. 199).
The rationale is as follows. The properties of a given S-representational vehicle, R,
cause it to be structurally similar to some target state of affairs, T. Because R can mirror the
structure of T more or less accurately, structural similarity entails accuracy conditions. Accuracy conditions are taken to entail content. Therefore, structural similarity is taken to entail
content. Thus, S-representationalists conclude, the fact that R structurally mirrors T entails
that R contentfully represents T.
According to this line of reasoning, the contentful properties of S-representations are
supplied by the vehicular properties that make them structurally similar to their targets. If
this is right, the contents of S-representations, unlike the contents of symbolic representations, are inherently and non-arbitrarily related to the properties of their vehicles (Williams,
2018; Lee, 2018).
Moreover, since it is assumed that structural similarity can be causally responsible for
the success or failure of a given cognitive function, if structural similarity entails content then
it follows that cognitive systems whose behavior is causally guided by the structural similarities holding between its S-representational vehicles and their targets are cognitive system
whose behavior is causally guided by representational contents. Representational contents
given by structural similarities are, according to S-representationalists, unproblematically
causally potent in cognition.48
With this in mind, O’Brien and Opie (2010) tell us that cognitive processes that involve
S-representations:

Invoking the much-discussed example of the thermostat, O’Brien seeks to demonstrate “the
causal efficacy of content fixed by resemblance” (2015a, p. 9). As he tells us, the thermostat’s functioning is causally driven by the structural similarity holding between the curvature of the bi-metallic
strip and the temperature of the room. Thus, if it is assumed that structural similarities are intrinsically
contentful it follows that representational contents can be causally efficacious of behavior.
48
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are driven by the very properties that determine the content of its vehicles. In this
sense, an [S-representational system] is not a mere semblance of a semantic engine—it’s the real thing. Any organism whose inner processes are analog in nature is causally
indebted to the semantic properties of its inner states. (p. 127, emphasis added)
Thus, according to their defenders, S-representations are not only consistent with what
we know about cognitive neuroscience, but they are better equipped to solve the classical
challenges faced by other representational theories in cognitive science. In light of this, Srepresentations have been invoked in virtually every area of cognitive science, including classic symbolic computation (Gallistel & King, 2009), connectionism (O’Brien & Opie, 2006,
2009), and predictive coding (Gładziejewski, 2016; Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018).

The case against structural representations

A standard, first pass objection to S-representational theories of mental representation is
that, even if we accept all that has been said so far, any content an S-representation might
have is indeterminate.
To see this, consider a cartographic map—the paradigm example of non-mental Srepresentation. Such map might be said to contentfully represent Sydney if the metrical relations among its constituent elements (lines, figures, symbols, and so on) mirror the metrical
relations between the relevant features of Sydney (buildings, streets, and so on). Yet it can be
the case that the very same map mirrors, perhaps to a different degree, the spatial layout of
New York City as well. If that is the case, it would seem that S-representationalists have to
say the same map represents both Sydney and New York City. Simply put, if the representational content of a map is wholly and uniquely determined by what it structurally mirrors,
then what it represents, assuming it represents at all, is indeterminate. 49
Two main solutions to this content-specificity problem have been offered in the literature. The first solution proposes that the content of an S-representation is fixed, not only
by what it is mirrored, but by whatever the S-representation targets when it is used to guide
49 Another, related, objection has to do with the fact that structural similarities, unlike representations, are symmetrical. A map structurally mirrors the layout of a city as much as the city structurally
mirrors the layout of the map. If that is the case, S-representationalists have to conclude that the city
represents the map too. To solve this problem, a number of authors have suggested rethinking the
representation relation as a triadic relation, this is, as a relation that involves not only the representational state and its target, but also a representational user or consumer (Millikan, 1984; Menary, 2007;
O’Brien, 2015a). Accordingly, with this condition at hand, we can now say that what makes the map
a representation of the city, and not the other way around, is the fact that the map is being used or
consumed as such by a cognitive agent or system.
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cognitive activity. Here we can assume, along with Godfrey-Smith (2006), that “[t]he target
of a map is just whatever the map is in fact used to deal with” (p. 58).50 The second solution,
instead, proposes that S-representational contents get determined etiologically—that is, by
the relevant causal relations that brought the S-representational vehicle into existence.51
We should not be distracted by these possibilities. A much stronger objection to Srepresentations focuses not on what makes the putative content of structural similarities determinate, but on whether structural similarities have any inherent content at all. Ultimately,
the S-representationalist package is only tenable if it can account for the source of S-representational contents. In other words, what is required is a naturalistic account of the
representational content of S-representations.
Recall that to be a structural representation, “a state must belong to a system of states
that bear a second-order [structural] similarity to their targets […] and the states must guide
action based on their similarity to their target” (Piccinini, 2018, p. 3). We are also told that
“[w]hen a system’s internal states satisfy [the above conditions] they qualify as representations in a robust sense, which possess semantic content by the lights of a naturalistic theory
of semantic content” (p. 3).
Yet, the pivotal question for S-representationalists is whether the holding of structural
similarity relations—on their own—suffices for one state of affairs to specify, refer or describe something about another state of affairs in a way that can true or false, veridical or
non-veridical, and so on. In other words, whether the fact that a particular item structurally
mirrors another item suffices for the former to contentfully represent the latter.
On close examination, we contend that even though structural similarities might be
said to ground content in the sense of enabling contentful evaluations and inferences, there
is no reason to believe that such structural similarities, in-an-of-themselves, are inherently
contentful.
Consider the following case. Against the backdrop of certain practice, we can use variations in the level of the tides in a particular region to make inferences and say something

50 O’Brien (2015a, 2015b; see also O’Brien & Opie, 2015) proposes a similar solution to the contentspecificity problem, putting emphasis on the interpretive activity of users. According to this idea, an
S-representational state R of a system S is a representation of W if S’s responses to W are causally
mediated by R. As he writes, “the behavioural dispositions of the system restrict the represented
domain to [W], and the second-order resemblance relations determine what [features of W] each
vehicle represents” (O’Brien, 2015a, p. 11).
51 Ramsey (2016) holds that a neural state R is a representation of W if W caused R to come about
and acquire the structure it has. Thus, if a particular neural structure “was developed in an effort to
learn how to navigate a specific maze, then it is that particular maze that is the target [of this neural
structure]” (p. 7).
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true or false, for example, about changes in the position of the Moon relative to the Earth.
In any particular case, attending to the level of tides may or may not be an accurate or reliable
way of keeping track of or saying something true about the position of the Moon. The same
goes for the way we use variations in the height of the liquid column of a mercury thermometer to make inferences about changes the ambient temperature of the room. In both cases,
certain structural correspondences or similarities must hold for the claims to be true and the
inferences valid. This is so even though there is no reason to suppose that the correspondences or the structural similarities in question must, themselves, represent things accurately or inaccurately.
In other words, it does not follow from the fact that we can make truth-evaluable
claims based on structural similarities holding between two items, A and B, that A contentfully represents something that might be true or false about B. It is thus logically confused
to suppose that the correspondences or structural similarities in question must be contentful
in order for us to rely on them in ways that make it possible to be right or wrong about things
contentfully.
Following Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017), we can imagine a cognitive agent
whose behavior is endogenously controlled by a mechanism that is sensitive to the fact that
some internal states of the agent change concurrently with changes in the external environment. In such a scenario, we agree that a promising way to explain how the agent successfully
copes with the environment “is to point to the [structural] similarity [holding] between its
internal processes and the processes in the environment” (Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017,
p. 351). We disagree, however, that this would be a case in which the behavior of the agent
is causally guided by representational content. Again, this is because we have no reason to
believe that structural similarities that meet the stated conditions suffice for mental representations with contentful properties. The mere fact that structural similarities can play a causal
role in enabling successful acts of cognition does nothing to establish that structural similarities are contentful.
So far, we have been given no reason to suppose that structural similarities are sufficient for or entail content (see Goodman, 1968; Fodor, 1987; Hutto, 2008 for similar claims).
If structural similarities do not suffice for or entail content, then a fortiori they do not get their
cognitive work done in virtue of possessing content.
In this light, if S-representationalists hope to meet the job description challenge, they
must do more than simply presuppose that neurally-based structural similarities are contentful: they must explain how and why such structural similarities are contentful. To answer this,
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in essence, requires answering the general challenge posed by the Hard Problem of Content,
or HPC, articulated by radical enactivists (Hutto & Myin, 2013). What is needed is a substantial, scientifically respectful theory that accounts for S-representational content.
One option, at this point, is to attempt to explain S-representational content by appeal
to some further theory of mental representational content. Most philosophers turn to teleosemantics to do this crucial work. For example, Thomson and Piccinini (2018) tell us that
teleosemantics is “the best-developed and most plausible theory of representational content
in biological systems” (p. 194).
Yet teleosemantics faces well-known shortcomings (Burge, 2010; Fodor, 1990; Hutto
& Myin, 2013a; Hutto & Satne, 2015; Rosenberg, 2015). To use a familiar example, whereas
teleosemantics can explain why frogs snap their tongues in presence of black dots, it lacks
the resources to specify, unequivocally, whether the frog’s visual system represents them as
“black dots,” “flies,” “food,” and so on. Thus, even though teleosemantics provides the required resources to explain how organisms come to systematically target certain aspects of
the world and not others, it fails to deliver a robust theory of representational content according to which entities are picked out intensionally or under a particular description.
We will not rehearse those arguments again here. Instead, we will assess Lee’s (2018)
attempt to address those concerns afresh and head-on. Concurring with the above analysis,
Lee (2018) holds that that existing S-representational accounts have only “touched upon the
issue of how to think about content” (p. 2). In an attempt to do better on this score, he aims
to “show in detail how we can provide a naturalised understanding of content that dispels
the strongest accusations of the antirepresentationalist” (p. 2).
Along with other defenders of S-representations, Lee (2018) holds that structural similarities are “what underwrites the representation’s degree of accuracy (its ‘accuracy value’)”
(p. 2). But this, again, is insufficient to show that S-representations have content. Notably,
Lee acknowledges that covariances of the sort structural similarities embody do not explain
the source of representational content. He agrees that answering the HPC requires providing
an account of S-representational content that does not rely solely on the notion of information-as-covariance.
At this juncture, Lee looks to the notion of non-natural information as a promising
way to address the HPC since, arguably, this notion allows for the possibility of misrepresentation.52 He tells us that:

As Lee (2018) explains, “x bears natural information about y, iff x reliably covaries with y. In this
case, x’s bearing information about y is dependent on a direct physical relationship. By contrast, x
52
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a non-natural information bearer is distinct from a natural information bearer in
that it is both potentially decouplable from the conditions it bears information
about, and the conditions it bears information about may be false. Yet both intuitively, and implicitly within the practice of cognitive science, non-natural
information remains ‘informative’ (p. 9).
But, ultimately, Lee’s (2018) strategy falls short of providing a straight answer to the
HPC. This is so because, as he admits, in these debates “there is no adequate theory which
justifies the presence of non-natural information” (p. 10).
In the end, instead of answering the HPC, Lee (2018) argues that considerations about
the explanatory role of non-natural information in cognitive science give us reason to question the legitimacy of what the HPC demands. As he holds, faced with a choice between
recognizing the centrality of non-natural information to explanations of cognitive neuroscience or the need to answer the HPC, we should question “the severity of the HPC” (p. 10).
In sum, rather than explaining how S-representations can have content, Lee (2018)
motivates acceptance that they do so by focusing on the explanatory work allegedly achieved
by S-representational contents. As he argues, given the kind of explanatory work earmarked
for S-representations, we are warranted in assuming that S-representations have content.
Specifically, Lee (2018) holds that if S-representations are involved in error-detection
work then we are justified, in light of explanatory need, in assuming that they are contentful.
In his own words:
If one’s theory of a system features an S-representation with a feedback component,
whereby the system adjusts its behaviour based on a mismatch between an S-representation and some feature of a task, then this mismatch […] provides further
justification for thinking that error, therefore accuracy conditions (therefore content), contributes to our understanding of how the mechanism works. (p. 12)
The important thing to notice is that not all mismatches entail representational errors.
In fact, a key claim of radical enactivism (Hutto & Myin 2013, 2017) is that it is possible for
some cognitive activities of agents to be “pragmatically mis-aligned, insensitive to certain
features of the environment in a way that causes their efforts to fail” (Roelofs, 2018, p. 246).
Therefore, when explaining why such cognitive activities go wrong it would be a mistake to

bears non-natural information about y iff x stands-in for y, where x’s tokening does not entail the
truth of y. In this instance, x’s bearing information about y is not dependent on any direct physical
relationship” (p. 8).
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assume that cognitive systems must always go wrong by representing things wrongly. This is
true even in those cases in which a pragmatic misalignment is brought about by a failure of
a system’s internal structures to mirror those of some target sufficiently well (see Kirchhoff
& Robertson, 2018; see Chapter 2).
Moreover, a system may be sensitive to such failures and may respond by effecting a
stronger match of its internal states to some target, thereby improving its chances of successful outcomes. Yet a system can do all of this without any part of it contentfully representing
that certain conditions hold.
Imagine a set of keys, but only one of them can open a particular lock. Each key has
its own unique geometry such that only one ‘fits’ the lock sufficiently well to open it. We can
imagine a system designed to attempt to open the lock by using those keys. We can also
imagine that the system is sensitive to the resistance of being unable to turn the key as a
signal to try another key, and that it will continue with such a strategy—using one key after
the another—until it succeeds.
What this simple example shows it that it is possible to be sensitive and responsive to
mismatches in the completing of tasks without having to contentfully represent such mismatches (see Miłkowski, 2015). This being the case, it is possible to explain a system’s
sensitivity to mismatches and its capacity to make corrective adjustments to them without
calling on the notion of representational content.
In conclusion, even if we accept that there is similarity-based cognition at the neural
level, we argue that appeal to structural similarities provides no new resources for overcoming the HPC—namely, that of accounting for the origins of content naturalistically—and, a
fortiori, helping us to understand how such putative contents could possibly make a causal
difference to cognition. At the same time, pace Lee (2018), we see no compelling reasons for
believing that there is an indispensable explanatory need to posit the existence of such representational contents, even in the case of cognitive systems that are equipped with errordetection mechanisms.

A further case against structural representations

Might contentless structural similarities still play a causal-explanatory, and yet properly representational, role in cognitive science even if they are contentless? Some proponents of Srepresentations seem to think so.
Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) maintain that the new emphasis on the explanatory value of structural similarities in cognitive neuroscience affords “an opportunity to
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develop, strengthen, and indeed reform the mainstream understanding of what representations are”
(2017, p. 338, emphasis added). For our purposes, the crucial adjustment would be to divorce
the notion of mental representation from any and all connections with the notion of content.53 Others, such as Jacobson (2003, 2015), argue that no revision is needed. This is
because, by her lights, the notion of content is a philosophical invention, and cognitive neuroscience has long been in the business of positing contentless representations.54
How can we understand S-representations as contentless but nevertheless representational? What justifies thinking of such structural similarities as representations if we assume
that they lack content?
A familiar argument for this conclusion defends the idea that structural similarities
function as maps or models in cognitive systems at the neural level. According to this view,
since maps and models are primary examples of everyday non-mental representations, this
gives us reason to regard neurally-based structural similarities as paradigm mental representations.
Ramsey (2016) articulates this view in the following terms:
If we think of mental representations not as indicators but instead as something
more like elements of maps, models or simulations, then we can at least get the
outlines of a story about how a part of the brain could actually function in a representational manner. (p. 7)
Yet for this argument to have bite neurally-based structural similarities must be more
than merely map-like or model-like. They must actually function as maps or models in cognition. Why so? The reason is obvious. Everything is map-like or model-like to some degree.
Hence, without further qualification, it is trivial to satisfy this criterion. Consider that humans
are protozoa-like, and vice versa in that they both humans and protozoa have cells.
So, the real question is: Are structural similarities actually exploited by a cognitive system
or some part of it as models, maps, or surrogates of distal targets? Again, this question is
53 There is a tendency in the current literature to attempt to deflate the mainstream notion of mental
representation. Egan (forthcoming) has suggested that we can treat representational content as an
explanatory gloss. She proposes this maneuver as a way of retaining the notion of mental representation in the cognitive sciences while avoiding the seemingly intractable problem of providing a
naturalistic explanation for the origin of representational contents. For detailed discussions of this
kind of deflationary move see Ramsey (forthcoming) and Hutto and Myin (forthcoming).
54 Interestingly, Jacobson justifies this idea by directly appealing to the explanatory role of similarity
in cognitive neuroscience. As she writes: “With the rise of representational similarity and their elaboration of what representation in neuroscience amounts to, there seems no doubt now that cognitive
neuroscientists have in mind a very different notion of representation […] cognitive neuroscience is
not employing contentful representations” (2015, p. 3).

88

important because, if they are, then there would be strong reasons to think, by analogy, that
they are playing a bona fide representational role in cognition.
Reasons have been given for thinking that neurally-based structural similarities should
be thought of play the role of a map in cognition. For example, elaborating on the place cells,
Ramsey (2016) maintains that:
Insofar as these neural transformations implement a coordinate geometry during
navigation that reflects the structure of the items and properties of the environment,
it is perfectly natural and, more importantly, explanatorily beneficial to regard such a system as
functioning as a map. Specific elements of the system are thus functioning as representations of features of the target domain. (p. 8, emphases added)
At this juncture, however, we must be careful not to conflate evidence that the neural
structures in question have map-like properties with evidence that brains or cognitive systems
are using such structures as maps.55 What needs to be shown is that the way the rat’s brain
uses place cells in order to guide navigation is analogous, in a full-bodied sense, to the way
agents use cartographic maps. This is pivotal since, again, robustly satisfying the analogy is
what, allegedly, secures that place cells are playing a representational role.
Some philosophers argue that new empirical findings regarding place cells motivate
thinking that the analogy with maps holds strongly (see Miłkowski, 2015; Gładziejewski &
Miłkowski, 2017, Shea, 2018). These empirical findings show that, in some circumstances,
hippocampal neurons fire in advance of action. As Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017) argue, this evidence supplies a compelling reason to think that place cells are not only
responsive to current location, but, rather, that they are used by the rats’ brains as surrogates
to plan potential routes towards a target location.
For example, after having recorded neural activity in the CA3 region of the hippocampus of rats engaging in decision tasks, Johnson and Redish (2007) discovered that many
sequences of spikes, or “sweeps,” fired by place cells during theta oscillation correspond to
locations ahead of the rat.
For their experiment, they used two different mazes—one (called “multiple-T maze”)
consisting of four T choice points and another (called “cued-choice maze”) consisting of a
single T turn (see Figure 4.2). Both mazes had two return trails with two places providing
reward food, but only the feeders on one side were providing food each day. In addition,

As Shea (2018) explains, “the remarkable discovery of the location-specific sensitivity of place
cells does not, by itself, show that rats have a cognitive map” (p. 115).
55
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different cue sounds were played nearby the final turn (the so-called “choice point”), indicating which side would provide reward on each trial.

Figure 4.2 Structure of the mazes used by Johnson and Redish (2007). Left image corresponds to

the multiple T-maze. Right image corresponds to the cued-choice maze. (From Johnson & Redish,
2007, Figs. 1 and 2, p. 12179, with permission)

When rats reached the choice point, they faced a high-cost decision—taking the incorrect route means having to run approximately 3 m along the track before having another
chance. Experimenters saw that, after being trained, rats often paused at the choice point,
and that place cells corresponding to locations in both return trails fired while the individuals
were standing still. Importantly, the sweeps occurred separately—first for the cells corresponding to one side, and then the other—and they were not correlated to the orientation
of the animal.
In a more recent experiment, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) used a 2 m x 2 m open-field
arena with 36 clearly demarcated locations. In the experimental task, rats had to alternatively
forage for food rewards between randomly distributed locations and a stationary ‘home’ base.
The location of the home base changed daily but remained constant within each day so that
rats could remember it.
Importantly, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) found that in the moments when a rat paused
before taking a journey, sequences of activity in place cells not only sweep ahead of it, but
they transiently predict the journey that the animal is about to take.56 Like in the previous

For their experiment, Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) recorded the activity of 250 place cells at short
time scales (circa 20 ms). The sequences or sweeps measured by Pfeiffer and Foster occur during
sharp-wave-ripple (SWR) events—this is, irregular burst of brief (100-200 ms) high-frequency (140200 Hz) neuronal activity. Place cell sweeps during SWR events are traditionally associated to processes of memory consolidation during sleep.
56
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experiment, future-oriented sweeps were seen to be independent of the rat’s orientation. As
they explain, these discoveries “reveal a flexible, goal-directed mechanism for the manipulation of previously acquired memories, in which behavioral trajectories to a remembered goal
are depicted in the brain immediately before movement” (Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013, p. 78).
According to Gładziejewski and Miłkowski (2017), this body of empirical evidence
reinforces the view that place cells are exploited in a way that is strongly analogous to the
process of consulting a cartographic map. As they write: “[t]he [hippocampal] map is internally manipulated [and] these manipulations are functional for the navigational mechanism
in that they (presumably) serve as a basis for route planning” (p. 351). Likewise, Shea (2018)
tells us that the evidence “suggests that rats use this prospective activity to plan the route
they are about to follow” (p. 115).
Yet, again, a note of caution is needed. The experiments show that place cells sometimes activate in a future-oriented manner, and that such activity is strongly biased toward
the satisfaction of a goal. Yet even if place cells play a part in explaining how rats navigate to
a location in advance of acting, it does not follow that the process in question equates to or
involves route planning.
For this to be the case, forward sweeps would need to be involved in a process of
evaluation so that they are used by other parts of the brain as surrogates of the available
routes in order to choose the preferred one (Gładziejewski, 2015). This is something the
experimenters themselves acknowledge:
Nonlocal forward [sweeps] are not sufficient for the consideration of future possibilities. Such consideration processes would also require mechanisms for the
evaluation of nonlocal [sweeps] as well as mechanisms for flexible translation into
behavior. (Johnson & Redish, 2007, p. 12184)
The problem, however, is that it remains unclear whether, how, and where this evaluation takes place. As Schmidt and Redish (2013) acknowledge, the hippocampus is thought
to be part of a complex neural network that involves several brain structures, but it is unclear
how the mentioned hippocampal activity interacts with the other brain structures in order to
generate behavior. As they write, after these empirical findings “researchers must now explore what processes generate these place-cells sequences, and how they are used in recalculating
the journey home” (p. 43, emphasis added; see also Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013, p. 78).57
Another issue has to do with the relation between the discoveries of Pfeiffer and Foster (2013)
and those of Johnson and Redish (2007). Schmidt and Redish (2013) ask: “what is the relation between these two planning phenomena? Does one negate the need for the other?” (p. 43)
57
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Therefore, however ‘natural’ it may be to interpret what is going on in the rat’s brain
as a map-using process, considering the current available evidence, we should not assume
that the rat’s brain engages in any kind of planning by means of surrogative reasoning in
these cases. There is no evidence available that the neural activity that drives behavior in
response to place cell firings is anything like the process of consulting a cartographic map in
order to navigate a location and plan a route. We agree with Godfrey-Smith (2006) that:
It is natural from the scientist’s point of view to say that the rat is using X [the
structure of place cells] as a guide to Y [the maze], but as far as the mechanics of
the situation are concerned, the ‘as guide to Y’ claim seems extraneous (p. 51).
Thus, without further evidence to show why we should think of these processes as
robustly, and non-metaphorically, involving the use of a mental or cognitive map, we conclude that calling neurally-based structural similarities maps or models is unsupported. It
follows that their representational status, in so far as it allegedly depends on them being used
as models or maps, is unjustified.

Conclusion: Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience

In this paper, we have challenged the popular suggestion that the existence of neurally-based
SBC gives us reason to believe in S-representations. We offered two arguments against this
view.
First, we argued that there is no reason to suppose that structural similarities, in themselves, suffice for or entail content. Hence, there is no reason to think that structural
similarities do their cognitive work in virtue of possessing contents. If so, then S-representations fail to answer the job description challenge.
Second, we have also shown that there is no compelling evidence that neurally-based
structural similarities function in a robust sense are representations when doing their cognitive work. Focusing on the parade case of place cells, we argued that the existing empirical
evidence regarding the future-oriented activity of place cells does not provide compelling
grounds for thinking that such neurally-based structural similarities are being used as maps,
models, or surrogates of the external world.
Putting all of this together, we conclude that there is no reason to assume that the
existence of causally potent neurally-based structural similarities entails the existence of mental representations. Therefore, pace Thomson and Piccinini (2018), we should not infer from
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the fact that modern techniques in experimental neuroscience allow us to observe structural
similarities doing causal work in cognition that we are observing S-representations in action.
An important consequence of our analysis is that non-representational accounts of
cognition can embrace neurally-based SBC. In what follows, we briefly explore how neurallybased SBC might be construed under the auspices of one radical view of cognition—namely,
the radical enactive account of cognition, or REC, advanced by Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017).
A signature idea of REC is that cognition does not always and everywhere involve or
entail representational content. When engaged in perceptual-motor tasks, for example, REC
proposes that organisms can detect, track, and interact with salient aspects of the environment by sensing and responding to the covariant information available in it, but they need
not internalize or represent such information.
REC challenges the longstanding assumptions that the brain is either the seat of cognition or plays the chief role in enabling cognitive activity in virtue of neural states
representing aspects of the environment. This, however, is not to deny that, at least for certain kinds of cognizers, neural activity plays a fundamental part in cognition, including basic
forms of cognition. REC assumes that the primary function of dispositional patterns of neural excitation and inhibition is to coordinate the dynamically unfolding responses of
organisms as they attune and adjust to environmental offerings in completing specific tasks
(see also Engel et al., 2013; Gallagher, 2017). We contend that adopting such a non-representational, action-oriented approach to neurodynamics is compatible with accepting that
neurally-based structural similarities may play a pivotal role in explaining centrally important
forms of intelligent and target-oriented behavior.
In understanding the kind of work the brain does in cognition REC draws on Anderson’s theory of neural reuse (Anderson, 2014). For Anderson, different parts of the central
nervous system can be used and reused to accomplish different cognitive tasks. When this
occurs, the various regions of the brain are temporarily soft-assembled into functional units
or systems. Accordingly, brains causally contribute to enabling intelligent behavior in a variety of circumstances by “putting [the same neural structures] together in different patterns
of functional cooperation” (p. 5).
Following Anderson’s theory, Hutto, Peeters, & Segundo-Ortin (2017) have proposed
that brains are fundamentally “protean.” The Protean Brain Hypothesis conjectures that
brain structures are functionally malleable and context-dependent. Brain-involving cognitive
systems, according to this hypothesis, make use of neural structures in inventive, temporal
assemblies to meet the requirements of specific cognitive tasks.
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Importantly, for our purposes, the way neurally-based structural similarities help to
explain certain instances of intelligent behavior can be understood in conjunction with neural
reuse and the Protean Brain Hypothesis. Accordingly, the dynamic activity of the central
nervous system can play a part in enabling intelligent behavior by temporally reconfiguring
already existing neural structures in order to resemble specific aspects of relevant targets.
This is a particular way of understanding how the dynamics of the central nervous system
can make a causal contribution to the intelligent behavior of cognitive systems without assuming that the brain is in the business of representing the external world.
Going radical on this score enables us to acknowledge the value the core machinery of
neurally-based SBC while characterizing it in more deflationary terms. It should be clear,
however, that in challenging the representational status of SBC, and in taking a non-representational, action-oriented approach to neurodynamics, REC is breaking with business-asusual cognitive science.
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Chapter 5
Ecological psychology is radical enough

Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied,
anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that
Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition (Myin,
2016; Hutto, 2017; Hutto & Myin, 2017; see also van Dijk, Withagen, & Bongers, 2015).
Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its
processing, these authors claim that ecological psychology needs to be “RECtified” so as to
explicitly resist representational readings. In this paper, we argue against this call for RECtification. To do so, we offer a detailed analysis of the notion of perceptual information, and
other related notions such as specificity and meaning, as they are presented in the specialized
ecological literature. We defend that these notions, if properly understood, remain free of
any representational commitment. Ecological psychology, we conclude, does not need to be
RECtified.
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Chapter 5
Ecological psychology is radical enough

As the reader may gather, I prefer radical solutions to scientific problems whenever possible.
— James J. Gibson
Introduction

Ecological Psychology is usually characterized by its stark opposition to representational and
computational theories of perception (Gibson, 1979; Turvey et al., 1981; Michaels & Carello,
1981; Chemero, 2009; Turvey, 2019). According to the ecological approach, perception requires neither the manipulation of contents nor the formation of mental representations of
the world. Instead, perception is said to consist of the detection of specifying information.
Despite agreeing about the benefits of non-representational approaches, radical enactivists are reluctant about embracing ecological psychology without reservation (Myin, 2016;
Hutto, 2017; Hutto & Myin, 2017). Radical enactivists give stronger and weaker reasons for
this reticence. Sometimes they accuse proponents of ecological psychologists of using language that encourages or, at least, makes the theory susceptible to representationalist
readings. A much stronger claim is that ecological psychology advances an account of perception that is akin to the one offered by representationalists. Those who press the stronger
complaint argue that to describe perceptual information as being meaningful and specific
entails an underlying commitment to the existence of informational content in the external
world. In light of this, radical enactivists conclude that ecological psychology is not radical
enough as it stands, and that it needs to be “RECtified”—viz., purged of its representational
commitments—before it can be included in a genuine non-representational approach to cognitive science.
In this paper, we argue against this call for RECtification. We offer a detailed analysis
of the notion of perceptual information, and other related notions such as specificity and
meaning, as they are presented in the specialized Gibsonian literature. We defend that the
use of these notions does not entail a commitment to a contentful notion of information
and, thus, that ecological psychology is not in conflict with the principles of the radical forms
of embodied, non-representational cognitive science.
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The action of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a general description of
ecological psychology. Section 3 reviews the main arguments of radical enactivists for being
reticent about ecological psychology, all of which target the notions of information, specification, and meaning. According to the stronger complaint advanced by radical enactivists
against ecological psychology, ecological psychologists are committed to the thesis that there
is informational content in the world. We offer a two-pronged counter-argument. Section 4
makes the first part of the argument, analyzing the notion of information as used in the
Gibsonian literature. We argue that information, as conceived of by ecological psychologists,
is not just “out there” and independent of organisms as Myin (2016) asserts. Rather, ecological or specifying information is always for organism-environment systems. Section 5 supplies
the second part of the argument, addressing the notions of specificity and meaning. First, we
argue that specificity refers to the lawful, unique relation holding between environment, information, and perception. This specifying relation, we suggest, can best be understood in
terms of lawful covariation or correspondence, without any assumption that it carries content. Second, we argue that ecological information is meaningful because it affords agents
the possibility of performing certain actions, and, thus, that the notion of meaning as used
in ecological psychology is orthogonal to semantics.
Hence, we conclude, the notions of information, specificity, and meaning, as used by
Gibsonians, are free of any commitment to contents and representations. Therefore, ecological psychology does not need to be RECtified.

A primer on ecological psychology

Arguably, the most notable feature of ecological psychology is its stark opposition to constructivist theories of perception. Constructivist theories, broadly construed, assume that
stimulus information is ambiguous and impoverished, and that perception requires the internal enrichment and disambiguation of the sensory data by the organism. These perceptual
processes, in addition, are thought to involve the computation of representations, and conclude with the construction of an image of the external world in the brain (Fodor & Pylyshyn,
1981; Marr, 1982; Ullman, 1980).
In arguing against constructivism, ecological psychologists usually subscribe to three
interrelated theses: First, that perception is direct; second, that perception is active; and, third,
that perception is action-oriented (Chemero, 2009; Heras-Escribano & de Pinedo, 2016)
First of all, ecological psychologists reject that perception starts by receiving impoverished stimuli. Instead, they suggest that perceptual stimulation can be informationally rich
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and unambiguous, and thus that agents can perceive the environment directly—without internal computation or processing—by detecting or picking up this information.
Second, ecological psychologists break with the traditional picture of perception as a
passive, sub-personal process that occurs inside the animals’ brains. By contrast, Gibsonians
understand perception as a kind of activity, a process that involves the goal-oriented exploration of the surroundings by the agent. Accordingly, perception occurs in the context of the
dynamic sensorimotor interactions between the agent and the environment—the so-called
“perception-action loops.”
A consequence of this active approach is that the perceptual systems of an organism
cannot be reduced to its sensory organs and its brain only. Instead, perceptual systems are
thought to include the bodily structures that are relevant to the exploratory activity of its
perceptual systems as well (Gibson, 1966; Stoffregen, Mantel, & Bardy, 2017).
The last thesis is that perception is action-oriented. According to ecological psychologists, the primary goal of perception is not the construction of internal images of the external
world but the successful control of action. In Gibson’s words: “perception serves behavior,
and behavior is controlled by perception” (1979/2015, p. 213). To explain how perception
can serve the control of the action, Gibsonians hypothesize that the primary objects of perception are affordances—viz., the opportunities for interaction that an environment or
situation offers to an organism.
One might be tempted to conclude, from the above, that perception involves two different processes according to ecological psychology: the detection of information, on the
one hand, and the perception of affordances, on the other. However, this would be a mistake.
Rather, these processes are thought to be the same: detecting information is perceiving affordances. Accordingly, when I see the mug on my desk, for example, I perceive the
possibility of grasping it and I can coordinate my actions to that goal by relying on the perceptual information I detect.
In summary, ecological psychology promises an explanation of perceptually guided
intelligent behavior that does not posit mental representations. Accordingly, agents do not
need to represent the environment in order to perceive and act upon the affordances available in it; instead, they can coordinate their interaction with the surroundings by detecting
information.
The principles of ecological psychology have inspired different research programs in
non-representational cognitive science (see, e.g., Chemero, 2009; Richardson et al., 2008; E.
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J. Gibson & Pick, 2000). However, not all advocates of non-representationalism are so optimistic about embracing it. The following section reviews the arguments offered by radical
enactivists (Hutto & Myin, 2017; Hutto, 2017; Myin, 2016). These arguments seek to show
that ecological psychology lends itself to positions that are incompatible with a non-representational approach to cognitive science.

Radical enactivism meets ecological psychology

Radical enactivism, hereafter REC, is a promising new line of thought in the current debates
on the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017). The core
hypothesis of REC is that the fundamental forms of cognition—those at the roots and basis
of cognition—are non-contentful.58
According to Hutto and Myin, a given state or process has content if and only if it has
conditions of satisfaction of a particular sort, namely, if it can be true or false, correct or
incorrect, accurate or inaccurate, veridical or non-veridical, etc., regarding something else
(2013, p. x). Traditionally, they argue, most theories in cognitive science have assumed that
mental representations are contentful in these terms, and that the manipulation of such contentful states or representations is a necessary condition for organisms to behave intelligently
or cognitively.
Against this tendency, REC states that cognition is, at its basis, “a matter of sensitively
and selectively responding to information, but it does not involve picking up and processing
information or the formation of representational contents” (Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 92). If
REC is on the right track, organisms can engage in sophisticated, world-directed cognitive
activities in ways that can be adequately explained by appeal to nothing more than their sensitivity and responsiveness to the information available in the environment.
Yet, as Hutto (2017) emphasizes, we should not see REC as a new, alternative version
of enactivism that tries to develop its own explanatory tools. Instead, REC aims to take elements from the enactivist tradition and combine them with other existing theories to form a
global, non-representational approach to cognitive science.

Hutto and Myin use “basic cognition” to refer to the cognitive capacities that are shared across
species and that are both ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior to sociocultural scaffolding.
These basic cognitive abilities include “central forms of human cognition, such as perceiving, imagining, and remembering both in children and adults” (2017, p. 90).
58

100

One of the theories that have attracted the attention of radical enactivists is ecological
psychology. Yet, despite the substantive points of agreement holding between both approaches, radical enactivists are skeptical about the possibility of incorporating ecological
psychology into a non-representational approach to cognitive science. In summary, Hutto
and Myin raise three main concerns. First, they are concerned about the idea that perception
involves picking up information from the external world. Second, they worry about the idea
that this information specifies or is about the environment and the affordances present within.
And, finally, they object to the idea that this information is meaningful. As expressed by Hutto
(2017), the fact that Gibsonians rely on these “semantic-friendly notions” reveals “an underlying commitment to an information-processing story that is inconsistent with
nonrepresentationalist accounts of mind and cognition” (2017, p. 383; see also Hutto &
Myin, 2017, pp. 82-88).
In a similar vein, Myin (2016) writes that:
in proposing this account of direct perception, and arguably in the very assumption
of invariant properties, some Gibsonian theorists have been driven to a position—
or to formulations which imply this position—which appears to propose externalist,
world-involving instead of brain-involving, versions of cognitivist posits. In particular, Gibsonians theorists have described invariants in what are essentially semantic terms,
namely invariants as being about the environment or affordances, where affordances are understood as action possibilities. (p. 97, emphasis added)
To support his argument, Myin draws on the analysis of van Dijk et al. (2015) about
the historical evolution of Gibson’s notion of information. According to van Dijk and colleagues, in his early works, Gibson conceived of the ambient optic array as being
contentful—as being true or false, correct or incorrect, and so on, with regards to the external
world (Gibson, 1961).
Importantly, although van Dijk and colleagues (2015) see Gibson’s later work (1966,
1979/2015) as an attempt to break away from the idea that information in the ambient array
carries content, they think that this attempt is unsuccessful. For them, the contentless account of information pursued by Gibson does not sit well with the fact that Gibson and
most Gibsonians conceive of perceptual information as being grounded “in environmental
specification” (2015, p. 212). This emphasis on specification, they argue, “makes it hard to
get a content-less reading of even the most progressive ecological theories” (p. 12).
Myin (2016) raises worries on this score too. As he states, the fact that most Gibsonians
stick to the use of notions such as ‘specificity,’ ‘aboutness,’ or ‘meaning’—that is, notions
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that belong “to the semantic sphere, or to the language with which content-carrying representations are characterized” (p. 98)—when describing the invariant patterns of the energy
array shows that they conflate perceptual information with information of a contentful kind.
Thus, he concludes, Gibsonians fall prey to a view of perception that is akin to the one
offered by representationalists:
For all the intended and real differences, there is something common to talking
about invariants and affordances in terms of specification (understood as description) and a cognitivist outlook. In both cases, perceptual experience gets explained
in terms of something that already carries content or has meaning. (2016, pp. 9798)
Two consequences follow from Myin’s analysis. First, ecological psychology, as it
stands, cannot be reconciled with a radical embodied, non-representational theory of cognition. Indeed, he writes, “[ecological psychology] holds on to the main characters of the
cognitivist picture, content-carrying vehicles, locating these in the outside world instead of
the head” (p. 98), thus remaining very conservative within the spectrum of the theories of
embodied cognition.
Second, if ecological psychology commits to a notion of contentful information, it
suffers from the same theoretical flaws as any other representational theory of cognition.
According to Hutto and Myin, the only naturalistic theory of information currently available
is information-as-covariance. According to this notion, a state of affairs A (e.g., the number
of rings in a trunk) is said to carry information about another state of affairs B (e.g., the age
of the tree) if and only if the occurrence of both states A and B covaries lawfully, or reliably
enough.59 This relation of covariance, however, is logically distinct to a contentful relation,
meaning that information-as-covariance is not by itself information-as-content. It follows
from this logical distinction that if we only have a naturalistic account of the former, “we
have, as yet, no explanation for the natural occurrence of informational contents in the

Hutto and Myin (2013, p. 66) borrow this example from Jacob (1997, p. 45), and present it as a
genuine instance of covariant information (for subsequent uses of this example see Hutto & Myin,
2017, p. 30). An anonymous reviewer, by contrast, points out that covariant information is more
technically referred to as Shannon information (Shannon, 1948), whereas this example refers to what
Grice dubs “natural meaning” (1957). In what follows, we remain neutral regarding this issue and
stick to the notion as presented by Hutto and Myin. For other authors using this notion of information in the same way as Hutto and Myin see Lee (2018).
59
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world” (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 71).60 Hutto and Myin (2013) refer to the lack of a naturalistic
account for the existence of content as the “Hard Problem of Content.”
Thus, in so far as Gibsonians commit to the existence of informational content in
nature, they fall prey to the same dilemma as their representationalist cousins. They can either
offer a new notion of information, one that satisfies the criteria for being contentful while
remains consistent with the natural sciences, or give up to any commitment to informationas-content when explaining perception and motor control.
Two main proposals have been advanced in order to purge ecological psychology of
its alleged representational commitments. Crucially, both proposals require abandoning the
idea that patterns in the ambient array stand in a relation of specification to the environment
and the affordances present in it.
The first one has been offered by van Dijk et al. (2015), and it is known as the “usagebased account.” According to this proposal, information only comes into play as an individual uses the patterns in the ambient array to deal with the environment. Accordingly,
“ecological information needs not be about anything—has no “aboutness”—prior to its use”
(p. 213). They claim that it is only by assuming that these patterns do not contain information
independently of being used that we can break away with the idea that they are contentful:
“from such a perspective there is no information in content, but only in use” (p. 213).
The second one is advanced by Myin (2016). Instead of active usage, Myin chooses to
emphasize the organisms’ history of interactions to explain how the patterns can relate to the
environment and the affordances without mediating content. According to this view, successful interactions generate patterns of sensitivity and reaction to similar worldly offerings.

60 According

to Hutto and Myin, the most promising strategy for representationalists is teleosemantics (Millikan, 1984, 2005), which appeals to biological teleofunctions as derived from natural
selection to explain content. The advantage of this approach is that it does not commit to the existence of representational contents in nature that need to be gathered via the senses. Instead, for
teleosemanticists content-related properties are (partly) given by the interpretive activity of the system. The guiding idea of teleosemantics is that a device or an internal state S has the teleofunction of
representing X if it is used (interpreted, consumed) by the system because S has the proper function
of indicating the presence of X. This, however, is not enough to naturalize content. As Hutto and
Myin argue, even though appealing to biological teleofunctions can serve to describe biological
norms, they do not suffice to account for the kind of normativity implied by content—such as the
property of misrepresenting X or being wrong regarding X. For instance, determining that a given
state S in the visual system of frogs has the function of indicating the presence of flies does not suffice
to determine under what description this state represents flies—i.e., whether it represent them as
“flies,” as “moving dots,” as “food,” etc. It follows that “[e]ven if we can specify what is meant to be
targeted [by the state S] that would give us no reason to think that the targeted item [the fly] is represented in a truth-conditional, referential, or otherwise semantic way” (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 80).
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These acquired patterns determine the organism’s current relationship with its environment,
and provide the basis on which new action-perception patterns can emerge:
Environmental properties don’t by themselves specify ‘that something can afford
this or that.’ But an organism that has a history of interactions with those properties
can have found out that this or that action was actually afforded in the past, and that
can be the basis on which its current perception of its environment can have become sensitive to these environmental properties. (p. 99, emphasis original)
Once the history’s role is properly understood, Myin argues, “there’s no longer a need
to describe environmental variables as themselves ‘specifying’ or ‘describing’ other properties” (p. 99). By going this direction, we can offer a theory that accounts for the animals’
perception and use of affordances without appealing to contentful relations such as the ones
allegedly implied by the notions of specification and meaning. Such “RECtified” version of
ecological psychology is apt to be integrated into a radical embodied account of cognition.
In what follows, we argue that the analyses offered by Myin (2016) and Hutto (2017),
as well as the one offered by van Dijk et al. (2015), are misguided. Our aim is to show that
describing ecological information as being specific and meaningful does not entail that this
kind of information is contentful. Prior to that, however, we account for the nature of information posited by Gibsonians.

Information at the ecological scale

To understand what Gibsonians mean by information we first need to account for the distinction they make between stimulus and stimulus information. As Gibson famously argues,
“[s]timulation may be a necessary condition for seeing, but it is not sufficient. There has to
be stimulus information available to the perceptual system, not just stimulation of the receptors” (1979/2015, p. 49; see also Gibson 1966, p. 48).
To illustrate this distinction, Gibson offers the following example (1979/2015, pp. 5962; Chemero 2009, pp. 107-108). Imagine an agent inside an illuminated room. Imagine, too,
that we fill the room with a dense fog. For Gibson, visual perception is impossible in this
situation. Even though there is still light in the room, he reasons, the dense fog precludes it
from reflecting and refracting on the walls and the objects that furnish the room, thereby
preventing the ambient optic array to get structured. This lack of structure entails a lack of
visual information. Therefore, even though there is light in the room to stimulate the agent’s
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retina, it “cannot inform the subject about the surfaces in the room” (Chemero 2009, p. 107),
making perception impossible.
This (perhaps simplistic) example allows us to formulate a preliminary characterization
of what stimulus information is, according to ecological psychology. Stimulus information
can be understood in terms of the relationship between the energy of a medium—i.e., light,
vibrations, etc.—and the substances and surfaces of the objects this energy interacts with.
Due to the interaction between the light and the objects that furnish the room, the ambient
optic array gets structured, and insofar as this structure corresponds to the structure of the
surroundings, the former can be said to ‘contain’ information about the latter. In this sense,
stimulus information can be said to be “a real, unproblematic aspect of the environment”
(Chemero 2009, p. 108).
Nevertheless, van Dijk and colleagues (2015) argue that it is precisely this characterization of information as being based on “[e]nvironmental correspondence alone” (p. 211)
that motivates the worries of radical enactivists that ecological information smuggles in content.61 In what follows, we shall show that this characterization captures only one part of the
story, and that it needs to be complemented by appealing to the activity of the organisms.
Once the role of the organism is properly understood, we can start seeing how the notion of
information as used in ecological psychology breaks away from the notion of content.
One of the core assumptions of ecological psychology is that psychological or cognitive phenomena occur along temporally-extended processes in which agent and environment
interact, reciprocally affecting each other. This assumption leads Gibsonians to reject the
possibility of taking organism and environment as separate areas of inquiry, explaining cognition by focusing on the activity of one side alone. Instead, organism and environment are
taken to be mutual, this is, as forming “an inseparable pair” (Gibson 1979/2015, p. 4) or a
single ecological unit: the organism-environment (O-E) system (Favela & Chemero, 2016;
Lombardo, 1987; Michaels & Carello, 1981). Several key concepts follow from adopting this
mutualist perspective, including the notion of information that we discuss in this section, but
also the notions of specificity and meaning.

van Dijk et al. (2015) trace this criticism back to the work of Varela et al. (1991). As they explain:
“They worried that the ecological notion of information that grounded information in the correspondence between the structure of ambient light and the environment, required too little
participation of the animal. Environmental correspondence alone could not guarantee that ecological
information allowed for perception without mediating content, and the process of information pick
up did not alleviate trafficking content” (van Dijk et al., 2015, p. 211).
61
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In light of this O-E mutuality, in the first pages of The Ecological Approach to Visual
Perception, Gibson (1979/2015) establishes a neat distinction between what he calls the “physical world” and the “environment.” As he states, “[t]he physical world encompasses
everything from atoms through terrestrial objects to galaxies. […] Neither of these extremes
is an environment” (p. 4). Since psychology is the study of the O-E systems, he argues, psychologists ought not to be interested in the physical world per se, but in the surroundings as
sized to the scale of the organisms that inhabit them. The environment as conceived of by
Gibsonians is hence distinct from the world, as it appeals to the surroundings when taken in
relation to what the organisms can detect and interact with. This environment can best be
referred to as a habitat or an econiche:
We are concerned here with things at the ecological level, with the habitats of animals and men, because we all behave with respect to things we can look at and feel,
or smell and taste, and events we can listen to. The sense organs of animals, the
perceptual systems […] are not capable of detecting atoms and galaxies. (Gibson,
1979/2015, p. 5)
Once we take into account the special meaning that “environment” has for Gibsonians, claims that information can be found in the environment acquire a new dimension. If
the environment is to be taken in relation to the organisms, so does the information this
environment contains. Information, Gibson (1979/2015, p. 132) explains, “points two
ways,” to the organism and to the environment.
This bi-directionality, however, admits different readings, depending on whether we
understand the organism as species or as an individual (Michaels & Carello, 1981; Baggs &
Chemero, 2019).62
Let us begin by focusing on the first interpretation: organism as species. Since different
physical patterns require specialized perceptual systems capable of detecting them, a pattern
that is informational for a kind of organism may not be so for another. For instance, whereas
sharks can detect electric fields, humans cannot, and, hence, patterns in the electric field are

According to Baggs and Chemero (2019), to the distinction between physical world and habitat
we must add the distinction between habitat and “umwelt.” As they point out: “we need to make a
further distinction, between: the environment as it exists for a particular member of a species, a habitat; and the environment as it exists for a particular living animal, an umwelt” (p. 7, emphasis original).
The same idea was already introduced by Michaels and Carello: “That an animal detects the affordances of an environment means that information is for a species and for an individual” (1981, p.
44, emphasis original).
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not information for humans. Due to their different phylogenetic history, then, different species turn to be sensitive and responsive to different patterns, and it is only in relation to a
particular kind of organisms that a pattern can be described as information. As Michaels and
Carello (1981) point out: “Information is the bridge between an [organism] and its environment and cannot be usefully described without a specification of both” (p. 37-38, emphasis
original).
Yet there is a way in which perceptual information relates not only to the species but
to the individuals. For example, when an individual occupies a point of observation, the
structure of the array at this point is said to contain information regarding this individual—
namely, information about her height, her position relative to other objects, her motion, and
so on.63 To articulate this idea, Stoffregen et al. (2017) have coined the concept of “embodied
point of observation.” As they describe it:
The embodied point of observation is not a point, in the geometrical sense. It is a
region of space, having size, dimensions, and dynamics corresponding to the size,
dimensions, and dynamics of the animal. The position and motion of the embodied
point of observation are influenced by properties of the animal that inhabits that
point of observation. (p. 179)
Remarkably, Gibson argues that even though we can separate both kinds of information—information about the environment and information about the animal—for
theoretical purposes, perceiving affordances implies that “self-perception and environment
perception go together” (1979/2015, p. 109). Thus, when Gibsonians speak of perceptual
information they also include information relative to the organism and its relationship with
the surroundings.
Also, perception is thought to require the detection of a particular kind of informational variables, the so-called “invariants.” Gibsonians call invariants to the structural
patterns of the ambient array that remain constant underlying other transformations. The
important aspect to be noted here is that since a transformation is needed to reveal an invariant, in most cases the availability of this invariant requires action (Mossio & Taraborelli,
2008; Travieso, Gomila, & Lobo, 2014; Warren, 2005). But, if so, it might be the case that

“A sharp distinction will be made between the ambient array at an unoccupied point of observation and the array at a point that is occupied by an observer, human or other. When the position becomes
occupied, something very interesting happens to the ambient array: it contains information about the body of the observer”
(Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 59, emphasis added).
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some perceptual information is not available in the structure of the static ambient array; rather it emerges as a consequence of the interaction between an individual organism and its
surroundings, and, thus, it is available to this particular actor only.
For illustration, consider optic flow—that is, the ongoing change of the optic array
due to the motion of the agent or the transportation of the objects. Most of the ecological
research focuses on the optic flow as a crucial element for visual perception (Lee & Kalmus,
1980; Lee & Reddish, 1981; Warren, 1998). An example of this is the production of motion
parallax as a strategy for the perception of depth (Gibson, 1950a; Favela & Chemero, 2016).
An animal that moves relative to the objects of the environment produces motion parallax—
viz, the continuous and regular transformation of the apparent position of all visible objects
from the start point to the end point of the movement. Because the objects closer to the
perceiver ‘move’ faster than those located further away, the perceiver can be aware of the
different distances she holds regarding the objects by attending to the different speeds to
which they ‘move’ in her optic field. Therefore, by moving about the environment the agent
makes available information that enables her to perceive depth.
Another example comes from research in haptic perception—viz. perception by dynamic touch. In well-known experiments on haptic perception, participants are requested to
estimate the length of a rod without seeing it, just through haptic information (Shockley,
Carello, & Turvey, 2004; Turvey & Carello, 2011). All these experiments point out to the
inertial tensor—that is, the resistance of an object to turn—of the rods as the relevant informational variable required to accomplish the estimation successfully. In the experiments,
participants wield and turn the rod, and this wielding and turning make available the inertial
tensor. Without turning the rod, then, there is no information relative to the inertial tensor
available in the ambient array of the perceiver, which it is to say that there is no information
available for the haptic perception of length.
These examples contribute to the view of perception as an active process—a process
that involves action. For Gibsonians, perception depends on the detection of invariants, and
it is often the case that these invariants only turn to be available because of the active exploration of the environment by the organism (Travieso et al., 2014, p. 365). This aspect also
stresses the importance of the organisms’ history of interactions in perceptual expertise. To
successfully accomplish concrete perceptual tasks, organisms have to learn, among other
things, how to explore the environment in order to make available the appropriate invariants
(E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000)
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Taken all these arguments together, we conclude that there is no room in ecological
psychology to think of perceptual information as being “outside in the world” (Myin 2016,
p. 98) and completely divorced from the organisms. Rather, although Gibsonians say that
information is in the environment, this information is to be understood ecologically, that is, as
being dependent on the relationship between the organisms and their econiches.
Before finishing this section, it is important to remark that nothing of what we have
said implies a commitment to the idea that information depends on its active use (van Dijk
et al., 2015). To say that physical patterns of the ambient array can only be considered information in relation to organisms of a certain kind does not equate to say that these patterns
are information only when used by these organisms. Patterns in the electric field are information for sharks, but they do not depend on being used or detected by an individual shark.
Also, even though we hold that some informational variables—namely, the invariants—turn
to be available because of the agent’s exploratory activity, what these invariants inform about
is independent of the use the actor makes of them. We elaborate further on these points in
the following section.
In what follows, we account for the notions of specificity and meaning as used by
ecological psychologists. We argue that describing perceptual information as being specific
and meaningful does not imply that this information is contentful.

No need for RECtification: Specificity and meaning without content

So far, we have addressed the nature of the information invoked by ecological psychologists.
As we have argued, this information cannot be understood as being independent of the organisms. This argument, however, does not by itself suffice to dismiss the idea that this
information is contentful. After all, both Hutto (2017) and Myin (2016) claim that Gibsonians describe ecological information in terms that belong to the semantic sphere—namely,
specificity and meaning. This section aims to deal with this second objection.
To begin with, it is important to note what “specificity” means in the context of ecological psychology. As used by Gibsonians, “specificity” refers to a lawful, 1:1 relation
between invariant patterns in the ambient array and aspects of the organism-environment
interaction.64 Accordingly, when Gibsonians say that an invariant “specifies” some feature or

It is worth mentioning that the notion of law as used by Gibsonians must also be understood at
the scale of the O-E systems. As Warren (2005) puts it: “Ecological information is lawful not in the
Newtonian sense of being universal in space and time, but in an ecological sense of being regular
within an ecological context or constraint” (pp. 242–243).
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property of the O-E system, what they mean is that this pattern relates uniquely to this feature or property.
The relationship between specification and perception was first articulated by means
of the “principle of symmetry” (Shaw, McIntyre, & Mace, 1974; Turvey et al., 1981; Turvey,
2019). According to this principle, environment, information, and perception lawfully determine one another: the environment uniquely relates to the information, which uniquely
relates to perception, and perception uniquely relates to information, which uniquely relates
to the environment. This symmetry is generally taken to be key to the possibility of direct
perception. As Michaels and Palatinus (2014) observe, “because information is specific to an
environmental state of affairs and perception is specific to the information, perception is
specific to the environmental state of affairs—that is, is direct” (p. 21).
Consider, again, the example of optic flow. As we mentioned earlier, the individual’s
movements in the environment lawfully produce invariant patterns in her sensory array. For
instance, as any animal moves toward an object, the image this object projects in her retina
lawfully expands, causing the object to expand in her visual field (see Figure 5.1). Optic flow
is thus “centrifugal in the direction of locomotion” (Chemero, 2009, p. 124, emphasis original).
By studying the plummeting behavior of gannet birds, Lee and colleagues demonstrated that
this centrifugal expansion is of particular relevance for the perceptual guidance of action (see
Lee & Kalmus, 1980; Lee & Reddish, 1981). As they demonstrated, the ratio of the apparent
size of the approaching object to the rate of change of the apparent size of the object—a
variable designed “Tau” (τ)—lawfully relates to the time remaining until physical contact
between the perceiver and the object (see Figure 5.2). Thus, according to the principle of
symmetry described above, an agent can be aware of the time remaining until colliding with
an approaching object by attending to the ongoing invariant expansion of the object in her
visual field—the optical variable that is specific to time-to-contact.
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Figure 5.1 Centrifugal expansion of the optic flow in the direction of locomotion. The arrows

represent the direction of the expansion of an object located at the center of the visual field. (From
Gibson 1979/2015, Fig. 7.6, p. 118, with permission)

Figure 5.2 Schema of the optical expansion of the object, R, as it approaches the agent. Suppose that

at time, t, the agent and R are at distance Z(t). At t, R projects an image, r(t), proportional to its size.
If the distance between both decreases at velocity V(t), r(t) will increase at v(t). Hence, τ = r(t)/v(t).
From the figure, we can infer that r(t)/v(t) is equal to the ratio of R at distance Z(t) and the rate, V(t),
to which it approaches the agent. Hence, τ = Z(t)/V(t). If V is constant then, τ = Z(t)/( Z(t)/t).
Therefore, τ = t. Derivates of τ has been applied for conditions where V(t) is not constant (see Lee,
2009). (From Chemero, 2009, Fig. 6.4, p. 124, with permission)

To explain how agents can modulate their behavior by detecting the invariant patterns
available in their sensory array Gibsonians hypothesize that these invariants specify opportunities for interactions or affordances as well. Imagine, for example, that you are driving
your car and a dog jumps onto the road. Detecting τ is crucial in this situation, as the time
remaining to contact determines whether you can avoid the collision and how (Fajen &
Devaney, 2006; Lee, 2009). For instance, during a certain period, stopping the car before
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colliding with the dog will be physically possible, and you will be able to do it by gradually
adjusting the pressure on the brake pedal. At some point, however, pushing the brake pedal
will not suffice to avoid the collision, and the only available option will be to steer the wheel.
According to ecological psychology, detecting τ is sufficient for you to perceive these behavioral opportunities, being able to adjust your behavior accordingly (Lee, 2009).
Now that we have explained what specificity means in the context of EP, the question
we need to address is whether describing invariant patterns as being specific equates to say
that these patterns are contentful. Recall that according to Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) a
process or a state is contentful when it has special conditions of satisfaction—viz. when it
can be true or false, veridical or non-veridical, etc., regarding something else. This is not the
case of invariants as used by ecological psychologists. When Gibsonians say that the ratio of
expansion of an object in the optic field of an animal specifies time-to-contact they do not
mean that this expansion relates to time-to-contact in a way that is susceptible of being semantically evaluated and misrepresenting. Specifying invariant patterns do not relate to the
environment or the affordances in any contentful way:
Information in the form of predication can be a truth or a falsehood. A person can
misinform in the sense of lie […]. Information in the form of stimulation (a flowing
array of energy) cannot lie—cannot be false in this sense (see below). The light and
sound from the environment do not say untruths about the environment, only men
do that. (Gibson, unpublished material, quoted in Reed, 1991, p. 159, emphasis
original)
In light of this, and to avoid confusion, we propose that the best way to understand
specifying information is to take it as a form of covariant information. Accordingly, the invariant ratio of expansion of the object in the optic array of the animal is said to specify timeto-contact because both features lawfully covary. Hence, although perceptual information is
often described as being about the environment (and the affordances therein), this
“aboutness” is to be read in terms of lawful covariation, not in terms of contentful descriptions or representation. Invariants, so to speak, do not convey anything true or false, veridical
or non-veridical, and so on, regarding the environment:
Information about something means only specificity to something. Hence, when
we say that information is conveyed by light, or by sound, odor, or mechanical
energy, we do not mean that the source is literally conveyed as a copy or a replica.
(Gibson, 1966, p. 187)
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Understanding specification as lawful covariation enables us to think of the structural
invariant patterns as being contentless, dissolving the worries of radical enactivists. Accordingly, patterns in the ambient array relate uniquely to the environment and the affordances
present within, but this relation does not by itself entail the possibility of semantic misrepresentation.65
Furthermore, despite the seemingly problematic image that speaking of information
“pickup” suggests to Hutto and Myin (2013, p. xvi; 2017, p. 86), Gibson (1979/2015, p. 231)
was particularly emphatic that specifying information is not information of the kind that can
be gathered, stored, transmitted, and manipulated, breaking with the idea that perceptual
systems ‘pass on’ contentful messages. Instead, animals are said to pick information up when
they attend to the invariant patterns, perceiving the affordances they specify. As he writes:
“The information does not consist of signals to be interpreted but of structural invariants
which need only to be attended to” (Gibson, 1972/2002, p. 79). In a similar vein, Reed (1996)
tells us that:
Ecological information cannot be transmitted: it is ambient and available, not something put over a channel; it is something to be detected or used (or not) in regulating
action […] Information pick up is not a process of “internalizing” information. (p.
155)
Note, again, that this is not the same as saying that invariant patterns need to be used
to bear information. To see how our proposal differs from the one of van Dijk et al. (2015),
consider a situation where perceptual information is not provided visually, but through a
vibrotactile sensory substitution device. A famous example of such a device is the enactive
torch (Froese et al., 2012). The enactive torch is handled as a flashlight, and it is equipped
with distance sensors and a vibrator strapped to the wrist. If the torch faces an obstacle,
namely, an object in the direction of exploration, the vibrator activates, and the characteristics
of the vibration depend both on the object explored and the pattern of exploration. The
closer the individual gets to the obstacle, for example, the more intensely the device vibrates.
Imagine an individual agent that navigates a room by relying exclusively on the vibrations the torch produces when steered in different directions (see, e.g., Lobo et al., 2019). As
she moves, the intensity of the vibration varies, and she attends to the different patterns of
vibrations to avoid the obstacles she finds. Imagine, however, that while she is moving

The notion of covariation, Hutto and Myin (2013) reminds us, is “logically distinct” from the
notion of content (p. x).
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around the room a loud alarm rings, distracting her attention from the vibrations on her
wrist, and causing her to eventually crash into a chair. According to the usage-based account
defended by van Dijk and colleagues (2015), although the intensity of the vibration patterns
kept increasing as the actor approached the chair, because she was not paying attention to
them—she was not using them at the moment of the collision—, the patterns of vibration
didn’t contain any information.
As we explained before, this account was introduced as an alternative way to understand perceptual information without appealing to the content-involving relations allegedly
implied by the notion of specificity. However, if the previous analysis is correct, specifying
information is not information-as-content, and hence there is no obvious explanatory gain
in giving up specificity from the theory. Moreover, if those who think that specificity is a
necessary condition for direct perception (see, e.g., Michaels & Carello, 1981; Michaels &
Palatinus, 2014; Richardson et al., 2008; Turvey, 2019; Turvey et al., 1981) are on the right
track, by giving up specificity we run the risk of giving up direct perception too.66
We propose, by contrasts, that because the intensity of the vibration lawfully corresponds or covaries with the proximity to the obstacle the former can be considered to be
informative about the latter, and it is so independently of whether the actor detects or uses
it.
Compare this case with a situation in which the patterns of vibrations have no relation
with the patterns of exploration of the agent—for instance, a broken device that vibrates to
the same intensity independently of the distance between the agent and the chair. In this
second case, the patterns of vibration cannot inform about proximity, but this is so independently of whether the agent tries to use them to guide her movements. Accordingly,
information is contingent on the lawful covariation or correspondence between patterns in
the sensory array and features of the O-E relation, but not on being actively used or perceived
by an agent. This reading is more accurate to the Gibsonian approach and shows that there
is no real conflict between the information as conceived by REC and the information as
conceived by ecological psychologists.

It is worth mentioning that some Gibsonians have proposed that the concept of information
needs to be expanded so as to include variables that do not relate to the environment in a lawful (1:1)
manner (Chemero, 2009; Golonka, 2015). According to this idea, non-specifying variables, this is,
variables that are contingent on conventions or reliably enough regularities, can support direct perception too. Whether or not this hypothesis is tenable is not an issue we can address in this paper.
Our claim, instead, is that the risk of conflating specifying information with information-as-content
is not a good reason to abandon specificity.
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Let us now discuss the last concern of radical enactivists: the notion of meaning as
used by ecological psychologists. As we saw before, for Hutto and Myin the fact that Gibsonians describe perceptual information as being meaningful reveals an underlying
commitment to the idea that this information bears content. The question is, then: Can we
hold that information is meaningful and contentless at the same time?
To begin with, it is important to note that the notion of meaning as used in ecological
psychology directly relates to the notion of affordance. As Gibson (1976/1982) writes: “the
meaning or value of a thing consists of what it affords” (p. 407). As explained before, Gibsonians conceive of perception as being primarily for the control of action. According to this
view, the exploratory activity of the agent is always purposeful, meaning that when agents
explore the environment the information they detect is taken in relation to a goal. This idea,
combined with the view that information specifies—in the sense explained above—affordances or behavioral opportunities lead to the claim that information is meaningful for
the organisms. Hence, the ecological notion of meaning is related to behavior, and has nothing to do with semantic properties such as implication or reference. To say of a particular
invariant pattern that is meaningful is not to say that it carries content, but that it affords the
possibility of doing such and such.67
An important aspect to be noted, however, is that perceptual information is said to be
meaningful for an organism, and not meaningful per se. The reason is that the affordances a
particular informational variable specifies depend on the conjunction of the agent and the
physical properties of the environment. Affordances imply “the complementarity of the animal and the environment” (Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 119). It follows that different organisms,
this is, organisms with different body features, different action capabilities, and so on, will
perceive different affordances while detecting the same information. When you see the mug
that is on your desk, for example, you perceive the possibility of grasping it, but this action
is possible only because you have opposable thumbs and because the relation between the
size of your hand and the size of the mug is adequate. An animal that does not have these
physical features will not perceive the possibility of grasping the mug.
Thus, meaning as used in EP is not “inherent to the natural world” (Myin, 2016, p.
98), nor does it need to be constructed or computed by mental processes. Rather, as Richardson et al. (2008) explicate, “meaning can be understood and studied as an objective and
real property of an O-E system” (p. 168). Perceptual information is meaningful in so far as

Costall (2012) has coined the notion of “use-meaning” to distinguish the ecological notion of
meaning from semantic meaning and the meaning associated with representations.
67

115

it specifies opportunities for interaction to an actor, without any assumption that it carries
content.

Conclusion

How radical is ecological psychology? According to radical enactivists, the way Gibsonians
describe perceptual information leads them to positions that are akin to the ones offered by
representationalists, locating informational contents in the outside world instead of in the
head (Myin, 2016; Hutto, 2017; Hutto & Myin, 2017; see also van Dijk et al., 2015). In summary, they find three main issues in the Gibsonian approach. First, the idea that perception
requires picking up information from the outside world. Second, the idea that this information specifies or is about the environment and the affordances present within. And, third,
that this information is meaningful. In light of this, radical enactivists conclude that ecological psychology is not radical enough as it stands, and that it needs to be “RECtified”—viz.,
“sanitized" of its representational commitments—if it is to be included in a genuine nonrepresentational approach to cognitive science.
Contrary to this view, we have argued that the notions of information, specificity, and
meaning, if properly understood, do not entail a commitment to the existence of informational content in the world, and, thus, that ecological psychology is not in conflict with the
principles of the radical forms of embodied cognitive science.
First, we have argued that perceptual information as conceived by ecological psychology is to be related to the organisms that inhabit a particular econiche. This relation, however,
can be understood in different ways depending on whether we understand the organism as
species or as an individual. Regarding the first interpretation, we have argued that different
physical patterns require specialized perceptual systems capable of detecting them, and, then,
that a pattern that is informational for a kind of organisms may not be so for another. Yet
there is a sense in which information is related to individuals as well. According to Gibsonians, perception requires the detection of invariants—viz., structural patterns that remain
constant underlying other transformation. Because an invariant can only be detected against
particular transformation, invariants as key informational variables only turn to be available
through the active exploration of the environment by the agent. In the absence of particular
organism-environment interactions, invariants are not available in the environment to be
detected. Both reasons together cast doubts upon the idea that perceptual information is
simply outside in the world, independent of the organisms.
116

After clarifying the nature of the perceptual information posited by ecological psychology, we have discussed whether describing this information as being specific and meaningful
entails that this information is of a contentful kind. As we have argued, the notion of specificity refers to the lawful, 1:1 relation between invariant patterns in the ambient array and
aspects of the organism-environment interaction. As such, specificity can best be understood
as lawful covariation or correspondence, without any assumption that it carries content. Invariants covary with the environment and the affordances present in it, but they do not
convey anything true or false, veridical or non-veridical, and so on, about them. Finally, we
have explained that the notion of meaning as used in ecological psychology is to be related
to the affordances. Perceptual information, hence, is said to be meaningful for an agent or
an organism because it affords certain opportunities for interaction to her, but this meaning
is orthogonal to semantics.
In light of these arguments, we conclude that ecological psychology is radical enough
and that it is apt to be included in a full-blown radical embodied approach to cognition of
the kind REC seeks to build.
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Chapter 6
Enriching radical enactive cognition

Critics of radical enactivism (REC) accuse it of not bringing any substantive change to cognitive science (Miłkowski et al., 2018; Thompson, 2018; Baggs, 2017). At the core of this
claim is the idea that REC offers neither empirically testable hypotheses nor explanatory
models for the cognitive phenomena it targets. There is nothing such as a REC-style cognitive science, and thus REC is not a real contender in the field. This paper aims to address
this objection. The argument provided is two-fold. First, I argue that charging REC for not
providing explanatory models and testable predictions is misguided. The reason for this is
that REC is not conceived of as a scientific theory of cognition but as a philosophical framework. Second, I hold that ecological psychology can provide REC with empirically testable
hypotheses and explanatory models that are compatible with its philosophical tenets. By enriching REC this way, the aforementioned objections can be put to rest.

Segundo-Ortin, M. (under review). Enriching radical enactive cognition. Why radical enactivism
needs ecological psychology. Synthese.
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Chapter 6
Enriching radical enactive cognition

Introduction

Radical enactivism (REC, hereafter) is a controversial and yet influential approach in the
current philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. Having its roots in embodied, enactive and dynamical theories of cognition, REC seeks to radicalize cognitive science by setting
it upon rigorously naturalistic foundations (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017; Hutto, 2017). REC’s
main signature mark is the distinction between “basic” and “non-basic” forms of cognition.
Basic forms of cognition range from the perceptual control of action to particular forms of
imagination and memory. By hypothesis, these basic forms of cognition contrast with nonbasic ones in that the former do not involve the manipulation of representational contents.
Nonetheless, the radical ambitions of REC have come under attack. For example,
Miłkowski et al. (2018), Thompson (2018), and Baggs (2017) hold that REC can be considered, at best, an abstract heuristic device for the study of cognition, but has little impact on
the empirical research in cognitive science. The reason for this is that REC provides neither
explanatory models nor testable predictions regarding concrete cognitive phenomena, so it
lacks the resources to replace the kind of representational accounts it criticizes.
This paper aims to address this objection. The argument provided is two-fold. First, I
argue that charging REC for not providing explanatory models and testable predictions is
misguided. REC is not conceived of as a theory of cognition but as a philosophical framework.
As such, it aims to contribute to our understanding of cognition by passing existing explanatory proposals through a process of philosophical and conceptual clarification.
This alone, however, does not suffice to defuse the core of the criticism. The reason
is that we can accept that REC is a philosophical framework and still hold that it is irrelevant
for cognitive science unless it is grounded in a productive empirical research program.
To address this second concern, I defend the thesis that there is a two-way, complementary, fit between REC and a viable research program in the form of ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1979/2015; Richardson et al., 2008; Chemero, 2009; Turvey, 2019). On
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the one hand, REC brings to the fore a set of theoretical posits that finds a natural home in
ecological psychology, even if there are still some issues to be addressed. On the other hand,
ecological psychology can provide REC with empirically testable hypotheses and explanatory
models that are compatible with its philosophical tenets. If this can be successfully shown to
be the case, then the criticisms of Miłkowski et al. (2018), Thompson (2018), and Baggs
(2018) can be put to rest.
It is worth mentioning that the possibility of incorporating ecological psychology into
REC is already gestured at in the work of Hutto and Myin (2017). They include ecological
psychology among the set of research programs REC could potentially ally with. These programs include predictive processing (Clark, 2016), sensorimotor enactivism (O’Regan &
Noë, 2001), and autopoietic-adaptive enactivism (Di Paolo, 2009). The problem is that Hutto
and Myin offer very little detail of how these alliances can be forged (Segundo-Ortin, 2018).
This issue is particularly pressing, for the kind of research programs they recognize as potential allies of REC rely on different explanatory concepts and offer seemingly contradicting
hypotheses. Hence, it is still unclear how all of them can be integrated into a single and
coherent approach to cognition of the kind Hutto and Myin envisage. This paper aims to
show how this integration can be made, at least for ecological psychology.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explicates the criticisms of Miłkowski et al. (2018), Thompson (2018), and Baggs (2018) to REC. Section 3 clarifies the nature
of REC as a philosophical framework for the study of cognition. Section 4 develops the
second part of the argument. It explicates in what sense REC and ecological psychology are
compatible, and substantiates this claim by providing some examples of empirical hypotheses
and explanatory models that, being produced under the principles of ecological psychology,
are compatible with the theoretical posits of REC. Finally, section 5 offers some preliminary
thoughts against the conjecture, advanced by Miłkowski et al. (2018), that a successful empirical research program must take a mechanistic view of scientific explanation.

Putting REC to the test

A radical change is afoot in cognitive science. In the last decades, so-called embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive approaches to the mind have gained considerable
momentum. This ‘E-turn’ challenges cognitive scientists to abandon their traditional neurocentric focus—that is, the idea that the whereabouts of the mechanisms responsible of
cognition are to be located solely and entirely in the individual’s brain—to recognize the nontrivial contribution exerted by the body and the environment (Barrett, 2015a; Chemero, 2009;
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Clark, 1997, 2008). E-approaches, in sum, have provided scientists and philosophers with a
fresh new perspective on many foundational issues in cognitive science, including perception-action, decision-making, memory, problem-solving, learning, and language, among
others (Calvo & Gomila, 2008; Newen, Bruin, & Gallagher, 2018).
Miłkowski et al. (2018) have nonetheless expressed doubts regarding the reach and
impact that E-approaches have for contemporary cognitive science. According to them, embodied, embedded, enactive and extended approaches—they include distributed approaches
to cognition on this list—may work well as “abstract heuristics” that help us to override
traditional individualistic and neurocentric assumptions in the study of cognition, but “[t]hey
are not theories in the sense of providing complete predictions or explanations of phenomena in question” (p. 4). Therefore, Miłkowski and colleagues conclude, such “E” or “wide”
approaches are only “partially relevant” for contemporary cognitive scientists.
Crucially, in so far as REC is part of these E or “wide” approaches, this objection
undermines REC too (Miłkowski et al., 2018, p. 3). REC may offer some heuristic guidance,
but it cannot do any cognitive scientific work by itself.
Others have raised similar concerns before. For example, in his review of Evolving Enactivism (Hutto & Myin, 2017), Thompson (2018) submits that REC fails to provide a positive
theory that can replace the kind of representational accounts it criticizes. In his own words:
“Fending off critics and rival theories with philosophical arguments does not a cognitive
science theory make.” And he adds: “They [Hutto and Myin] have given not so much a
positive account as a proposal for an account.” In a similar vein, Baggs (2017) tells us that
“it is hard to imagine how [REC] could be translated into a positive empirical programme.”
According to these authors REC lacks adequate resources to be considered a genuine contender within the cognitive sciences.
This paper aims to address this concern. In the next section, I clarify the nature of
REC. I argue that REC should not be taken as an attempt to provide a scientific theory of
cognition but, instead, that it should be taken as a philosophical framework. After this, I
explicate how REC can team up with ecological psychology, a productive research program
for the study of perception and action, thus satisfying the demands of its critics.

On the nature of REC

As Hutto and Myin (2018) present it, REC urges us “to rethink—root and branch—oldschool conceptions of cognition, demanding that we revise our views of the mind’s core
work and how it gets done” (p. 96). As they explain, the primary aim of REC is to advance
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our understanding of cognition and cognitive science by carefully elucidating existing explanatory proposals, passing them through a process of philosophical and conceptual clarification
(see Hutto, 2017). As a philosophical framework, REC seeks to radicalize cognitive science by
setting it upon rigorously naturalistic foundations—foundations that are consistent with our
best scientific theories.
According to Hutto and Myin, one of the scientific proposals that desperately stands
in need of such philosophical scrutiny is the one according to which all cognitive phenomena
require the manipulation of mental representations. Mental representations are canonically
characterized by the fact that they are contentful—i.e., they refer or denote something else
(what is being represented) in a way that makes them susceptible of being right or wrong,
true or false, and so on (Ramsey, 2007; Shea, 2018; Adams, 2010b; Neander, 2017).
Even though representationalism still constitutes the mainstream position in the field,
all representational theories of cognition that commit to content, Hutto and Myin argue,
suffer from the same foundational issue: they are unable to explain how representational
states can acquire their contentful properties in the first place. Shea (2018), a prominent representationalist, describes this issue as an “undoubted lacuna in our understanding, a void
hidden away in the foundations of the cognitive sciences” (p. 5).
For one thing, Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) argue, the only naturalistic theory of information we have stipulates that a state A carries information about another state B if and
only if both states covary lawfully or reliably enough. In the absence of another scientific
notion of information, we must assume that the information organisms gather via their
senses is of this covariant kind. Covariance, however, is logically distinct from content—it
does not follow from the fact that A and B covary that A is true or false about B (Lee, 2018;
Ramsey, 2007; Shapiro, 2014).
Furthermore, it is unlikely that appealing to resemblance, causal relations, or biological
teleo-functions will pay the bill either, for none of them suffices for the kind of normativity
implied by the notion of content (Hutto & Satne, 2015; Segundo-Ortin & Hutto, under review [Chapter 4]). Both claims combine to form what Hutto and Myin dub the “Hard
Problem of Content” (HPC). If their analysis is correct, it follows that we do not have scientific basis for thinking that mental representational contents can constitute the building
blocks of cognition.68

To clarify, this should not take to imply that REC advocates for a globally anti-representational
approach to cognition. Instead, REC holds that some cognitive activities, namely those that involve
the manipulation of public symbols, are contentful, whereby the content of these symbols is grounded
68
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Provoking a philosophical rethink by means of the HPC is a paradigmatic example of
the kind of work REC aims to do. REC’s conceptual and philosophical investigations, if
successful, have potential implications for our empirical research. For example, in light of
the HPC, REC urges us to get rid of the idea that the primary function of perception is to
yield mental representations. If there is no informational content in the world to be gathered
by the senses, then there is no reason to think that neural states that emerge as a consequence
of an individual’s perceptual activities are contentful. At the core of REC is the idea that we
can explain an organism’s capacity to perceive, keep track, and act appropriately with respect
to some state of affairs of the environment without positing internal processes that represent—in the sense explained above—the state in question.
Critics of REC are thus right that it does not constitute an empirical theory of cognition, but this was never REC’s ambition in the first place. REC does not aim to deliver
testable hypotheses and explanatory models for concrete cognitive phenomena. Instead, the
work REC promises to do is philosophical in nature. This is something radical enactivists
openly acknowledge. For example, Hutto (2017) tells us that “REC is not an alternative version of enactivism with distinct explanatory tools in its own right” (p. 379). Rather, he
clarifies, “[REC’s] analyses and arguments are designed to cleanse, purify, strengthen, and
unify a whole set of existing anti-representational offerings” (p. 379). In light of this, we can
conclude that charging REC for not offering a theory of cognition is misguided.
Some may find this answer unsatisfactory. We can accept that REC is a philosophical
framework and still hold that it is irrelevant for cognitive science unless it is grounded in a
productive empirical research program. Yet, for those who decide to take this path, the right
question is not whether REC by itself constitutes a scientific theory of cognition, but whether
there are examples of scientific theories of cognition that are compatible with the philosophical program of REC. Note, in addition, that this question captures better the spirit of REC,
for which philosophy and science “can be distinct and yet productively connected” (Hutto
& Satne, 2018, p. 56).
REC is thereby open to incorporate into its philosophical framework a positive research program of the kind its critics demand (see Hutto, 2017). So, are there good examples
of REC-style theories of cognition?
In what follows, I shall argue that there is at least one candidate that can deliver the
goods. My thesis is that there is a two-way, complementary, fit between REC and a viable

in the kind of normative practices that make their use possible (Hutto & Myin, 2017; Hutto & Satne,
2015).
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research program in the form of ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979/2015; Richardson et
al., 2008; Chemero, 2009; Turvey, 2019). On the one hand, REC brings to the fore a set of
theoretical posits that finds a natural home in ecological psychology. On the other hand,
ecological psychology can provide REC with empirically testable hypotheses and explanatory
models that are compatible with its philosophical tenets.

Going radical? Go ecological!

So far, I have argued that REC must be understood primarily as a philosophical framework
for cognitive science. To exemplify this, I have focused on the HPC, explaining how it contributes to undermining longstanding assumptions in cognitive science—i.e., that all forms
of cognition need to be explained by invoking computational processes over mental representations. REC, however, offers some positive ideas too. This section explores some of
these ideas in order to show how REC can ally with ecological psychology.

Emphasizing information

Whenever someone realizes that the acronym “REC” stands for radical enactivism the normal
conclusion is to think that REC is a close relative to the theory first articulated by Varela and
colleagues (1991/2016), and later developed by Thompson (2007) or Di Paolo (2005, 2009),
among others. The truth, however, is that albeit both approaches have much in common,
REC marks a sharp contrast with traditional enactivism (Kee, 2018).
For enactivists, cognition is fundamentally an activity of sense-making, where sensemaking is defined as “the ongoing emergence of roles, values, dispositions to act, and meaning” (Rosch, 2016, pp. xlviii-xlix). According to enactivists, a minimally cognitive system is
one that generates and maintains itself through constant structural change and interaction
with the environment. To do so, it has to evaluate the environmental perturbations in regards
to the material conditions of its own systemic viability. As a consequence of this continuous
evaluation, the organism brings forth or enacts a meaningful perspective of the environment:
environmental perturbations become good or bad, advantageous or disadvantageous, attractive or repulsive, and so on, to this organism (Thompson, 2007, p. 158).69

According to Di Paolo, Buhrmann and Barandiaran (2017), sense-making is ubiquitous to all
forms of cognition: “Bacteria swimming up chemical gradients and scientists trying to understand
them are both cases of sense-making, albeit very different ones” (p. 123). In a similar vein, Kyselo
and Di Paolo (2013) claim that sense-making “admits for various forms of complexity and styles
69
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Radical enactivists, however, disagree that cognition is fundamentally an activity of
sense-making—a notion that they find susceptible of cognitivist renderings—and propose,
instead, that cognitive systems make their way in the world by sensing and responding to the
naturally occurring environmental information. As Hutto (2017) explains:
Fundamentally, cognition is a matter of sensitively and selectively responding to
information but it does not involve picking up and processing informational content or the formation of representational contents. (p. 380)
My core claim is that in putting the emphasis on the existence of environmental information and the necessity of organisms to get attuned to it, REC positions itself closely to
ecological psychology.
Ecological psychology is well-known for advancing two interrelated theses. First, that
perception consists of the direct (un-mediated) detection of information, and, second, that
the environment is informationally rich. Let us see what these theses imply.
To first understand what Gibsonian psychologists understand by perceptual information we need to account for the distinction, introduced by Gibson (1966, 1979/2015),
between stimulus and stimulus information. Roughly, a stimulus is whatever physical energy
capable of affecting the perceiver’s sensory organs. Say, for instance, the ambient light of a
room. Because of the interaction between the light and the object that furnish the room, the
light gets structured in a particular way, forming what Gibson calls an “ambient optic array.”
For ecological psychologists, it is the ambient optic array that serves as the basis for perception, and not the stimulus per se (the light).
This static array is nonetheless a limit case. In normal conditions, the array an individual sees undergoes different transformations, often as a consequence of the perceiver’s own
movements. Elaborating on these transformations, Gibsonians define the notion of “invariant.” In short, invariants are higher-order70 structural patterns of the ambient energy array
that remain unchanged underlying other transformation.71
involving continuous and discontinuous categories, from bacterial chemotaxis to aesthetic judgements […] any process that we can describe as cognitive is a case of sense-making” (p. 530).
70 Invariants are deemed “higher-order” because they are defined over substantial spatial and temporal scales.
71 Among the invariants we can further distinguish structural invariants and transformational invariants (Michaels & Carello, 1981). Structural invariants are defined as those properties of the sensory
array that remain constant through motor interaction. Transformational invariants, by contrast, are
characterized as “modes of change” of perceptual objects. As Mossio and Taraborelli (2008) explain,
“structural invariants are those properties that allow perceptual systems to parse structural components of the environment, whereas transformational invariants allow perceptual systems to detect and
track dynamic regularities to which structural components obey” (pp. 1327-1328).
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Optic flow provides an intuitive example of invariant. When an observer moves about
its environment, it produces transformation in its optic array. For example, as the observer
approaches an object, the image of the object in the visual field expands. Such centrifugal
expansion is an example of an invariant optic pattern. For Gibsonians, perceptual information primarily depends on the existence of such invariant patterns (Gibson, 1975/2015,
Ch. 5).
But how can invariants serve for direct perception? To understand this idea, we need
to remember what motivates scientists and philosophers to posit mental representations in
accounts of perception. According to representational theories of perception, because perceptual information is indeterminate with regards to their causal origins, perception requires
“an almost unimaginably difficult causal inference problem: [perceivers] must infer the hidden state of the constantly changing environment from its profoundly non-linear and
ambiguous effects on the organism’s numerous sensory transducers” (Williams, 2018, p.
150). Allegedly, it is the necessity to explain this causal inference that calls for a representational-cum-computational account of perception (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Hohwy, 2013).
Ecological psychology, by contrast, denies that perceptual information is necessarily
ambiguous. Instead, the theory conjectures the existence of a nomological, 1:1 correspondence between the invariants of the perceiver’s energy array and the environmental properties
or events that cause them. “Specificity” (also referred to as “specification”) is used here to
denote this nomological relation, and the notion of information is reserved for those invariant patterns that are specific in this sense (Michaels & Palatinus, 2014; Richardson et al.,
2008; Turvey, 2019).72
Specificity is at the basis of direct perception. Because certain patterns in the energy
array specify (lawfully correspond to) environmental properties or events, these patterns nonambiguously inform about these properties or events. Hence, the “perception of the layout
and objects and events is possible without hypothesizing processes of supplementation such
as intermediary concepts and representations” (E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000, p. 18). Detecting
or picking up these invariant patterns is tantamount to perceiving these properties and
events, which, by hypothesis, is tantamount to perceiving what we can or cannot do in this
situation—the affordances the situation offers to a particular observer:

Although this is the most canonically accepted account of information in the ecological literature,
it is worth mentioning that not all Gibsonians agree with the view (see Chemero, 2009). Due to the
lack of space, I focus on the notion of information as canonically accepted by ecological psychologists
and I will not make a substantive analysis of Chemero’s hypothesis.
72
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Ecological information is […] specific to the organism in its environment: information enables me to encounter my surroundings, to regulate my encounters, and
to be aware of my activities in the living world. (Reed, 1996, p. 7)
In sum, ecological psychologists hypothesize that the environment provides organisms
with information that specify functional properties for these organisms. Because the environment is informationally rich, no representation is required at the level of perceptionaction, but the active exploration of the environment in order to find the required invariants
that inform of the relevant affordances (see Figure 6.1). Basic intelligence is thus conceived
of as goal-oriented, information-guided behavior (Chemero, 2009; Turvey, 2019).

Figure 6.1 The schema represents the co-dependence of perception and action according to ecolog-

ical psychology. The function of perception-action cycles is to stabilize the system’s overall behavior
with regards to achieving a particular task or goal. Through action, the organism makes available
information, and this information specifies further opportunities for action (affordances).

Taking this into account, I defend not only that REC aligns better with ecological psychology than it does with traditional enactivism, which heavily relies on the notion of sensemaking to explain intelligent behavior, but also that ecological psychology can provide REC
with a productive research program—one that investigates both the particular informational
variables that organisms need to be attuned to in order to perform specific sensorimotor
tasks, and the different ways these informational variables can be detected by the different
organisms.
Well-known examples of this ecological research include, for example, studies of how
detecting tau (τ), the variable that specifies the time remaining until contact between an approaching object and the perceiver, can be reliably exploited in the regulation of locomotion
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by human and non-human animals (Lee, 1980, 2009; Warren, 2006). Regarding visual perception, τ is defined as “the ratio of the size of a projected image to the rate of change of the
image’s size” (Chemero, 2009, p. 124). Detecting this rate of expansion is crucial to control
action. For example, as showed by Lee et al. (1992), birds landing on a branch can ensure
soft contact by acting to maintain the rate of optical expansion of the approaching branch
closer to zero (see Lee, 2009 for more examples). Derivates of τ have also been applied to
explaining the approaching behavior of climbing plants, although it still unclear under what
sensory modality they perceive it (Calvo, Raja, & Lee, 2015).
Another line of research concerns perception by dynamic touch. Experiments have
confirmed that sensitivity to the different moments of inertia of an object—a variable that
refers to the muscular torque required to hold and rotate an object—is implicated in a broad
range of perceptual tasks, including estimating the length and width of objects (Shockley,
Carello, & Turvey, 2004; Turvey & Carello, 2011).
To conclude, consider the ecological research in sensory substitution. Cancar et al.
(2013) have shown that perceivers can detect time-to-contact while blindfolded by relying
on haptic information provided by distance-related vibrotactile flow only.73 Likewise, studies
conducted by Favela et al. (2018) show that sensory substitution devices that convert distance
into vibrotactile stimuli allow for accurate perceptual judgements concerning the possibility
of walking through different apertures (for more experiments on sensory substitution inspired by ecological psychology see Lobo et al., 2019; Lobo et al., 2014; Paz et al., 2019).
All of the aforementioned are instances of empirical research conducted under the
principles of ecological psychology. The primary goal of this research is to describe the laws
that constraint the perception-action loops under specific task conditions (Turvey, 2013). All
these models emphasize the relevance of occurring perceptual information, showing how
perceivers can rely on it to achieve a particular task or goal. I contend that even though REC
does not produce empirically testable hypothesis by itself, it can rely on ecological psychology
to provide them.
Nonetheless, despite this shared emphasis on information as a key aspect to explain
intelligent behavior, radical enactivists are reluctant to take the ecological path. For them,

In their experiment, participants were asked to hit an approaching ball while blindfolded. Participants wore a sensory substitution device consisting of a Kinect sensor and a series of vibrotactile
actuators attached to the torso with a belt. The device was meant to provide information regarding
time-to-contact by means of vibrotactile flow. Researchers found that, after a short training period,
participants were able to detect the moment at which the ball was about to hit them, coordinating
their arm movements with the vibrotactile stimulation to hit the ball at the appropriate time.
73
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ecological psychology rests on a series of assumptions that, until clarified, are seemingly inconsistent with nonrepresentationalist accounts of mind and cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2017,
pp. 82–88; Myin, 2016; Hutto, 2017). These assumptions are as follows: (i) that perception
involves picking up information; (ii) that such information specifies the environment and the
affordances within; and, (iii) that this information is meaningful. In what follows, I shall show
that the concerns of radical enactivists come from a misinterpretation of the ecological approach (see Segundo-Ortin, Heras-Escribano, and Raja, in press [Chapter 5]).
To begin with, although it is true that ecological psychologists use “detection” and
“information pickup” interchangeably, it does not follow that they hold that perception requires internalizing and processing information.74 In fact, they explicitly reject this view. The
reason is that information in the form of invariants is not of the sort that can be coded and
transmitted as messages or signals from the senses to the brain:
[Perceptual information] could not be transmitted at all. But then I do not believe
that the visual system is a channel for transmitting signals from the retina to the
brain. I believe it is a system for sampling the ambient array. […] And that means
that the observer’s brain cannot be compared to a computer, or to a processor of
information delivered to it. (Gibson, 1970/1982, p. 86)
Instead, for ecological psychologists an organism detects or picks information up
whenever she attends to an informational variable, thus perceiving what this variable affords.
Hence, regardless what the notion of “information pickup” might suggest, this process has
nothing to do with “internalizing,” “coding,” and “processing” information (Reed, 1996, p.
155).
The second worry of radical enactivists concerns the notion of specificity. According
to Myin (2016, pp. 98-100), the fact that Gibsonians describe perceptual information as specifying or being specific to the environment or the affordances within, reveals that they are
committed to the existence of informational content in the world. To repeat, a state is
deemed contentful when it is susceptible of being true or false, veridical or not veridical, etc.
To this contentful notion of information, Hutto and Myin oppose the notion of informationas-covariance. According to them, unlike contentful information, information-as-covariance
“has impeccable naturalistic credentials […] and thus clearly serves the need of a cognitive
science with explanatory naturalistic ambitions” (2017, p. 30).

74 This

objection is also present in the work of Di Paolo et al. (2017, p. 227).
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Two consequences follow from the previous reasoning. First, ecological psychology
and REC are not compatible, for they rely on different, and even contradictory, notions of
information. Second, ecological psychologists must face up the HPC—they must offer a
theory of information that justifies the assumption that there is informational content in the
world.
I hold that this reasoning is misguided. As explained before, the term “specificity” is
used in ecological psychologists to denote the nomological correspondence between certain
patterns in the ambient energy array of an organism and the environmental properties or
events that cause them. For instance, the centrifugal expansion of the optic flow is said to
specify the direction of heading in this particular sense. But if it is true that correspondence
or covariation is not to be conflated with content (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 70), then there is
no reason to suppose that ecological information is contentful. In fact, Gibson tells us that
specifying information “cannot lie—it cannot be false” (Gibson, unpublished material, quoted
by Reed, 1991b, p. 159, emphasis original).
The last issue concerns the notion of “meaning.” For ecological psychologists, the
meaning of a thing consists of what this thing affords to a perceiver. Information is deemed
meaningful for an organism insofar at it specifies, in the sense explained above, a functional
relationship between the organism and the environment—namely, the possibility of performing certain action. As such, the ecological notion of meaning is related to behavior and
has nothing to do with semantic properties such as implication or reference. To say of a
particular invariant that is meaningful is not to say that it carries content, but that it affords
such and such action to a particular organism. Besides, ecological meaning is not created or
brought forth by the organisms as in the classical enactivist picture, but depends on the functional relationship between the organism and the environment.75
Once the concerns of radical enactivists are dismissed, we can see how the research
program put forth by ecological psychology fits the philosophical agenda of REC. Ecological
psychology investigates the laws that determine the perception-action cycles by putting the

75 Admittedly, meaning in the sense of ecological psychology is ontologically puzzling. On the one
hand, affordances are real in that they do not depend on being perceived to exist. The door of my
office affords passability to me even though I am currently typing on my keyboard. On the other hand,
this meaning is not a property of the world independently of the organism. My mug affords graspability
to me, but it doesn’t do so to my dog. As Richardson et al. (2008) explain: “affordances reveal meaning to be an objective property of an O-E system. That is, the use of an object or surface—what it
affords and what it means for an animal—is a functional relation between animal and environment;
affordances are not subjectively imposed by an animal, nor do they exist within the object in isolation
from the animal” (p. 179). For a philosophical discussion on affordances see Heras-Escribano (2019).
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emphasis on a kind of information that is unproblematic regarding REC’s naturalistic standards.

From the extensive mind to the ecological stance

As explained before, one of the merits of the E-approaches is that they have contributed to
overcoming traditional assumptions that cognition is “realized in the brain alone” (Aizawa,
2015, p. 756). Enactivists are at the leading edge of this assault. For them, what happens
strictly inside the skull, or broader, the boundaries of the organism, never counts as cognitive.
Rather, cognition emerges from the dynamic coupling of organism and environment, and
the intra-organismic processes count only as participants in a transaction that spans the organism’s body and the environment (Di Paolo, 2009; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009; Kyselo
& Di Paolo, 2013).
Radical enactivists conceptualize this view by saying that minds are “extensive.” To say
that minds are extensive instead of merely extended is to say that the extra-neural body and
the environment are always, constitutively, part of the larger system responsible of bringing
forth cognitive activity (Hutto & Myin, 2013, Ch. 7).
Radical enactivists, however, differ from classical enactivists in a core aspect. Whereas
both approaches emphasize “the co-determination of animal and environment” (Varela,
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991/2016, p. 204) in the unfolding of cognitive activity, enactivists
concede a privileged causal-explanatory role to the intra-organismic processes. In the words
of Thompson: “it is the internal self-production process that controls or regulates the system’s interaction with the outside environment” (2007, p. 79).
Radical enactivists, instead, subscribe to what they dub the “Equal Partner Principle.”
According to this view, causal contributions from the side of the organism should not be
explanatorily prioritized over those exerted by the environment:
When it comes to explaining intelligent activity REC subscribes to the Equal Partner Principle. […] From the dynamical perspective [that REC advocates for],
variables of any kind make an equally important contribution, irrespective of where
they lie with respect to the boundaries of skin and skull, just as long as they make
an appropriate contribution to explaining the overall shape of the system’s responsiveness. (Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 21)
Here, too, REC finds a perfect ally in ecological psychology. One of the core assumptions of ecological psychology is that when it comes to explaining psychological or cognitive
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phenomena, we must treat organism and environment as forming “a combined whole, a
synergy or coalition” (Richardson et al., 2008, p. 166).76 Adopting this ecological stance implies taking the Organism-Environment (O-E) system as the minimum unit of analysis, and,
with it, the denial that intra-organismic states and processes play a privileged causal-explanatory role in driving cognitive behavior (Järvilehto, 2009; Michaels & Carello, 1981).77 As
Gibson puts it: “The rules that govern [cognitive] behavior are not like laws enforced by an
authority or decisions made by a commander; behavior is regular without being regulated”
(1979/2015, p. 215).
Gibsonians have looked at the principles of self-organization as a promising framework to account for the behavior of O-E systems (Richardson et al., 2008a; Riley & Holden,
2012; Warren, 2006). Self-organization refers to the spontaneous emergence of ordered patterns in a complex system under specific boundary conditions. Self-organization is usually
observed in open systems composed of many coupled individual components with various
degrees of freedom. The occurrence of a fluctuation breaks the symmetry among the components, launching the pattern-formation process. The whole system is deemed selforganizing because the new emergent behavioral pattern is not exhaustively caused by the
activity of any single component. Rather, “the system organizes itself, but there is no ‘self,’
no agent inside the system doing the organizing” (Kelso, 1997, p. 8).
Evidence of the existence of emerging self-organized behavior can be traced back to
the works of Haken, Kelso, and Bunz (1985) in bimanual coordination, but the principles of
dynamical self-organization have been further applied to the study of perception-action loops
in ecological terms (Kugler & Turvey, 1987; Turvey, 2007; Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey,
2003). For example, Warren (2006) has developed a general explanatory framework for behavioral dynamics, articulated in terms of the emergence of behavioral trajectories from
informational and bio-mechanical constraints. In Warren’s model, agent and environment
are conceived of as a pair of dynamical systems coupled by perceptual information. According to him, the confluence of the biomechanics of the (neural and non-neural) body, the
76 In this context, the notion of “synergy” refers to a functional group of elements that are temporarily constrained to act as a single coherent unit (Kelso, 2009).
77 There is nonetheless some tension among enactivists regarding this aspect. Whereas Stapleton
presents the fact that enactivism is “more heavily weighted on the side of the organism” (2016, p.
326) as a crucial distinction between it and ecological psychology, other enactivists are moving toward
positions that are somewhat more ecological. For example, Di Paolo et al. (2017) write: “While we
may be inclined to point to an organism’s body as the locus of sensorimotor agency, it is important
to stress that sensorimotor schemes, and networks of these, constitutively involve both the organismic body and its environment. […] Sensorimotor schemes are by definition modes in which
structures in the agent and structures in the environment meet and mutually stabilize. As such, it
makes no sense to try to identify their physical boundaries” (p. 152).
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structure and physics of the environment, and the available perceptual information, all of
them intertwined under the boundary conditions of a particular task or goal, give rise to
adaptive, intelligent behavior. As he writes: “Stable, adaptive behavior emerges from the dynamics of the interaction between a structured environment and an agent with simple
[perceptual-motor] control laws, under physical and informational constraints” (Warren,
2006, p. 358). Warren successfully applies his model to a range of different tasks, from simple
ones such as bouncing a ball on a racquet in one vertical dimension to other considerably
more complex such as navigating towards a stationary goal while avoiding moving obstacles.
In light of what we have said so far, it might look like that REC and ecological psychology disregard the brain as an important element to cognition. Nothing could be further
from the truth. To adopt the Equal Partner Principle or the ecological stance is not to deny
that what goes inside the organism makes an essential contribution to cognition. Rather, it is
to situate this contribution in the context of a similarly important contribution made by the
extra-neural body and the environment. In short, both REC and ecological psychology invite
us to see the brain not as the center of cognition, but as part of a larger self-organizing system
that comprises brain, body, and environment.
Drawing on Anderson’s theory of neural reuse (Anderson, 2014),78 radical enactivists
have advanced the “Protean Brain Hypothesis” (Hutto, Peeters, & Segundo-Ortin, 2017; see
also Segundo-Ortin & Hutto, under review [Chapter 4]). The Protean Brain Hypothesis conjectures that neural structures are “functionally malleable” and that cognitive systems make
use of neural resources “in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance and
context” (p. 210). Neural structures are, according to this idea, pluripotent, meaning that they
can be enlisted to form different temporal assemblies to accomplish various cognitive tasks.
As it stands, however, I agree that the Protean Brain Hypothesis is “too abstract”
(Miłkowski et al., 2018, p. 4) in that it provides no specific details of how nervous system,
body, and environment interact. To counter this observation, I propose that one way this
hypothesis might be fleshed out is by appeal to the theory of resonance recently proposed
by Raja (2018).79
Inspired by Gibson (1966), Raja refers as “resonance” to the activity of the central
nervous system with respect to what occurs at the ecological scale—the scale of the O-E

As formulated by Anderson (2014), the main idea of neural reuse is that different parts of the
nervous system can be used and reused in achieving different cognitive functions. These parts and
pieces self-organize in temporal, soft-assembled task-specific synergies.
79 It is worth mentioning that Raja’s theory of resonance is also heavily influenced by Anderson’s
account of neural reuse.
78
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system. More concretely, Raja proposes to model the O-E system and the organism’s brain
as two dynamical systems, and hypothesizes that the dynamics (the evolution over time) of
the intra-organismic system is constrained by the variable that determines the dynamics of
the model at the ecological scale. Thus, both dynamical systems are coupled by the ecological
variable, meaning that the dynamics at the intra-organismic scale is temporally constrained
by (or “resonates” to) the dynamics at the ecological scale:80
My core claim regarding the coupling between the dynamic systems at the two scales
is that the ecological variable we take to be the main variable of our dynamic systems
model at the ecological scale (i.e., the collective variable in DST jargon) is also the main
variable of the dynamic system model at the intra-organismic scale […] [T]he dynamic system at the intra-organismic scale reverberates to the ecological variable.
(Raja, 2018, p. 41)
In addition, Raja proposes a methodology for the study of resonance. This methodology goes by the name of “multi-scale fractal DST [Dynamical Systems Theory],” and seeks
to address the coupling between the ecological and the neural scale in terms of fractals—viz.,
how relevant structural properties can be found at different scales.
Imagine an experiment involving an individual grasping an object with her hand. Every
time she does so, she performs the same movements, but there will always be some variability
between the different trials. If analyzed over a temporal distribution, these variations show a
fractal pattern or structure called “1/f noise” or “pink noise.” According to Raja, if the dynamics at the neural scale are constrained by the ecological interaction, we should find that
their temporal variability exhibits the same fractal pattern. This 1/f noise pattern, Raja asserts,
“is a mark of a scalar relation, namely, a relation in which a higher scale constraints a lower
one […] the ecological scale is modulating the CNS” (p. 47; see also Van Orden et al., 2003).
The notion of resonance as developed by Raja allows us to understand how the activity
at the scale of the CNS can get coupled with the activity of the whole O-E system. Moreover,
80 We can exemplify this idea using an abstract model (see Raja, 2018, p. 41). Suppose a system
performing a cognitive task—namely, estimating the right time to hit an approaching ball. We can
define the dynamics of the whole system by means of two different dynamical models: a model that
represents the ecological scale (O-E), and a model that captures the intra-organismic scale (N). Then,
we define the dynamics of these scales as two functions of some variable, say τ for O-E and α for N.
According to Raja’s model, we say that N resonates to O-E when both functions are coupled by the
variable at the ecological scale, τ. In this case, α must be defined as: α=kτ, where k is a linear constant.
Given that, the abstract model of resonance for this task would be as follows:

O-ED = f (τ, t)
ND = f (kτ, t)
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once both dynamical systems are coupled, it is to be expected that the changes at the neural
scale will also reverberate at the ecological scale, contributing to the dynamics of the whole
system.
To sum up, I hold that Raja’s (2018) theory of resonance and Warren’s (2006) behavioral dynamics are good examples of testable hypotheses and explanatory models produced
under general theoretical principles that are licensed by REC. Through these, RECers can
move away from the ideas that minds are “extensive” and brains “protean” to more scientifically tractable conjectures regarding how the brain-body-environment system self-organizes
to yield intelligent, context-sensitive, and adaptive behavioral responses.

Learning and evolution as key explanatory aspects

Another key tenet of REC is that basic cognitive abilities—namely, the fact that organisms
target specific aspects of their environment and respond the way they do—need to be explained “by invoking the idea that [organisms] adapt to naturally occurring regularities
acquired during their history of previous interactions with the environment” (Hutto & Myin,
2017, p. 165). Accordingly, it is the history of interactions, both at phylogenetic and ontogenetic scales, that provides the basis for understanding the kind of biological normativity that
characterizes basic forms of cognition; and not the material substrate the organisms are made
of.
Applying this rationale to perception, Hutto and Myin (2017) tell us that:
Interaction and history explain what, why, and how we perceive. We perceive, in
Clark’s [2016] helpful formulation, “the patterns that matter for the interactions
that matter.” And the explanation why we tend to currently perceive such patterns
as do we is that we, or our forebears, have a history of engaging in interactions with
those selfsame patterns. (p. 172)
REC’s proposal, however, stops at this general point. Although Hutto and Myin offer
convincing reasons why the history of interaction needs to be taken into account when explaining perception (2017, Ch. 7), they offer no explanation regarding how this perceptual
attunement can take place. In this section, I shall show how different proposals made by
contemporary Gibsonians can help shed light on this issue.
Let us begin by reviewing the role of evolution in perception. The ecological approach
not only assumes that species live in informationally rich environments, but also that they
have evolved in these environments. Consequently, “it is supposed that the structure and
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function of the perceptual systems have become tailored to the available information”
(Michaels & Carello, 1981, p. 15). Through evolution, organisms evolved the capacity to
detect the informational patterns that are relevant to perceive the affordances present in their
econiches. Hence, Gibson suggests, “adaptations were at once both anatomical and behavioral. Modified limbs and specialized sense organs went along with new styles of motor action
and new modes of stimulus discrimination” (1966, p. 23).
Reed was the first author in proposing an ecological account for the evolution of perception (1991, 1982, 1986, 1996). Combining ecological psychology and evolutionary theory,
Reed sketched a selectionist approach in which affordances, conceived as environmental resources, are thought to exert selection pressures, giving rise to animals equipped with action
systems—viz., systems that are specialized in perceiving and taking advantage of certain affordances.
Reed’s approach is nonetheless under attack by current neo-Gibsonians (Withagen &
van Wermeskerken, 2010). The reason for this is that his account is markedly adaptationist,
thus conflicting with the current trends in evolutionary biology. On this adaptationist view,
environmental pressure and natural selection shape organisms’ evolution by favoring some
genetic mutations over others, while organisms remain as passive receptacles of genes. This
asymmetric approach to evolution is deemed too simplistic by current evolutionary biologists, who emphasize the active role of organisms in shaping their own evolution.81 Lewontin
(1983/2001), for example, has famously argued that organisms not only adapt to the environment, but they also construct it, thereby altering the selection pressures to which they are
exposed.
Inspired by Lewontin, a series of theorists have developed the so-called “niche construction theory” or NCT (Laland, Matthews, & Feldman, 2016; Laland, Odling-Smee, &
Feldman, 1996, 2000; Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003). Niche construction refers to
the processes by which organisms modify their econiche in ways that alter their chance of
fitness.82 If the environment is modified in a relatively persistent way, the offspring will not
only inherit the genes but the modified econiche too. Advocates of NCT refer to this second

Turvey (2019, Ch. 2) has recently argued against this adaptationist view as well. For him, adaptationism perpetuates a dualism between organism and environment that is inconsistent with taking
the O-E system as the primary unit of analysis.
82 As explained by Odling-Smee et al., (2003) niche construction occurs “when an organism modifies the feature-factor relationship between itself and its environment by changing one or more
factors in its environment, either by physically perturbing factors at its current location in space and
time, or by relocating to a different space-time address, thereby exposing itself to different factors”
(p. 41).
81
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inheritance as “ecological inheritance.” Examples of such ecological inheritance include different species, ranging from the building of dams by beavers to the adoption of dairy farming
by human populations.
Neo-Gibsonians recognize NCT as a natural ally to develop a theory that accounts for
the evolution of perceptual systems (Heras-Escribano & De Pinedo-García, 2017; Withagen
& van Wermeskerken, 2010). The reason is that NCT conceives of evolution as a symmetrical
process, thereby putting the organism-environment reciprocity and the study of O-E systems
at the center of the stage. On this approach, affordances are both implicated in the modification of the econiche (modifications are driven by the perception of affordances to that
end) and affected by the modifications (the actions of the organisms to alter the environment
also alter the affordances it offers), thus becoming part of the ecological inheritance of the
species.
Admittedly, the proposals reviewed above do not constitute a full-blown theory. They,
however, exemplify a genuine concern by ecological psychologists in explaining current patterns of perception and action in terms of the phylogenetic history of the species. They also
show how the complementarity of ecological psychology with modern theories in evolutionary biology can give rise to detailed empirical proposals that support the REC framework.
Let us now shift our attention to perceptual learning. Along with the study of perceptual processes, based on the development of ecological laws of perception and action,
another branch of ecological psychology, mostly leaded by Eleanor J. Gibson, has focused
on the ways in which growth and experience enhance the pickup of information and the
perception of affordances (E. J. Gibson, 1969, 2000; E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000; Camachon
et al., 2004; Jacobs & Michaels, 2002; Rader, 2018; Read & Szokolszky, 2018a, 2018b). The
core idea is that perceptual learning does not consist of adding new information to the information already gathered through the senses, but of responding to informational patters
not previously responded to (Gibson & E. J. Gibson, 1955). As such, perceptual learning is
depicted as a process of discrimination and selection, instead of as a process of enrichment:
[Perceptual Learning] always involves a change in the relation between an active
organism and some affordance of the environment, especially in the use of information about the environment in relation to the organism itself [...] Learning can
affect changes in tasks, in what is perceived, and in the form of an activity, both
exploratory and performatory. (E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000, p. 50)
Drawing on this assumption, the ecological approach to perceptual learning has traditionally focused on two main aspects: attunement and calibration. Attunement refers to the
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processes by which an organism learns to detect specific information for affordances. This
involves two interrelated processes. The first one is referred to as “education of attention.”
Attention is said to be optimally educated when the perceiver comes to detect the informational variables that specify the affordances she intends to perceive. Experimental evidence
shows that practicing with feedback allows individuals to progressively rely on more useful
(i.e., more specific) variables, adjusting their perception-action cycles more efficiently in order to complete an intended task (Camachon et al., 2004; Fajen & Devaney, 2006; Fitzpatrick,
Bui, & Garry, 2018; Huet et al. 2009, 2011; Wagman et al., 2001; Withagen & Michaels, 2005).
Along with the education of attention, perceivers have to learn how to explore the environment in order to make available the information relevant to perceive an affordance.
Calibration, in turn, refers to the process by which the organisms adjust their behavior to an
informational variable (Fajen, 2005; Jacobs & Michaels, 2006; Wagman & Van Norman,
2011; Withagen & Michaels, 2004).
Once we know what perceptual learning consists of according to ecological psychology, the subsequent question concerns how this learning can occur.
Jacobs and Michaels (2007), for example, have proposed that perceptual learning can
be direct. The theory of direct learning rests on the hypothesis that there is information in
ambient energy arrays that specifies the possibility of reducing non-optimalities in perception-action cycles. Jacobs and Michaels refer to this type of information as “information for
learning.” Accordingly, detecting these informational variables is tantamount to perceive how
to improve our performance,83 meaning that learning can occur in a direct—non-mediated—
manner too:
The direct-detection approach portrays perceiving as establishing a lawful chain
from properties to be perceived, to information for perception, to perceived properties […]. Likewise, the here-presented direct-learning approach portrays learning
processes as lawful chains, in this case from higher-order properties of the environment-actor system, to information for learning, to change in perceptual or
perceptual-motor systems. (2007, p. 340)
The theory of direct learning represents a significant advance for ecological psychology, as it explains how organisms can become progressively better attuned to perceptual

Presumably, changes on the relation with the external information are accompanied by changes
at the physical, musculoskeletal, and neural level too (Jacobs & Michaels, 2007, p. 341).
83
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information without invoking internal representations and computations.84 This theory has
been successfully applied to model perceptual enhancement—involving both change in variable use and calibration—in multiple tasks (Jacobs, Silva, & Calvo, 2009; Withagen & van
Wermeskerken, 2009; Jacobs et al., 2012; Higueras-Herbada et al., 2019)
This section has reviewed some theoretical developments advanced by ecological psychologists regarding how perception-action may evolve across phylogenetic and ontogenetic
scales. Ecological psychology can thereby provide REC with the adequate resources to explain how organisms get attuned to the informational patterns relevant to cope with their
environment.

On what (cognitive) scientific explanations require

Before concluding, there is an aspect of the analysis of Miłkowski et al. (2018) that deserves
attention. In this paper, I have proposed ecological psychology as a productive research program for the study of perception and action that is consistent with the philosophical tenets
of REC. Most of the explanatory models proposed by ecological psychologists—namely, the
behavioral dynamics of Warren (2006), Raja’s theory of resonance (2018), or the theory of
direct learning advanced by Jacobs and Michaels (2007)—take the form of dynamical systems. In fact, many scholars have defended that DST is the perfect explanatory partner for
ecological psychology (Richardson et al., 2008; Chemero, 2009; Riley & Holden, 2012).
This conflicts with a conjecture advanced by Miłkowski and colleagues (2018). According to them, it is “by going mechanistic [that] wide approaches can become non-trivial
and integrated explanatory proposals” (p. 2). As they tell us, although mechanistic explanations can sometimes benefit of appealing to dynamical models, especially when the
phenomenon at issue concerns the evolution over time of a system, “mere dynamical explanations are actually explanatorily unsatisfactory” (p. 12, emphasis original). Dynamical
models, they argue, can be useful only insofar as they are put to the service of providing
mechanistic explanations. The logical consequence of this is that unless the aforementioned
explanatory models are rendered in mechanistic terms, ecological psychology, and REC for
that matter, remain explanatorily unsatisfactory.
Determining the full scope and application of dynamical models in cognitive science
is beyond the scope of this paper (see Chemero, 2009; Chemero & Silberstein, 2008; Favela
Formally, the theory represents a perceptual task as an “information space.” Such information
space takes the form of vectors and points representing all possible perception-action couplings, and
trajectories that connect these points. These trajectories stand for potential “learning paths.”
84
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& Martin, 2016; Kirchhoff & Meyer, 2019; Silberstein & Chemero, 2012; Stepp, Chemero,
& Turvey, 2011). Instead, I shall offer some preliminary reasons as to why the assumption
that there is no alternative to a mechanistic account with regards to explanations in cognitive
science is unjustified.
Some defenders of dynamical systems have argued that the explanatory leverage of
dynamical models derives from their descriptive and predictive power. For example, Stepp
et al. (2011) tell us that “dynamical explanations show that particular phenomena could have
been predicted, given local conditions and some law-like general principles” (p. 432). Notice,
too, that dynamical explanations are counter-factual supporting in that they can predict the
behavior of the system in regards to “so-far-unobserved” conditions (p. 432).
But attempting to ground explanation in prediction has well-known shortcomings
(Miłkowski et al., 2018, p. 12). To use an example from Kaplan and Bechtel (2011), by knowing a law-like regularity, one can predict the occurrence of a storm from falling mercury in
the barometer. It does not follow, however, that falling mercury explains the storm. Rather,
to explain the storm we must reveal the causal structure that underlies it. In this case, we
discover that it is a common cause—a drop in the atmospheric pressure—that explains both
the storm and the fall in the level of mercury. Generating accurate predictions about a target
phenomenon is therefore not the same as explaining it.
Extrapolating to our current discussion, we can conclude that even though a dynamical
model can be predictively adequate in regards to some target phenomenon, this model is unexplanatory unless it reveals the causal relations that bring forth the phenomenon at issue.
This, according to some defenders of mechanisms, can be done “only if there is a plausible
mapping between elements in a [dynamical] model and elements in the mechanism for the
phenomenon” (Kaplan & Craver, 2011, p. 601). To be explanatory, a given dynamical model
must either be grounded in or wholly reduced (via localization and decomposition) to a
mechanism.
Yet having to choose between prediction and mechanism when assessing the explanatory value of dynamical models is a false dichotomy. As defended by Meyer (2018) and
Kirchhoff and Meyer (2019), we can justify the belief that dynamical models have explanatory
value via interventionism (Woodward, 2005). Appealing to interventionism on this matter is
crucial, for those who defend the mechanistic view of explanation often appeal to interventionism as a useful tool to uncover causal connections between variables (see, e.g., Craver,
2009; Kaplan & Craver, 2011).
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In short, the central idea of interventionism is that any claim about a causal relationship
between two variables, X and Y, in some background circumstances Bi, needs to be understood in terms of how the value of Y would change as a result of an (ideal) intervention on
the value of X in Bi.85 Besides, for this causal connection to be significative, the relationship
between X and Y must hold under a range of interventions.
The idea here is that dynamical models are akin to mechanisms in that they are suitable
to Woodwardian interventions too. As Meyer puts it: “If we can intervene on the values of
variables in a dynamical model, and see changes in the value or another variable, then (on
the interventionist account) we have exposed a causal relationship [between the variables]”
(2018, p. 14).
Meyer illustrates this point by means of the HKB model of bimanual coordination
(Haken et al., 1985). Subjects asked to wag their index fingers at the same time can produce
only two stable patterns. One is called in-phase—both fingers move simultaneously in the
same direction—, and the other anti-phase—the fingers move simultaneously in opposite directions. The model predicts that when the frequency of the oscillation is slow (b/a > 0.25)
there are two stable attractors in both in-phase and anti-phase conditions. Both patterns and
thus equally possible However, as the frequency increases, the anti-phase attractor disappears, and the finger-wagging aligns with the in-phase pattern. According to Meyer, this
shows that interventions in the value of b/a, namely, by increasing the frequency of the oscillation, result in regular changes in the relative phase of the limbs (𝜙). Hence, all according
to interventionism, “the relationship from b/a to 𝜙 is a causal relationship” (Meyer, 2018, p.
16).
Crucially, if Meyer (2018) and Kirchhoff and Meyer (2019) are on the right track, at
least some dynamical models are suitable to provide causal explanations of the kind required
by Miłkowski et al. (2018) without mapping onto mechanisms. Of course, it is an open question whether dynamical models by themselves suffice to produce exhaustive explanations for
cognitive phenomena, but an argument must be forthcoming on Miłkowski and colleagues’
(2018) behalf that is not question-begging.

The reader might think that interventionism so described already calls for a mechanistic account.
However, according to Campbell (2007), interventionism makes “no appeal to the idea of mechanism.
All we are asking, when we ask whether X causes Y, is whether X is correlated with Y under interventions on X” (p. 64).
85
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Conclusion

Critics of REC accuse it of failing to substantively change cognitive science. At the core of
this claim is the idea that REC offers neither empirically testable hypotheses nor explanatory
models for the cognitive phenomena it targets. There is nothing such as a REC-style cognitive science, and, thus, REC is not a real contender in the field.
This paper has addressed this objection. First, I have argued that REC ought to be
understood as a philosophical framework, not a scientific theory of cognition. As such, the
primary aim of REC is to meaningfully advance our understanding of cognition and cognitive
science by carefully elucidating existing explanatory proposals, passing them through a process of philosophical and conceptual clarification. The Hard Problem of Content exemplifies
the kind of philosophical work REC aims to do. A consequence of this problem, for example,
is that there is no reason to assume that neural states that emerge as a consequence of individual perceptual activities have the function to represent what is being perceived.
This, however, does not defuse the criticism completely, for critics can still hold that
REC offers no positive account of cognition that can compete with the theories it aims to
defeat.
I have proposed that this second concern can be addressed by incorporating ecological
psychology into the REC framework. I have defended that there is a two-way, complementary, fit between them. On the one hand, REC brings to the fore a set of theoretical posits
that finds a natural home in ecological psychology. On the other hand, ecological psychology
can provide REC with empirically testable hypotheses and explanatory models that are compatible with its philosophical tenets regarding how to best account for perception and motor
control. I have supported this claim by showing how concrete ideas of REC match empirical
developments in ecological psychology. By enriching REC this way, the objections of
Miłkowski et al. (2018), Thompson (2018), and Baggs (2018) can be put to rest.
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Chapter 7
General discussion

In this dissertation, I have defended the thesis that REC should be complemented with ecological psychology and similarity-based theories in cognitive neuroscience. By partnering
these scientific approaches with a REC framework, we can build a theoretically sound, empirically robust positive alternative to both representationalism and other forms of
enactivism.
At this point, however, the reader may have the impression that REC, conceived of as
a philosophical framework, adds nothing to the mix, for all the substantial explanatory work
is being done by ecological psychology and SBC. I think this impression is misguided. In
what follows, I explain why the philosophical work REC does is important for the project of
building a radical embodied cognitive science. Exposing these reasons will serve to summarize some of the main conclusion drawn in this dissertation.
First, and most obvious, by pointing out that the physical and biological sciences do
not explain how the physical states of a system can have representational content, REC contributes to casting doubts on the long-standing assumption that all forms of cognition involve
the manipulation of contentful mental representations. In so doing, REC’s philosophical
work reinforces the idea that radical embodied theories of cognition ought to be taken seriously both by philosophers and cognitive scientists.
Chapters 2 and 3 aim to contribute to this end too. A possible way to avoid facing the
HPC advanced by Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) is to say that even though we have no naturalistic explanation for the origin of representational contents, this should not lead us toward non-representationalism. Those who advance this line of reasoning claim that since
mental representations are indispensable for explaining all forms of cognitive activity, we can
safely question the severity of the HPC (see Lee, 2018; Shapiro, 2013; Burge, 2010).
Chapter 2 has shown that the main argumentative strategies advanced in order to justify the thesis that positing mental representations is indispensable to scientifically explain all
forms of cognitive activity are untenable. It follows from the analysis provided in Chapter 2
that whichever cognitive functions, if any, are best explained in representational terms is
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something to be determined by comparing the explanatory merits of representational theories against those of their radical embodied counterparts. There are no compelling grounds
to dismiss all radical embodied theories of cognition a priori, and doing so is incompatible
with investigating cognition in a methodologically naturalistic way.
Focusing on the philosophy of Plant Neurobiology, Chapter 3 has reviewed the current
empirical literature concerning plant adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, as well
as learning and memory. It has been defended that plant behavior is in many ways analogous
to animal behavior, meaning that plants are suitable to be described as cognitive agents in a
non-metaphorical way. I contend that this analysis is relevant for the purposes of those who
defend radical embodied cognitive science. Although plants have something functionally
similar to a nervous system, the fact that they have no brain (at least that we know of) makes
plants a model of cognition that is radically different from the kind of computational models
that have inspired classical representational theories of mind. In short, the fact that plants
are brainless makes it easier for us to seriously conceive the possibility that intelligent behavior might emerge from the complex reciprocal interaction between the body, the (phyto-)
nervous system, and the environment, where no component of this system represents any
other part. Following this line of thought, the chapter has outlined the principles of a radical
embodied approach to plant intelligence. Going this way entails putting the emphasis on the
capability of organisms to actively interact with the environment by sensing and responding
to informational variables. In sum, the study of plant intelligence from a radical embodied
perspective can serve to reinforce the view that complex intelligent behavior does not need
complex forms of cognition such as the ones required to manipulate concepts and representations. Hence, although this radical embodied approach comes with its own challenges, it
can also offer valuable resources to construct a theory of cognition that reaches all the way
from single cell organisms to human beings, including plants.
Second, defenders of radical embodied cognitive science have previously advocated
giving primacy to the empirical data when deciding on scientific issues such as whether a
particular instance of cognitive behavior involves mental representations (see, e.g., Chemero,
2009). Chapters 2 and 3 are in line with this proposal. Nonetheless, empirical data do not
always speak for themselves. In fact, as showed in Chapter 4, the scientific literature offers
plenty of example where the authors claim to have observer representations playing a causal
role in the production of such and such cognitive behavior (see, e.g., Thompson & Piccinini,
2018).
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Another way philosophers can contribute to the enterprise of radical embodied cognitive science is by carefully analyzing the empirical data in order to determine whether
committing to the existence of representations in these specific contexts is justified for scientific and explanatory reasons. As Hutto and Myin (2017) write:
Whether or not the scientists use the term “representation” in their theorizing
should not distract us from the really important questions. After all, we are not
interested in the use of labels but in which properties the scientists need to commit
to in their theorizing and which properties show up in the best account of the relevant phenomena. The theoretical debate turns on how, after careful analysis, we
should best understand and explicate the nature of cognition. (Hutto & Myin, 2017,
pp. 243–244)
Chapter 4 exemplifies this kind of contribution. This chapter has been devoted to analyzing the popular conception that SBC at the neural scale entails the existence of a special
kind of mental representations called S-representations. First, it has been argued that we have
no substantive reasons to think that structural similarities—including those that purportedly
do explanatory work in cognitive neuroscience—bear representational content. This is a
problem for defenders of S-representations because it implies that S-representations fail to
answer the job description challenge (Ramsey, 2007). After this, the chapter has offered a
substantive analysis of the recent empirical findings concerning the future-oriented activity
of hippocampal place cells. It is a widespread assumption among philosophers and cognitive
scientists that these findings reveal that place cells are exploited by other parts of the brain
as models or maps of the external world. Defenders of S-representations argue that this suffices for concluding that place cells are S-representations. Against this view, it has been
argued that these empirical findings provide no support for the claim that place cells are used
as maps or models in any robust sense. In short, even though place cells’ future-oriented
activity seems to play a causal role in engendering cognitive behavior, there is no empirical
evidence that this activity is being used for route-planning or surrogative reasoning by other
parts of the brain. It follows that if there is no robust, non-metaphorical sense in which the
brain uses structural similarities as models or maps we have no substantial reasons to think
of them as S-representations.
This is not to say that we should deny that neurally-based structural similarities can
play a causal role in enabling the success of certain cognitive tasks. On the contrary, Chapter
4 has defended the thesis that defenders of radical embodied cognitive science can welcome
neurally-based SBC within their explanatory toolbox. The chapter has advanced a possible
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way to do so, reading neurally-based SBC through the lenses of REC and neural reuse (Anderson, 2014). The core idea is that the dynamic activity of the central nervous system can
play a part in enabling intelligent behavior by temporally reconfiguring already existing neural
structures to resemble specific aspects of relevant targets. It remains to be investigated
whether the theory of resonance (Raja, 2018) described in Chapter 6 can be used to make
sense of complex structural similarities such as those exemplified by hippocampal place cells.
Finally, radical enactivist philosophers can help keep radical embodied cognitive scientists away from assumptions that can be logically inconsistent with non-representationalist
accounts of mind and cognition. One such assumption, according to Hutto and Myin, is that
all organisms evaluate and make sense of their environment. It is an important task for philosophers in this context is to contribute to determining what concepts are the most
appropriate for the kind of explanatory models being provided.86
In light of this, Chapter 5 has provided an interpretation of ecological psychology that
is free from these inconsistencies, and that is unproblematic regarding REC’s naturalistic
standards. First, it has been argued that the notion of information at use in the theory is best
understood in terms of lawful correspondence or covariation. Ecological information is thus
totally unproblematic regarding REC’s naturalistic standards. Second, it has been shown that
the notion of ecological meaning the affordances or opportunities for interaction the environment offers to a particular perceiver, without any assumption that it carries content. This
reading is a more accurate rendering of the ecological approach and it avoids all the issues
previously flagged by radical enactivists. It follows that ecological psychology, understood in
this way, is apt to be integrated into the kind of radical embodied cognitive science REC
envisages.
To finish, Chapter 6 has fleshed out the details of the partnership between REC and
ecological psychology. First, it has been defended that the notion of specific information
used by ecological psychologists is both scientifically robust and compatible with the philosophical tenets of REC. Second, it has been shown that ecological psychology adopts an
explanatory strategy that fits the principles of the extensive approach to cognition proposed
by REC, making REC’s extensive mind thesis empirically tractable. Last, it has been argued
that recent developments in ecological psychology concerning evolution and learning can
provide REC with adequate resources to explain how perception-action may evolve across
Ecological psychologists have also incurred the kind of problematic assumptions denounced by
radical enactivists. For instance, Turvey (2019) has recently depicted ecological information as being
“semantic,” whereas at the same time emphasizes that such information is not representational (pp.
37-38). This case reveals a conceptual confusion that needs to be clarified.
86
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phylogenetic and ontogenetic scales. In sum, Chapter 6 has defended the thesis that ecological psychology provides REC with empirically testable hypotheses and explanatory models
that are compatible with its philosophical principles.
This suffices to show how the philosophical labor of radical enactivists, and the scientific work of both ecological psychologists and non-representationalist cognitive
neuroscientist can be different and yet productively connected. Those who see REC as a
fruitful philosophical framework for the study of mind and cognition can now see that there
can be a radical enactive cognitive science.
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According to F. Adams [this journal, vol. 68, 2018] cognition cannot be realized in plants or bacteria. In his
view, plants and bacteria respond to the here-and-now in a hardwired, inflexible manner, and are therefore
incapable of cognitive activity. This article takes issue with the pursuit of plant cognition from the perspective of
an empirically informed philosophy of plant neurobiology. As we argue, empirical evidence shows, contra
Adams, that plant behavior is in many ways analogous to animal behavior. This renders plants suitable to be
described as cognitive agents in a non-metaphorical way. Sections two to four review the arguments offered by
Adams in light of scientific evidence on plant adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, as well as
learning and memory. Section five introduces the ‘phyto-nervous’ system of plants. To conclude, section six
resituates the quest for plant cognition into a broader approach in cognitive science, as represented by enactive
and ecological schools of thought. Overall, we aim to motivate the idea that plants may be considered genuine
cognitive agents. Our hope is to help propel public awareness and discussion of plant intelligence once appropriately stripped of anthropocentric preconceptions of the sort that Adams' position appears to exemplify.

1. Extra! Extra! A new war on cognition!
Fred Adams begins his recent Cognition wars [this journal, 2018, vol.
68] by announcing that “there is a war going on over what counts as
cognition” (p. 20). The conflict has two main battlefields. The first, a
long-standing one, pertains to the discussion between what he calls ‘the
traditional view’ in cognitive science—that is, the view that equates
cognition with brain-bound processes—, and the theories of embodied
(Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) and extended (Clark & Chalmers,
1998) cognition. The second battlefield is relatively newer and has to
do with the kinds of organisms across phyla we deem to be cognitive. As
Adams advances, a number of plant scientists and bacteriologists have
recently informed us that plants and bacteria do behave in a cognitive
or intelligent way. He focuses on this second battlefield, promising to
evaluate both the scope and plausibility of such claims.
After analyzing different instances of behavior in plants and

∗

bacteria, Adams concludes that scientists that call such behaviors cognitive must mean something entirely different by ‘cognition’. When
scientists say that plants and bacteria ‘learn’, ‘decide’, or ‘choose’, they
necessarily mean something different to what we mean when we say,
for instance, that ‘Anna chooses water instead of beer’. Plants and
bacteria, he suggests, respond to the here-and-now in a hard-wired,
inflexible manner, meaning that they are incapable of cognitive activity. Thus, attributing cognitive abilities to plants and bacteria is a
profound mistake, unless such attributions are figurative or metaphorical:
The use of cognitive terms by plant scientists and biologists who
study plant and bacterial behavior, is likely being used because
there is no better term for what these scientists have discovered,
namely, that these organisms use informational exchanges with the
environment and other cells in the organism to guide and control
behavior. That is, they are systems whose behavior is
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informationally driven. … It is for that reason that these scientists
are taking what Dennett (1987) has called the “intentional stance”
towards these organisms. Taking this stance is perfectly harmless if
one is using it as a mere heuristic device or metaphor, but if one
intends the cognitive ascriptions to be true, then it is not harmless.
(p. 30)

not, cognizes not (the same as the garage door). (p. 28)
Scientific evidence, however, calls doubts upon this received view.
To begin with, plant behavior can be directional (e.g., phototropic suntracking) or non-directional (nastic responses such as the folding of
some plant leaves, or the closing of the traps of some carnivorous
species). Such responses can also be positive or negative. For instance,
whereas roots are photophobic (Burbach, Markus, Zhang, Schlicht, &
Baluška, 2012) and exhibit negative phototropic behavior, they are
positively geotropic, growing downwards. Shoots, by contrast, generally grow away from the gravity vector, and towards light sources.
It does not mean, however, that plants react to gravity or light on a
one-by-one basis—that is, by producing automatic responses to individual sources of stimulation. As a matter of fact, multiple experiments show that plants can sample and integrate over 20 diverse biotic
and abiotic parameters. These parameters are continuously monitored
by plants with an eye to deciding how to behave adaptively (Hodge,
2009; Baluška & Mancuso, 2009; Karban et al., 2014; Karban, 2015).
Plant roots, for example, are sensitive to many environmental cues,
including gravity, water, minerals, chemicals and alien roots (Baluška
et al., 2006; Yokawa & Baluška, 2018). It is by combining information
from these multiple vectors that plants can maximize their fitness,
eliding responses that involve structural changes at the level of their
physiology, morphology, and phenotype.
For illustration, consider salt-avoidance behavior, as performed by
the root apparatus. Because salinity is a major constraint for plant
growth (a high concentration in the substrate below ground can disrupt
rather dramatically cellular biochemistry), roots have evolved sensitivity to abnormal saline conditions, being able to adapt their growth
accordingly. Li and Zhang (2008) tested this capability in Arabidopsis
thaliana, the model lab plant par excellence (see also Sun et al., 2007;
Yokawa, Derrien-Maze, Mancuso, & Baluška, 2014). Li and Zhang set up
a two-layer medium in a growth bottle, putting a normal nutrient agar
medium at the top, and a salt-stressed agar medium at the bottom. As
expected, the roots of seedlings started to grow straight downwards
exhibiting a positive gravitropic behavior. However, as soon as the level
of NaCl became slightly higher, the roots of seedlings curved and grew
upward toward the medium with lower levels of salt. Interestingly,
roots started to bend upward even before contacting the high-salt
medium (250 mM NaCl) of the bottom, which, according to Li and
Zhang, indicates “that roots can sense ion gradients in the growing
environment and … make decisions that enable roots to stay away from
high salt” (2008, p. 352).
In a series of experiments with Pisum sativum, the garden pea, Dener,
Kacelnik, and Shemesh (2016) have demonstrated that root growth can
also vary with respect to temporal variance in nutrient availability. For
their experiment, Dener and colleagues used split-root pea plants—that
is, plants whose primary root tips are cut off, so that lateral roots can
develop from the incision zone and grow in separate containers. One
pot received constant and the other one variable nutrient concentration. What they found is that when the nutrient concentration in the
first pot was sufficient for the plants to meet their metabolic needs, they
grew more roots in this pot. However, when the concentration of nutrients was not enough for the plant to survive, plants allocated more
biomass in the second pot—the one receiving the variable nutrient
concentration. For Dener and colleagues, it suggests that plants “respond strategically to patches varying in their average of nutrient
availability” (p. 1765), switching between risk-prone and risk-averse
behavior as a function of resource availability. Commenting on this
experiment, Schmid (2016) claims that it indicates that “theories of
decision making and optimal behavior developed for animals and humans can be applied to plants” (p. R677).
Moreover, resources are often sparse, and organisms have to compete for them. To do so, plants have evolved the ability to detect the
presence of others, developing different responses accordingly.
Cahill et al. (2010) measured patterns of root growth of Abutilon

In this Discussion, we aim to show that Adam's conclusions with
regard to this matter are unfounded. 1
To keep the record straight, we agree with Adams that inflexible,
hard-wired reactions to current environmental stimuli are not interesting from a cognitive science perspective. Yet recent empirical discoveries suggest that the behavioral repertoire of plants (and bacteria,
for that matter)2 contains much more than hard-wired reflexes. Plants
appear to behave in ways that are adaptive, flexible, anticipatory, and
goal-directed (Calvo, 2018). Taking this into account, we argue that
plant behavior is in many ways analogous to animal behavior, meaning
that plants are suitable candidates to be described as cognitive agents in
a non-metaphorical way.
Survival mandates that organisms must explore the environment
and secure life-sustaining resources. Although sessile, plants are no
exception. To accomplish this need, plants have evolved different
foraging strategies, and sensitivity to a variety of environmental cues,
that we can appreciate as part of their vast behavioral repertoire
(Silvertown & Gordon, 1989). Put somewhat differently, plant behavior
takes the idiosyncratic form of ‘phenotypic plasticity’, courtesy of cell
elongation, among other tricks in their bag (Calvo, 2018; Trewavas,
2014, 2017).
Overall, we aim to motivate the idea that plants may be considered
cognitive agents. To do so, our discussion is divided into five sections.
The first three deal respectively with the notions of adaptive behavior
and decision-making; anticipation; and learning and memory. In this
first part, we discuss specific claims made by Adams regarding the alleged lack of cognitive abilities in plants. We shall move on then to
introduce the interested reader to the ‘nervous’ system of plants in the
context of the emerging field of Plant Neurobiology (Calvo, 2016). We
end up by re-situating the quest for plant cognition into a broader approach in cognitive science, as represented by (post-cognitivist) embodied, enactive and ecological schools of thought.
2. On adaptive behavior and decision-making
Traditionally, plant behavior has been interpreted as purely reactive
and mechanical; that is, as an overt manifestation of hardwired instincts
triggered by environmental stimuli. Adams explicitly shares this view.
As he suggests, plants are no more sophisticated than a garage door
equipped with a presence detector. In the presence of a sufficiently
large object, the sensor triggers, causing the mechanism that closes the
door to stop automatically. This behavior, Adams argues, can be said to
be informationally-driven, caused by the detection of a relevant environmental condition, but is not cognitive:
Some plants detect drops in temperature and this causes the leaves
to fold, only to reopen when the temperature climbs. This is a kind
of sensor, and it is coupled with processes that close and open the
leaves (no less than closing the garage door). But the plant thinks
1

To build his argument, Adams relies on Ben-Jacob (2009), Calvo Garzón and
Keijzer (2009), Calvo Garzón (2007), Lyon and Keijzer (2007), Trewavas
(2003). In what follows we shall take issue with Adams' charges from an empirically informed philosophy of cognitive science perspective.
2
For the sake of concision, our reply focuses exclusively upon plants, although the line of response to be rehearsed herewith applies, mutatis mutandis,
to the case of bacterial cognition (see, for example, Baluška & Levin, 2016;
Hung, 2017; Tagkopoulos, Liu, & Tavazoie, 2008; and; Westerhoff et al., 2014).
For a review of the early history of intelligent behavior in bacteria, see Jennings
(1906).
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theoprasti, an annual plant from the Malvaceae family, while manipulating both competition and resource distribution. Exemplars of A.
theoprasti were planted into six combinations of soil, depending on
heterogeneity (uniform, patch-center, and patch-edge) and competition
conditions (alone and with a competitor). In all treatments, individuals
were planted on opposite sides of the pot. Cahill and colleagues reported different foraging behavior depending on the conditions. When
plants grew alone, they displayed both maximum root distribution and
maximum rooting breadth. This was so independently of how resources
were distributed. When a competitor was present, by contrast, plants
adopted restricted foraging strategies (different root distribution and
breadth), depending on the allocation and distribution of resources. For
Cahill and colleagues, these results suggest that root placement in A.
theoprasti is determined by the non-additive combination of information
regarding the neighbor presence and resource distribution.
Likewise, Trewavas (2014) reports that when young exemplars of
Calamagrostis canadiensis, a species of wetland grass commonly known
as ‘bluejoint’, are offered adjacent habitats to grow, they choose the
habitat with the best conditions of competition, warmth, and light.
Moreover, he mentions, C. canadiensis “also discriminate these conditions in combination … choosing light plus warm soil in preference to
others” (p. 84).
Light foraging and competition also offer a good case study.
Gruntman, Groß, Májeková, and Tielbörger (2017) conducted a series
of experiments with Potentilla reptans, a clonal plant in the Rosaceae
family. In clonal plants, light competition is well-known for eliciting
three types of phenotypic responses: shade avoidance, shade tolerance,
and competition-avoidance. Shade avoidance responses typically involve morphological adjustments that result in vertical growth, thereby
allowing the plant to position its leaves in conditions of higher light
exposure. Shade tolerance responses, instead, involve morphological
changes that promote plant performance under limited light conditions.
These morphological changes typically involve an increase in leaf area.
Finally, competition-avoidance responses typically involve horizontal
spread.
Gruntman et al. (2017) built an experimental setup that simulated
three different light competition settings. The first one simulated similarly sized and dense neighbors, which can be outgrown vertically
but offers limited advantages of horizontal growth. The second one
simulated tall, dense neighbors, offering limited advantages of either
vertical or horizontal growth. The third one simulated taller but sparse
neighbors, which cannot be outgrown vertically but offers higher light
availability in the horizontal direction.
They found that P. reptans can tailor its phenotype according to the
relative stature and densities of their opponents. When subjected to the
first setting, plants displayed the highest vertical inclination—viz., the
highest height-per-diameter ratio. When subjected to the second setting, by contrast, plants exhibited a lower vertical inclination, but the
highest leaf area. Finally, exemplars under tall and sparse neighbors
displayed low levels of vertical inclination and leaf area, but longer
stolons.
Taking stock, as the previous examples illustrate (but see Trewavas,
2014, 2017, and references therein, for many other examples), we can
see that plants' interactions with the environment need not be automatic responses to single cues. Plants sample different informational
vectors, and respond flexibly by adapting both their morphology and
their phenotype to increase energy intake and efficiency. Crucially, to
repeat, plants can respond not just to the particular magnitude (and
direction) of a given environmental variable, but also to its temporal
and relational profile with respect to other variables (Silvertown &
Gordon, 1989). Bluntly put, this is anything but unsophisticated ‘garage
door’ behavior.
A note of caution is needed, though. The possibility that plants
combine information in a pairwise fashion (e.g., gravity vector vs. light;
minerals vs. salt concentration; etc.) cannot be discarded beforehand.
The fact that plant behaviors are not automatic responses to single cues

(e.g., salt concentration together with gravitation accounts for partly
geotropic responses) is compatible with the alternative hypothesis that
plants are able to separate the cues linearly and, in this case, simply
allow salt, if present in high concentrations, to override the gravitational cue. If that were the case, the analogy between plant and animal
behavior would appear unjustified. But, by the same token, it cannot be
discarded that the stream of sensorial information is being integrated
and assessed in a richer, contextual manner. Complex configurations of
stimuli may need to be discriminated, if the flexible capacities of plants
are to be accounted for.
In sum, more research is needed to distinguish those cases of plant
behavior where we may resort to relatively simple rules from those that
defy a linear separation of the problem space. Our point is simply that,
considering what we know empirically, it is not clear that we can dismiss the hypothesis that plants behave in cognitive manners, as Adams
does.
3. On anticipatory behavior
Anticipation is another relevant feature of cognition, according to
Adams (2018), and we cannot but concur. As he writes, “[i]f a system
has the capacity to anticipate what is going to happen in its environment, that sounds like the right kind of capacity to be a cognitive capacity” (p. 26). He doubts, however, that plants are capable of doing so,
and we cannot but disagree. Considering (metabolically speaking) how
costly mismatches can be for organisms whose decisions take the form
of development and growth over long periods of time, and whose
changes can be flexible but sometimes also irreversible, plants cannot
afford not to be able to anticipate the future.
Although one of us (PC) has recently discussed plant anticipatory
behavior at length elsewhere (Calvo & Friston, 2017), in his treatment,
Adams borrows a previous example from [Calvo] Calvo Garzón (2007),
and so we shall get started with Adams' preferred example before we
submit to the reader's consideration some of the more recent literature.
Echoing Schwartz and Koller (1986), Calvo Garzón and Keijzer
(2009) reported that leaf laminas of Lavatera cretica, a species of
flowering plant in the Mallow family, reorient during the night in order
to face the direction of sunrise ahead of time.3 Heliotropic nocturnal
reorientation constitutes a complex off-line response, and shows that L.
cretica “can, not only anticipate the direction of the sunrise, but also
allows for this anticipatory behavior to be retained for a number of days
in the absence of solar-tracking” (Calvo Garzón and Keijzer (2009), p.
210).
For Adams (2018), however, it is misguided to interpret heliotropic
nocturnal reorientation as a complex off-line (cognitive) response. In
his own words: “I fail to see why [this behavior] would constitute the
right sort of “anticipation” … to be within the domain of the cognitive”
(p. 26, emphasis added).
But, why isn't the offline nocturnal reorienting behavior of L. cretica
leaves an instance of cognitive anticipation? Adams offers no clear
answer to this question. Instead, he shifts the focus from the behavior
itself to its underlying causes. As he asserts, whether leaf orientation is
cognitive “will depend on what kind of mechanism is involved in the socalled “anticipation”, and how it is processing information” (p. 26). As
he argues, there is a form of anticipation that is full-blown cognitive,
and this is so because it involves future-oriented representations (p. 26).
Since L. cretica don't have, presumably, these kinds of representations, it
follows that its anticipatory behavior is not cognitive.
3
This allows L. cretica to optimize sunlight intake whilst avoiding devoting
metabolic resources that are needed for other physiological processes that take
place before dawn (Kreps & Kay, 1997). Although Adams only cites [Calvo]
Calvo Garzón (2007) in this regard, the interested reader may care to consult a
somewhat more recent elaboration of the L. cretica example in García Rodríguez
and Calvo Garzón (2010).
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Yet we must be cautious here. On the one hand, we have the
question of whether plants can anticipate what is about to happen in
the environment. The issue here is whether the empirical evidence we
have supports this view. On the other hand, we have the question for
the mechanisms that underlie such anticipations. This is an entirely
different issue, as it pertains to what best explains the anticipatory
capabilities of plants, if any.
In his analysis, Adams conflates both issues, and infers that plants’ anticipatory behavior is not cognitive because it does not involve cognitive
representations.4 By doing so, however, Adams is conflating explanandum
and explanans, begging the question against non-representational theories of
cognition; theories that have been proposed in the past together with representational ones (Calvo, 2016; Calvo, Baluška, & Sims, 2016).
To avoid this fallacy, we recommend addressing both issues separately.
In what follows, we explore the first issue. Our goal here is to motivate the
view that plants do indeed behave in an anticipatory manner.5
Anticipatory capabilities have been tested more recently at the root level
with pea plants. As reported by Novoplansky (2016), young pea plants grow
different roots if subjected to variable, temporally dynamic, and static
homogeneous and heterogeneous nutrient regimes. When given a choice,
plants not only develop bigger biomasses in roots located in richer patches;
in fact, they discriminately allocate more resources to roots that develop in
patches with increasing nutrient levels. More strikingly, they do so even if
these patches are poorer in absolute terms than the others. According to
Novoplansky, “[t]hese findings demonstrate that rather than responding to
absolute resource availabilities, plants are able to perceive and integrate
information regarding dynamic changes in resource levels and utilize it to
anticipate growth conditions in ways that maximize their long-term performance” (p. 63). Pea plant roots, so the evidence suggests, do not grow in
a blind, hardwired way. Instead, their growth is sensitive to relative values
of resource availability, and is conditioned by the future availability of nutrients.
This and other examples have led some theorists to conceive of plants as
proactive, ‘anticipatory engines’ (Calvo et al., 2016; Calvo & Friston, 2017).
According to this view, plants are constantly monitoring gradients and
guessing ahead of time what the world is like. These predictions enable them
to minimize surprise in pretty much the same way as animals do, and to
adapt to the local conditions via phenotypic plasticity.
It goes without saying that the interpretation of plants as anticipatory
engines is still a long shot from equating their behaviors with, for instance,
the planning of the western scrub-jay corvid (Aphelocoma californica). With
an eye to provisioning itself for future needs, this corvid can even store
away types of foods in hiding places where they can be retrieved at will as it
becomes hungry the following day (Raby, Alexis, Dickinson, & Clayton,
2007). Again, more research is needed before we can conclude that, for
example, the dynamic foraging behavior of pea plants—whose roots would
anticipate growth conditions and develop bigger root biomasses in patches
with an increasing amount of nutrients (Novoplansky, 2016)—can be interpreted along similar lines, as opposed to being explained by appealing to
chemotactic signal integration, as has been done in bacteria (Khan, Spudich,
McCray, & Trentham, 1995).
We advocate that those interested in the debate over plant cognition
take into serious consideration the need to inform theoretical discussion
with tools, such as time-lapse photography, that have the potential to
unearth patterns of behavior. Generally speaking, plants' responses are

markedly slower than those of animals. From this, we run the risk of
concluding that plants cannot stand up to animal comparison (e.g.,
“reflexes, escape, arousal, attack, and recognition”—Silvertown &
Gordon, 1989, p. 362), only to find out that the methodologies and
tools of observation were inappropriate for the model organism in
question, provided the very idiosyncratic nature of their responses.
4. On learning and memory
Relying on Firn (2004) and [Calvo] Calvo Garzón (2007), Adams
advocates for a skeptical position toward the possibility of learning in
plants. As he argues, “the term ‘learn’ cannot mean the same thing in
the mouth of a plant scientist as it means when used by the animallearning theorist” (p. 21). For him, what plant scientists call ‘learning’ is
more accurately described in terms of mutations—viz., changes in the
genotype of the plant. This sort of learning, he adds, is not of the same
kind as the one we find in human and non-human animals, “who learn
in their lifetime and not at the level of the genome” (p. 22).6
Recent empirical evidence, however, contradicts this view, suggesting that plants enhance their chance of survival by modifying their
behavioral repertoire through learning and memory processes.
The sensitive plant Mimosa pudica—a species that is well-known for its
capacity to fold its leaves when disturbed—is the best-studied model for
habituation, a form of non-associative learning. Experimental results date
back to Pfeffer (1873) and Bose (1906). The former showed how the leaflets
would diminish their folding response to a frequently repeated mechanical
stimulus. Bose, in turn, extended Pfeffer's insights to electrical stimuli,
showing that the leaflet folding response could be likewise triggered electrically, and not just mechanically (for a review of the history of learning in
plants, see Abramson & Chicas-Mosier, 2016).
More recently, Gagliano, Renton, Depczynski, and Mancuso (2014) have
studied habituation in Mimosa in the context of light foraging and risk
predation. Applying the theory and methodology of animal learning research, Gagliano and colleagues subjected exemplars of Mimosa to repeated
15 cm falls. Although harmless, these stimuli were enough to cause leaves to
fold. The goal of the experiment was to test whether Mimosa plants can
detect that a repeated stimulus is harmless, ignoring it in subsequent interactions. Like Pfeffer had done a century earlier, Gagliano and colleagues
demonstrated that leaf-folding behavior exhibits habituation, and this habituation is responsive to environmental conditions. Their research appears
to confirm that Mimosa can learn from past interactions; indicating, in addition, that the studied exemplars developed more efficient responses—responses for the sake of minimizing energy waste and optimizing
light foraging. Leaf-folding habituation, the study shows, is more pronounced and persistent for exemplars growing in energetically costly environments.7 Finally, and more shockingly, they found out that this habituated reflex lasted for up to 28 days, which demonstrates the acquisition
6

Other philosophers have shown similar skepticism on this matter. Tye
(1997), for example, asserts that “[t]he behavior of plants is inflexible. It is
genetically determined and, therefore, not modifiable by learning. Plants do not
learn from experience” (p. 302). In a similar vein, Sterelny (2005) argues that
changes in the behavior of plants are best explained as the results of mutation at
the level of lineage. If that is the case, there is nothing such as learning at the
level of the individual—that is, learning as consequence of past interactions
with the environment.
7
For the experiments, exemplars of Mimosa were randomly assigned to one of
the two environments, one with high light (HL) and the other with low-light
(LL) conditions. After seeing that a single drop did not elicit any behavior at
change, experimenters subjected both groups of plants to a series of seven
consecutive trains of 60 drops, each at either 5 or 10 second intervals. They
discovered that leaves started to re-open even before the first train of drops was
delivered entirely, and that leaves had stopped closing by the end of the first
train. They also discovered that the leaf-folding reflex habituated more rapidly
under LL, suggesting that leaf-folding reflex habituation is sensitive to the environmental conditions.

4

Adams is particularly clear on this matter. As he argues, commenting on
Lyon (2006), “if she has in mind the kind of mechanism in plants and other
organisms that drive their behavior but in ways that don't involve cognitive
level representations, then I wonder why the term “cognition” is being used
literally, not metaphorically” (p. 26).
5
Reasons of space prevent us from exploring the second issue—'Is the anticipatory behavior of plants best explained by positing cognitive representations?‘—, but see García Rodríguez and Calvo Garzón (2010) for an elaboration
of the idea that architectural constraints per se do not entail that cognition is a
matter of representations.
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and expression of a long-lasting memory in Mimosa.
And yet, however intriguing the behavior of Mimosa happens to
be—the possibility to study its behavior to the naked eye, as in the case
of the Venus flytrap and other carnivorous species, has certainly contributed to its dissemination— plant learning is not limited to simple
habituation. More sophisticated forms of learning, including Pavlovian
classical conditioning, have been reported in Mimosa exemplars
(Holmes & Gruenberg, 1965), as well as in other less flashy species.
Although in the case of the Mimosa studies researchers were unable
to confirm the presence of classical conditioning (Holmes & Yost,
1966), recent research on the garden pea (Pisum sativum) has tested,
successfully, the ability to learn by associating significant cues.
Gagliano, Vyazovskiy, Borbély, Grimonprez, and Depczynski (2016)
employed a classical conditioning paradigm where the airflow produced by
a fan (the conditioned stimulus) was predicted by the occurrence of blue
light (the unconditioned stimulus). Training took place inside a customdesigned Y-maze such that the pattern of growth of pea seedlings could be
studied as the exemplars approached the Y-bifurcation, and grew either
toward one arm or the other. Their results show not only that P. sativum can
anticipate the occurrence of a biologically significant event by relying on
related environmental cues, but also that they can adapt their phototropic
behavior by associating a neutral factor—the presence and position of the
fan—with the occurrence of light.
In particular, plants were randomly assigned to two different groups. In
one group, exposure to light (L) and fan airflow (F) was on the same arm of
the maze (L + F), whereas in the other group L and F were on opposite
arms (L v F). The experiment tested for both a positive association of F with
L, resulting in the plant seeking out F as a predictor of L, and a negative
association, resulting in the plant avoiding F. They found out that the majority of seedlings exhibited a conditioned response to the fan. In the F + L
group, 62% of the seedlings grew towards the fan, whereas in the F v L
group, 69% of the seedlings grew in the direction opposite to the fan.
This empirical data appears to contradict Adams’ (2018) views on plant
learning.8 As we have seen, plants can learn in their lifetime, and they can
modify their behavioral repertoire on the basis of past events and interactions. Both associative and non-associative forms of learning are ubiquitous in
the animal kingdom, and the fact that plants are capable of both reinforces
our thesis that plants ought to be considered as cognitive agents (see Baluška
et al., 2018, for the most recent review of plant learning and memory).
With that being said, one could argue that it is premature to assume that
Gagliano's experiments on associative learning in pea plants are to be interpreted alongside conditioning experiments in the animal literature. For
one thing, typically, classical Pavlovian conditioning is the one and only
behaviorist perspective that the plant science community takes into account. But other forms of behaviorism could well bring new light to the
discussion of plant learning. Some neobehaviorists make use of intervening
variables (see Abramson & Calvo, 2018 and references therein). In fact,
altering the meaning of stimulus and response can result in the merging of
cognitive and neobehaviorist approaches (Denny, 1986).
One way or another, closer attention to ecological conditions and
experimental replication (a commodity nowadays, Grice, Barrett,
Schlimgen, & Abramson, 2012) will certainly shed light upon the dispute. As Affifi (2018) observes:

take these conditioning experiments out to field settings. […] Where
and how conditioning breaks down (if it breaks down) would provide important insights into the nature of plant intelligence. (p. 30)
Next, we would like to call into question one more aspect of Adam's
analysis. As he warns us, “if one attributes cognition […] to plants, one
must be prepared to find the mechanisms to support such attributions.
But I would add that those mechanisms as well must share some similarities, if only in the ways in which they process information or the
levels of information processed” (p. 21). In what follows, we take issue
with the all too thorny issue of the ‘nervous’ system of plants.9
5. The ‘nervous’ system of plants
As we saw, plants can navigate multiple vectors, producing flexible
and context-dependent responses. This ability, Trewavas (2005) argues,
calls for the integration of information among the different plant
structures. Finding the signaling mechanisms that underlie such cognitive abilities is the target of the emerging field of Plant Neurobiology
(Baluška, Hlavacka, Mancuso, & Barlow, 2006; Calvo, 2016).
We are well aware that speaking of plant neurobiology can, and indeed
has generated a good deal of controversy in the past (Alpi et al., 2007;
Brenner, Stahlberg, Mancuso, Baluška, & Van Volkenburgh, 2007;
Trewavas, 2007). Although it is undoubtedly true that plants do not have
neurons (and synapses) that could give rise to a ‘brain’ or a ‘nervous’ system,
they respond electrically to many different environmental factors. Plants
possess cells capable of electrical signaling and transmission; that is, cells
that are functionally equivalent to animal neurons. Plant neurobiologists
refer to these cells as “phytoneurones,” and to the research area as “phytoneurology” (Calvo, Sahi, & Trewavas, 2017).
Moreover, it is important to note that although plant excitable cells lack
axons-like structures, they are capable of producing and supporting action
potentials (APs), akin to animal ones (Baluška & Mancuso, 2009) as well as
variation potentials (VPs)—this time, specific of plant cells—among other
sorts of electric, as well as hydraulic and chemical, signals that have been
unearthed only in recent years (Huber et al., 2016; Souza, Ferreira, Saraiva,
& Toledo, 2017).10 These electric potentials are propagated in the membranes of plant cells, being transmitted along vascular conduits distributed
throughout the whole plant body, courtesy of a complex network of bundles
of phloem, xylem and cambium (Fromm & Lautner, 2007; Trebacz,
Dziubinska, & Krol, 2006). Overall, this electrical transmission is crucial for
plants, as it underlies their ability to respond in a fast and yet coordinated
manner to environmental contingencies (Baluška, Mancuso, Volkmann, &
Barlow, 2010; Trewavas, 2014).
An important debate, in relation to one of Adams' lines of resistance,
pertains to the form that a plant's phyto-nervous system can take.
Remarkably, plant anatomy and electrophysiology reveal that phytoneurones are highly cross-linked, forming complex stacks of interconnected bundles akin to the cellular networks we find in the nervous
sytems of invertebrates (Volkov, 2012, 2013).
Consider the Papaya tree, to take an illustration from Indian physicist,
9

Thorny to the extent that even Gagliano, a firm advocate of plant cognition,
comments: “To insist on using [neuro-talk] for plants is like to insist that plants
must fit in the animal-like model. So, it seems a little contradictory to then say
that plants do their thing their way [ …] plants and animals are indeed very
different in structures but functionally may not be so different. Applying such a
word to plants is to rob them of their own unique way of doing their thing”
(personal communication).
10
APs and VPs relate to non-damaging and to damaging stimuli, respectively.
In the case of APs, and despite the lack of axonal projections in plant cells,
information is transmitted electrically in a wavelike manner (Choi, Hilleary,
Swanson, Kim, & Gilroy, 2016). The initiating signals known to induce the
spread of waves of depolarization include physical damage, leaf and fruit removal, rapid and stressful variations in temperature, changes in light, or mechanical stress from bending, to name but a few. In the case of VPs, these can be
induced by herbivore predation, heat or wounding, for instance.

If Gagliano et al. (2016) experiment is replicated and associative
learning by pea plants triangulated in laboratory settings, we should

8
The careful reader will have noted that “the majority of seedlings exhibited
a conditioned response” could be interpreted as a bit of an overstatement. After
all, the number of seedlings that responded to F in the absence of L is only
slightly more than half. However, as Gagliano explains (personal communication), it should be noted that an expectation of 50:50 (random choice) is not the
baseline of reference, as the natural behavior of pea seedlings is to grow in the
direction in which L was experienced for the last time. When provided an
ecological baseline, the results are consistent with the associative learning hypothesis.
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Having a substrate that is functionally equivalent to a nervous
system of animals, and in line with the aforementioned considerations,
we submit to the readers’ consideration the working hypothesis that
plant cognition could possibly be realized, at least in part, in such a
phyto-nervous system. We say “at least in part” because, following recent post-cognitivist trends in cognitive science (Calvo and Gomila
2008; Robbins and Aydede 2009), we do not think that (animal) cognition is realized in the nervous system alone. Instead, we think that
cognition occurs across the brain-body-environment triplet. Applying
the same rationality, we hypothesize that plant cognition happens
across their own green triplet: phyto-neuronal structures, plant body,
and environment.
6. Resituating cognition
Why is the quest for plant cognition relevant? Throughout
his article, Adams (2018) repeats that there is no adequate, unified
notion of cognition that fits both the behavior of humans and the
one of plants (and bacteria). In his own words: “I fail to see that
there is such a common core or that the explanation of these ‘basic
behaviors' will yield a unified account of cognition that will cover
equally the behavior of bacteria [and plants] and humans” (p. 29). If so,
accepting that plants are cognitive implies using the word ‘cognition’ in
equivocal ways—we must mean one thing for humans, and other for
plants.
To bypass this problem, and in the absence of this unifying account,
Adams suggests to restrict the use of the term, distinguishing between
information-driven behavior and cognition, proper.
But, how does information-driven behavior differ from cognitive
behavior? The difference, Adams argues, relies on the kind of cognitive
mechanisms involved in both. For him, cognition only comes into play
when the system is able to exploit representations—that is, mental
states that are subjected to semantic evaluation, namely, that can be
true or false, accurate or inaccurate, veridical or non-veridical, and so
on. Such representational states, he argues, take the form of propositional attitudes—e.g., beliefs, desires, thoughts, hopes, etc.—, and require the mastery of concepts. In light of this, he concludes, “since
[plants and bacteria] lack beliefs or concepts—the higher-level, discriminating representations associated with genuine knowledge—what
they do isn't really cognition” (p. 23).
This position is nonetheless problematic. To begin with, there is no
reason to suppose that cognition depends on having conceptual-level,
semantically evaluable representations. To do so, we argued before, is
simply to beg the question against non-representational theories of
cognition.
Secondly, this approach to cognition seems overly demanding, for
even if we assume that human beings are capable of conceptual competence, we can rationally wonder whether this capability spans to nonhuman animals. Thus, by positing conceptual representations as the
hallmark of cognition as Adams does (p. 25), we run the risk of advancing important (and undue) limitations to our cognitive science,
leaving out of consideration all forms of sophisticated behavior that we
find in the animal and plant kingdoms, and restricting the domain of
the cognitive to human beings exclusively.
Adams appears effectively to fall prey to Morgan's canon; an appeal
to parsimony in comparative psychology that, although once upon a
time a commandment, is increasingly being called into question from
all quarters of the cognitive science community. In fact, we can say that
Adams is swimming against the stream of contemporary research in
comparative cognition in this respect (Allen, 2017; Andrews, 2015;
Buckner, 2017; Calvo, 2017; Figdor, 2018).
Contra Adams, we propose to go a step further and call into question, not only anthropocentrism, but also zoocentrism. To do so, we
suggest the adoption of an approach along the lines of enactivism (Di
Paolo, Buhrmann, & Barandiaran, 2017; Thompson, 2007; Hutto &
Myin, 2013, 2017) and ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979/2015;

Fig. 1. Distribution and network of vascular tissue in a single stem layer of Papaya.
According to the text in the script, there are 20 such layers of vascular tissue, one
inside the other (like Russian dolls) and surrounding the whole trunk. The bundles
are connected through enormous numbers of tangential connections and perhaps
anastomoses to form a complex excitable structure. “The existence of a system of
nerves enables the plant to act as a single organized whole” - a requirement perhaps
for selection on fitness (From Calvo, Sahi and Trewavas 2017b - Figure and quote
taken from Fig. 54, page 121,; Bose, 1926).

and father of the field of plant electrophysiology, J.C. Bose. From his (unfortunately) largely ignored The Nervous Mechanism of Plants, a book that
dates back to 1926, we learn that the vascular system (Fig. 1) of the Papaya
tree consists of vascular elements cross-linked by numerous, irregularly
distributed, tangential connections. In mature stems and trunks, this vascular architecture becomes very complex, showing tangential connections
and anastomoses (cross-links) between numerous bundles, forming a complex, reticulated system. This vascular system, originally thought to mediate
exclusively the transport of water and nutrients, allows plants to coordinate
their behavior, with electric signaling occurring over long distances through
the vascular bundles (see Calvo et al., 2017).
Gagliano et al. (2016) speculate as to the physiological and molecular
mechanisms that underlie associative learning, as exemplified by pea plants;
epigenetic reprogramming, being one key factor (Thellier & Lüttge, 2013).
Understood, as in the Papaya case, as a neural-like network for the sake of
information-processing, we can easily see how to move on from plant physiology to plant ‘psychology’. For illustration, consider the case of learning.
It is well known that synaptic modifiability underlies animal learning
(Hebb, 1949). Interestingly, despite the lack of neurons, it is easy to see how
the same functional principles apply to the information-processing network
of Papaya, again under epigenetic principles of the sort deployed by nonneural systems, more generally (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2009). To cut a long
story short, plant learning can take place courtesy of a phyto-neural network in which ‘plant synapses’ can be modified as a result of experience.11
Information can thus flow selectively throughout the vascular system of
plants (for a clear-cut parallelism between plants and neural networks in
learning, see Trewavas, 1999). As Trewavas (2014) puts it:
Just as the process of learning in a brain could be represented as a time
series, a set of snapshots of developing brain connections, in plants, each
snapshot may possibly be represented by developing plasmodesmatal
connections or equally, successive new tissues. So, instead of changing
dendrite connections, plants form new networks by creating new tissues,
a series of developing brains as it were (p. 14).
11

Baluška et al. (2004) consider “acting-based asymmetric adhesion domains
specialized for rapid cell-to-cell communication which is accomplished by vesicle trafficking” (p. 9) to be the functional equivalent of the animal synapse.
For a survey of many other functional similarities between plant cells and animal neurons, see Baluška (2010).
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Chemero, 2009). Going this direction, we put the emphasis on
agency and adaptivity instead of conceptual competence, and we conceive of cognition primarily as intelligent behavior—that is, as the
capability of organisms to actively interact with the environment in
adaptive, flexible and sophisticated ways so as to maintain their systemic autonomy.
From this perspective, a cognitive system is an autonomous, open
system that explores the environment to meet its own needs and goals,
instead of simply reacting to the external impingements, and that is
capable of actively regulating its sensorimotor coupling in contextsensitive ways. Complex intelligent behavior, according to this view,
needs not complex forms of cognition such as the ones posited by
Adams (2018).
Importantly, the ecological-enactive approach invites us to think of
complex cognitive capacities such as the ones that involve representations as being deeply rooted in the more basic processes that enable
biological organisms to survive and maintain their integrity in a dynamical environment. It thus offers valuable resources to construct a
theory of cognition that reaches all the way from single cell organisms
to human beings, including plants.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, some enactivists have expressed
doubts about the cognitive status of plants. According to Froese and Di
Paolo (2011), for instance, “a plant does not have the same kind of
relationship with its environment as does an animal which has to move
and perceive in order to sustain itself” (p. 9). For them, because plants
need not actively regulate their interaction with the environment as
animals (and even bacteria!) do, it is not clear that they have evolved
cognitive resources.
In a similar vein, Barrett (2015) compares plants with Portia spiders
and asserts that:

Acknowledgments
We thank František Baluška, Monica Gagliano, Kristi Onzik, and two
anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments and suggestions.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.001.
References
Abramson, C. I., & Calvo, P. (2018). General issues in the cognitive analysis of plant
learning and intelligence. In F. Baluska, M. Gagliano, & G. Witzany (Eds.). Memory
and learning in plants (pp. 35–49). New York, NY: Springer.
Abramson, C. I., & Chicas-Mosier, A. M. (2016). Learning in plants: Lessons from Mimosa
pudica. Frontiers in Psychology, 7https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00417.
Adams, F. (2018). Cognition wars. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 68,
20–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.11.007.
Affifi, R. (2018). Deweyan psychology in plant intelligence research: Transforming stimulus and response. In F. Baluška, M. Gagliano, & G. Witzany (Eds.). Memory and
learning in plants (pp. 17–33). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-75596-0_2.
Allen, C. (2017). On (not) defining cognition. Synthese, 194, 4233–4249. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s11229-017-1454-4.
Alpi, A., Amrhein, N., Bertl, A., Blatt, M. R., Blumwald, E., Cervone, F., et al. (2007). Plant
neurobiology: No brain, no gain? Trends in Plant Science, 12(4), 135–136. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.tplants.2007.03.002.
Andrews, K. (2015). The animal mind: An introduction to the philosophy of animal cognition.
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Baluška, F. (2010). Recent surprising similarities between plant cells and neurons. Plant
Signaling & Behavior, 5, 1–3.
Baluška, F., Gagliano, M., & Witzany, G. (Eds.). (2018). Memory and learning in plants.
New York, NY: Springer.
Baluška, F., & Levin, M. (2016). On having no head: Cognition throughout biological
Systems. Frontiers in Psychology, 7https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00902.
Baluška, F., & Mancuso, S. (2009). Plants and animals: Convergent evolution in action? In
F. Baluška (Ed.). Plant-environment interactions (pp. 285–301). Berlin: Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89230-4_15.
Baluška, F., Mancuso, S., Volkmann, D., & Barlow, P. W. (2010). Root apex transition
zone: A signalling–response nexus in the root. Trends in Plant Science, 15(7), 402–408.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2010.04.007.
Baluška, F., Hlavacka, A., Mancuso, S., & Barlow, P. W. (2006). Neurobiological view of
plants and their body plan. In F. Baluška, S. Mancuso, & D. Volkmann (Eds.).
Communication in plants: Neuronal aspects of plant life (pp. 19–35). New York, NY:
Springer.
Barrett, L. (2015). Beyond the brain: How body and environment shape animal and human
minds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ben-Jacob, E. (2009). Learning from bacteria about natural information processing.
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1178, 78–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1749-6632.2009.05022.x.
Bose, J. C. (1906). Plant response. London: Longmans.
Bose, J. C. (1926). The nervous mechanism of plants. London: Longmans, Green.
Brenner, E. D., Stahlberg, R., Mancuso, S., Baluška, F., & Van Volkenburgh, E. (2007).
Plant neurobiology: The gain is more than the name. Trends in Plant Science, 12(7),
285–286. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2007.06.005.
Buckner, C. (2017). Understanding associative and cognitive explanations in comparative
psychology. In K. Andrews, & J. Beck (Eds.). The routledge handbook of philosophy of
animal mindsAbingdon: Routledgehttps://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742250.ch39.
Burbach, C., Markus, K., Zhang, Y., Schlicht, M., & Baluška, F. (2012). Photophobic behavior of maize roots. Plant Signaling & Behavior, 7(7), 874–878. https://doi.org/10.
4161/psb.21012.
Cahill, J. F., McNickle, G. G., Haag, J. J., Lamb, E. G., Nyanumba, S. M., & Clair, C. C. S.
(2010). Plants integrate information about nutrients and neighbors. Science,
328(5986), 1657–1657 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1189736.
Calvo, P. (2016). The philosophy of plant neurobiology: A manifesto. Synthese, 193(5),
1323–1343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1040-1.
Calvo, P. (2017). What is it like to be a plant? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24(9–10),
205–227.
Calvo, P. (2018). Plantae. In J. Vonk, & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.). Encyclopedia of animal
cognition and behavior. New York, NY: Springer.
Calvo Garzón, P. (2007). The quest for cognition in Plant Neurobiology. Plant Signaling &
Behavior, 2(4), 208–211.
Calvo Garzón, P., & Keijzer, F. (2009). Cognition in plants. In F. Baluška (Ed.). Plantenvironment interactions (pp. 247–266). Berlin: Springer.
Calvo, P., Baluška, F., & Sims, A. (2016). “Feature detection” vs. “predictive coding.”
Models of plant behavior. Frontiers in Psychology, 7https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.
2016.01505.
Calvo, P., & Friston, K. (2017). Predicting green: Really radical (plant) predictive processing. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 14(131), 20170096. https://doi.org/
10.1098/rsif.2017.0096.
Calvo, P., & Gomila, A. (Eds.). (2008). Handbook of cognitive science: An embodied approach. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Calvo, P., Sahi, V. P., & Trewavas, A. (2017). Are plants sentient? Plant. Cell &

[T]he behavior of Portia spiders is very flexible—one could almost
say inventive—and they don't just respond to the world in a singular, fixed manner. This is true of all animals, from amoebas to
armadillos. All show at least some variability in how they act and
regulate their behavior in the world. They do so because they are
animals, and not plants. (p. 71)
Thus, although committed to an ecological-enactive approach to
cognition, both Barrett (2015) and Froese and Di Paolo (2011) align
themselves with a long-standing tradition in philosophy, a tradition
that has consistently and continuously seen plants as being fundamentally different from animals in their relationship with the environment. Patricia Churchland (1989) nicely captures this view as
follows: “If you root yourself in the ground, you can afford to be stupid.
But if you move, you must have mechanisms for moving, and mechanisms to ensure that the movement is not utterly arbitrary and independent of what is going on outside” (p. 13). 12
Theoretical prejudices aside, in light of the scientific evidence
outlined earlier, we hope to have shown that such a plant-blind
view, whichever quarter it comes from, is unmotivated. From our
previous discussion we conclude that there are no empirical or theoretical reasons to discard beforehand that certain patterns of plant behavior call for some form of cognitive agency. Indeed, we think that
considering plants as cognitive agents would enable us to develop a
more comprehensive account of cognition, one that sheds light on
how cognitive abilities could have evolved, perhaps differently, across
phyla.

12
Perhaps, somewhat symptomatically, it is worth noting that even researchers such as Harry Heft, whose work has helped lay the theoretical
foundations of the ecological approach, observed in his Ecological Psychology in
Context (2001): “Categorical boundaries are rarely sharp. Where do plants fit
into this conceptual division [animate-inanimate]? Admittedly, they do not fit
into either category, but because they lack agency, for the purposes of an
ecological psychology they fit into the inanimate category” (p. xxiii, fn. 1).

70

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 73 (2019) 64–71

M. Segundo-Ortin, P. Calvo
Environment, 40(11), 2858–2869. https://doi.org/10.1111/pce.13065.
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Choi, W.-G., Hilleary, R., Swanson, S. J., Kim, S.-H., & Gilroy, S. (2016). Rapid, longdistance electrical and calcium signaling in plants. Annual Review of Plant Biology,
67(1), 287–307. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-arplant-043015-112130.
Churchland, P. S. (1989). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-brain.
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19. https://doi.
org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7.
Dener, E., Kacelnik, A., & Shemesh, H. (2016). Pea plants show risk sensitivity. Current
Biology, 26(13), 1763–1767. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2016.05.008.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Denny, M. R. (1986). Retention of s-r in the midst of the cognitive invasion. In D. F.
Kendrick, M. E. Rilling, & M. R. Denny (Eds.). Theories of animal memory. Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Di Paolo, E., Buhrmann, T., & Barandiaran, X. (2017). Sensorimotor life: An enactive proposal. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Figdor, C. (2018). Pieces of mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates. Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Firn, R. (2004). Plant intelligence: An alternative point of view. Annals of Botany, 93(4),
345–351. https://doi.org/10.1093/aob/mch058.
Froese, T., & Di Paolo, E. A. (2011). The enactive approach: Theoretical sketches from cell
to society. Pragmatics and Cognition, 19(1), 1–36. https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.19.1.
01fro.
Fromm, J., & Lautner, S. (2007). Electrical signals and their physiological significance in
plants. Plant, Cell and Environment, 30(3), 249–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.13653040.2006.01614.x.
Gagliano, M., Renton, M., Depczynski, M., & Mancuso, S. (2014). Experience teaches
plants to learn faster and forget slower in environments where it matters. Oecologia,
175(1), 63–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00442-013-2873-7.
Gagliano, M., Vyazovskiy, V. V., Borbély, A. A., Grimonprez, M., & Depczynski, M.
(2016). Learning by association in plants. Scientific Reports, 6(1)https://doi.org/10.
1038/srep38427.
García Rodríguez, A., & Calvo Garzón, P. (2010). Is cognition a matter of representations?
Emulation, teleology, and time-keeping in biological systems. Adaptive Behavior,
18(5), 400–415. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712310385479.
Gibson, J. J. (1979/2015). The ecological approach to visual perception. New York, NY:
Psychology Press.
Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2009). Epigenetic learning in non-neural organisms. Journal
of Biosciences, 34(4), 633–646.
Grice, J. W., Barrett, P. T., Schlimgen, L. A., & Abramson, C. I. (2012). Toward a brighter
future for psychology as an observation oriented science. Behavioral Sciences, 2(1),
1–22. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs2010001.
Gruntman, M., Groß, D., Májeková, M., & Tielbörger, K. (2017). Decision-making in
plants under competition. Nature Communications, 8(1), 2235. https://doi.org/10.
1038/s41467-017-02147-2.
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior: A neuropsychological theory. New York,
NY: Wiley.
Hodge, A. (2009). Root decisions. Plant, Cell and Environment, 32(6), 628–640. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-3040.2008.01891.x.
Holmes, E., & Gruenberg, G. (1965). Learning in plants. Worm Runner's Dig. 7, 9–12.
Holmes, E., & Yost, M. (1966). "Behavioral" studies in the sensitive plant. Worm Runner's
Dig. 8, 38–40.
Huber, A. E., & Bauerle, T. L. (2016). Long-distance plant signaling pathways in response
to multiple stressors: The gap in knowledge. Journal of Experimental Botany, 67(7),
2063–2079. https://doi.org/10.1093/jxb/erw099.
Hung, T.-W. (2017). Rationality and Escherichia coli. In T.-W. Hung, & T. J. Lane (Eds.).
Rationality constraints and contexts (pp. 227–240). San Diego: Academic Press. https://
doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804600-5.00012-X.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism : Basic minds without content.
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content. Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press.
Jennings, H. S. (1906). Behavior of the lower organisms. New York, NY: Columbia
University Press.
Karban, R. (2015). Plant sensing and communication. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
Karban, R., Wetzel, W. C., Shiojiri, K., Ishizaki, S., Ramirez, S. R., & Blande, J. D. (2014).
Deciphering the language of plant communication: Volatile chemotypes of sagebrush.
New Phytologist, 204(2), 380–385. https://doi.org/10.1111/nph.12887.
Khan, S., Spudich, J. L., McCray, J. A., & Trentham, D. R. (1995). Chemotactic signal
integration in bacteria. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 92(21),
9757–9761. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.92.21.9757.

Kreps, J., & Kay, S. (1997). Coordination of plant metabolism and development by the
circadian clock. The Plant Cell Online, 9(7), 1235–1244.
Li, X., & Zhang, W. (2008). Salt-avoidance tropism in Arabidopsis thaliana. Plant Signaling
& Behavior, 3(5), 351–353. https://doi.org/10.4161/psb.3.5.5371.
Lyon, P. (2006). The biogenic approach to cognition. Cognitive Processing, 7(1), 11–29.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-005-0016-8.
Lyon, P., & Keijzer, F. A. (2007). The human stain: Why cognitivism can't tell us what
cognition is & what it does. In B. Wallace, A. Ross, J. Davies, & T. Anderson (Eds.).
The mind, the body and the world. Psychology after cognitivism? (pp. 132–165). Exeter,
UK: Imprint Academic.
Novoplansky, A. (2016). Future perception in plants. In N. Mihai (Ed.). Anticipation across
disciplines (pp. 57–70). New York, NY: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-31922599-9_5.
Pfeffer, W. (1873). Physiologische untersuchungen. Leipzig: Springer.
Raby, C. R., Alexis, D. M., Dickinson, A., & Clayton, N. S. (2007). Planning for the future
by western scrub-jays. Nature, 445(7130), 919–921. https://doi.org/10.1038/
nature05575.
Robbins, P., & Aydede, M. (Eds.). (2009). The cambridge handbook of situated cognition.
Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.
Schmid, B. (2016). Decision-making: Are plants more rational than animals? Current
Biology, 26(14), R675–R678. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2016.05.073.
Schwartz, A., & Koller, D. (1986). Diurnal phototropism in solar tracking Leaves of
Lavatera cretica. Plant Physiology, 80(3), 778–781.
Silvertown, J., & Gordon, D. M. (1989). A framework for plant behavior. Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics, 20(1), 349–366. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.es.20.
110189.002025.
Souza, G. M., Ferreira, A. S., Saraiva, G. F. R., & Toledo, G. R. A. (2017). Plant “electrome”
can be pushed toward a self-organized critical state by external cues: Evidences from
a study with soybean seedlings subject to different environmental conditions. Plant
Signaling & Behavior, 12(3), e1290040. https://doi.org/10.1080/15592324.2017.
1290040.
Sterelny, K. (2005). Made by each other: Organisms and their environment. Biology and
Philosophy, 20(1), 21–36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-004-0759-0.
Sun, F., Zhang, W., Hu, H., Li, B., Wang, Y., Zhao, Y., et al. (2007). Salt modulates gravity
signaling pathway to regulate growth direction of primary roots in Arabidopsis. Plant
Physiology, 146(1), 178–188. https://doi.org/10.1104/pp.107.109413.
Tagkopoulos, I., Liu, Y.-C., & Tavazoie, S. (2008). Predictive behavior within microbial
genetic networks. Science, 320(5881), 1313–1317.
Thellier, M., & Lüttge, U. (2013). Plant memory: A tentative model. Plant Biology, 15(1),
1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1438-8677.2012.00674.x.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind.
Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Trebacz, K., Dziubinska, H., & Krol, E. (2006). Electrical signals in long-distance communication in plants. In F. Baluška, S. Mancuso, & D. Volkmann (Eds.).
Communication in plants: Neuronal aspects of plant life (pp. 277–290). New York, NY:
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-28516-8_19.
Trewavas, A. (1999). Le Calcium, c’est la vie: Calcium makes waves. Plant Physiology,
120(1), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1104/pp.120.1.1.
Trewavas, A. (2003). Aspects of plant intelligence. Annals of Botany, 92(1), 1–20. https://
doi.org/10.1093/aob/mcg101.
Trewavas, A. (2005). Green plants as intelligent organisms. Trends in Plant Science, 10(9),
413–419. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2005.07.005.
Trewavas, A. (2007). Plant neurobiology – all metaphors have value. Trends in Plant
Science, 12(6), 231–233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2007.04.006.
Trewavas, A. (2014). Plant behaviour and intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trewavas, A. (2017). The foundations of plant intelligence. Interface Focus, 7(3),
20160098. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2016.0098.
Tye, M. (1997). The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it is like to be a honey
bee? Philosophical Studies, 88, 189–317.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied Mind : Cognitive science and
human experience. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Volkov, A. (Ed.). (2012). Plant electrophysiology: Signaling and responses. New York, NY:
Springer.
Volkov, A. (Ed.). (2013). Plant electrophysiology. New York, NY: Springer.
Westerhoff, H. V., Brooks, A. N., Simeonidis, E., García-Contreras, R., He, F., Boogerd, F.
C., ... Kolodkin, A. (2014). Macromolecular networks and intelligence in microorganisms. Frontiers in Microbiology, 5https://doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2014.00379.
Yokawa, K., & Baluška, F. (2018). Sense of space: Tactile sense for exploratory behavior of
roots. Communicative & Integrative Biology, 11(2), 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1080/
19420889.2018.1440881.
Yokawa, K., Derrien-Maze, N., Mancuso, S., & Baluška, F. (2014). Binary decisions in
maize root behavior: Y-maze system as tool for unconventional computation in
plants. International Journal of Unconventional Computing, 10(5/6), 381–390.

71

Article below removed for copyright reasons, please refer to the citation (or see chapter 5):

Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Manuel Heras-Escribano & Vicente Raja (2019)
Ecological psychology is radical enough: A reply to radical enactivists, Philosophical Psychology,
32:7, 1001-1023, DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2019.1668238

